The Quang 1,205 Document surfaced in the
archives of the former Soviet Union just after Clinton's first term in office
began. Dr. Stephen Morris, a Harvard Researcher, while researching the FSU's
archives came across the document, realized it spoke of American Prisoners of
War in Vietnamese custody and got it out.
The Clinton Administrations
first inclination was to classify the document top secret.
The Quang 1205 Document
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
USSR
MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE [GRU]
Top Secret
Copy NO. 6
REPORT
OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
VNA [VIETNAMESE PEOPLES ARMY] GENERAL-LIEUTENANT TRAN VAN QUANG
AT THE POLITBURO MEETING OF THE TSK PTV
15
SEPTEMBER 1972
(translation from Vietnamese into
Russian)
Moscow 1972
For Official Use Only
2
Dear comrades!
I reported to you earlier about the situation which has developed and about
the fundamental characteristics of the past stage of our people's conflict
against the American imperialists. I will cover the main tasks of the people and
the army of North and South Vietnam which were proposed by the 23rd plenum of
the TsK PTV.
These tasks once again confirm our resolve to attain
victory. This is a very correct course for our party and people at the present
stage of conflict. We have already worked out measures for achieving the
resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the TsK. We will also cover a number of the
Supreme Command's and the Government Defense Council's positions, in which an
evaluation of our victories gained over the period from 30 Mar 72 to the
present is given.
The military situation for us is developing favorably
on all fronts. A number of profound changes which took place in the military
situation demanded that we develop a necessary frame of reference for solving
all issues which arise during the war. Several meetings between us and the US
aimed at developing measures on resolving the Vietnam issue have already taken
place.
We have decisively rejected a number of proposals put forth by
the American side. With assistance from a number of countries. there were to be
secret meetings in Paris and in other places aimed at drawing up a solution to
the Vietnam issue. Such meetings took place. They once again testified to the
deranged nature of the proposals put forward by the American side. As before, we
have maintained our position, the essence of which includes the following: if
the US truly wants to resolve the Vietnam issue, then above all else it must
refuse to support the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and on]y afterwards will we
engage in a discussion about a cease fire. This demand is the main tenet in our
conflict against the American imperialists.
If Nixon continues adhering
to his policy of "Vietnamization" of the war and desires to leave the present
Saigon Government of Thieu in power, then the peace negotiations between us and
the US will not yield any results.
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3
During our general offensive on the fronts of South Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia, the progress which we have attained in implementing our strategic
and tactical line [direction, orientation] was clearly evident.
Earlier,
I analyzed the activity of our command, elucidated the great victories we have
attained and also explained the shortcomings and mistakes that we made during
the general offensive. The lessons we learned from analyzing the mistakes we
made were also discussed. I stated all of this to the Politburo in order to
work out a direction for solving the fundamental principal problems.
Today I will report a number of positions regarding expanding the scope of our
future offensive.
We organized meetings with South Vietnamese
representatives aimed at preparing a solution of the military and political
issues in South Vietnam according to the Politburo's and State Defense Council's
plan. These meetings have great significance for us, and we are linking several
of our plans with them [South Vietnamese representatives]- A number of our
comrades have met with representatives of the South Vietnamese authorities, and
it can be said that we have succeeded in winning their sympathy at these
meetings. We were able to exchange ideas not only orally, but also in written
form during these meetings and contacts. This gave us the opportunity to draw
definite conclusions- Recently, we have conducted 8 similar meetings with
representatives of the Saigon authorities and South Vietnamese political
figures.
First, we will cover meetings with General Ngo Dinh Dzu. Earlier
Ngo Dinh Dzu was listed as a candidate for president of South Vietnam and fought
with Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky for this post. Ngo Dinh Dzu is a
prominent South Vietnamese capitalist and well-known political figure. He
occupied the post of chairman of the upper chamber of the Saigon Parliament and
during the Ngo Dinh Diem government, he was a senator in the upper chamber. Ngo
Dinh Dzu, in his own opinion, is a nationalist- He speaks
(1) Commander of the 2nd Regional Corps of South Vietnam,
General-Lieutenant (GRU's note).
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against American troops on South Vietnamese territory, and also against
several policy positions conducted by the Saigon authorities. At the same
time. he is characterized as a reactionary an enemy of communism. Afterwards,
as Ky and Thieu attained victory in the presidential elections, the latter
undertook all measures to take revenge on General Dzu. Dzu used the
pre-election campaign to criticize the Saigon regime and to undermine its
security. He spoke against American troops on South Vietnamese territory, for
which he was subjected to bitter attacks from Nguyen Van Thieu. General Dzu
was forced to leave the political arena after 9 months under pressure from
Thieu. Afterwards, General Dzu became an even greater enemy of Nguyen Van Thieu
and his government. This is why we tried to win this person over to our
side.
Despite General Dzu remaining an enemy of communism, his relations
with Nguyen Van Thieu and the present Saigon factions, as well as our meetings
with him have allowed him to see the nature of the Americans and the true
colors of the Saigon Government.
We sent one of our comrades from the
Supreme Command to Saigon for meetings with General Dzu. At the meeting, which
lasted 3 hours, General Dzu agreed to enter into a future coalition government
and spoke out against the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war carried out by
Nixon and also against the Nguyen Van Thieu clique. During this meeting he also
stated that he will fight against Nguyen Van Thieu's clique and Nixon's present
designs.
Now, we see clearly how significant changes have taken place in
General Dzu's life and way of thinking. He is no longer the same ardent
anticommunist. Now prevailing in his views are those features such as the
conflict against Nixon's policy of Vietnamization" of the war and against
Nguyen Van Thieu's clique which he considers as fascist and as expressing the
interests of the financial oligarchy which is against freedom and independence.
And finally, General Dzu is for the expansion of democracy and freedom over the
entire territory
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5
[handwritten
"188"]
of South Vietnam. Such are General Dzu's basic national
qualities which correspond to our present course. This is why we are
attempting to win General Dzu over to our side and why we entered into contact
with him. After the first meeting, there were three other recent meetings during
which he expressed his opinions. During these meetings, we understood what kind
of major changes took place in his way of thinking and in the position he has
taken and in his approach to solving the problem.
Thus, we can
ascertain that these meetings and contacts with General Dzu had very good
results. Recently, General Dzu requested to meet with one of the prominent
leaders of the NFO [National Liberation Front] of South Vietnam. We are now
busy preparing for the upcoming meeting between General Dzu and Hyuyn Tan Phat.
This meeting will be conducted in secret to insure the fulfillment of our main
principles as we understand that this new person is contradictory - he is among
those in the Saigon Government whose number is daily growing.
The
second person is Nguyen Khanh. He earlier occupied the post of prime minister
for three years after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem. Nguyen Khanh is a
representative of the army. Earlier he served in the French Amy; now he is a
prominent South Vietnamese capitalist whose capital is invested in various
foreign enterprises, especially in France. Nguyen Khanh is a representative of
the new trend. This is why we have entered into contact with him. These
contacts took place in Paris, where we have conducted 5 meetings.
Nguyen Khanh maintains constant contact with military circles in the Nguyen Van
Thieu government. After being removed from his post, he left the country, but
periodically returns to Saigon where he engages in political activities in the
capacity of an emigree representative.
In summarizing the five meetings,
we noticed in Nguyen Khanh the following: first, as regards the ruling faction
he believes that Nguyen Van Thieu is a dictator and fascist who is not capable
of being the head of the government. Khanh considers the present government
to be rotten to the core; second, he is against the bombing of North
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6
Vietnam; third, while criticizing the Nguyen Van Thieu faction, he
speaks against the participation of Saigon troops in combat actions on Cambodian
territory. He believes that the Saigon Army is in danger of disintegration and
that it has poor morale and combat spirit. Nguyen Khanh speaks for the
establishment of a new government which would have authority with the people
and which would carry out a nationalist policy, while receiving foreign aid.
These are the views of Nguyen Khanh. He says nothing about his feelings toward
the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. This is explained primarily by his
connections with military circles. Therefore, we are not striving to directly
attract him to our side. Presently, Nguyen Khanh is maintaining connections
with the current Saigon generals.
The third person is Duong Van Mirth,
who also represents the military circles. Previously, he occupied the post of
prime minister after Nguyen Khanh, and was then sent out of the country as an
ambassador. The political views of Duong Van Min' differ from the political
views of Nguyen Khanh. This is first expressed in Duong Van Min' speaking out
against Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" and for the independent solution of
internal problems by the Vietnamese without US interference. He believes that
the US should be responsible for prolonging the Vietnamese War and for its
consequences. He subjects the Vietnamese policy of Nixon to sharp criticism,
as well as the policy carried out by the current Saigon Government. These are
very good political views. He speaks against Thieu's clique, considering it to
be pro-fascist, anti-democratic and not capable of carrying out the leadership
of the country. These are the primary political views of Duong Van Min'.
As a result of these contacts with Duong Van Minh, we have attained an
important victory, which has forced him to reflect. He also met with Nguyen Thi
Binh several times in Paris. At these meetings, Duong Van Minh felt that, as
before, he was close to the Fatherland and that he is Vietnamese. This is why he
began to conduct this great work with us and with the intelligentsia and
military circles located outside of the country. He did this with the aim of
entering into a coalition government and in the hope of solving the Vietnamese
issue
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7
on the basis of conducting consultations and negotiations between the
various political factions of South Vietnam. This is Duong Van Min's
desire.
The fourth person is the former emperor Bao Dai. At one time the
possibility existed that the former emperor would have been behind us. But,
under pressure from reactionary factions after the August revolution, he was
forced to emigrate to France. As before, Bao Dai holds great influence amongst
the political figures in the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and also in the
city of Hue, the ancient capital of Vietnam. This is why we moved to make
contact with Bao Dai. We are not hoping that Bao Dai becomes a part of the
coalition government, but to attract him to our side is to attract his
supporters in the regions where he has influence. As a result of the meetings
conducted, we clarified that Bao Dai will come out against the presence of
American troops on the territory of South Vietnam, and he also criticizes Nguyen
Van Thieu's existing regime. Bao Dai is also calling for all political factions
to create a free, neutral, peace-loving government that would resolve the tense
situation that has taken form in the country. This is why we entered into
contact with Bao Dai and are trying to win him over to our side. We hope that
he, in turn, will work with his people in a plan for securing peace and freedom
for our country.
The fifth person is General Nguyen Van Vi who previously
occupied the post of Minister of Defense of South Vietnam. Tkhieu removed him
from his post for disorder and chaos in the army's financial affairs. The real
reason, however, for Nguyen Van Vi's retirement was the series of serious
defeats that the puppet army has suffered. From Nguyen Van Tkhieu's
viewpoint, the military circles responded to this move with a specific
reaction. We also had contacts with General Nguyen Van Vi which allowed us to
understand his political position. He thinks that the US will certainly suffer
defeat in this war and that a war in Vietnam is not the responsibility of the
American Army. This is why Nguyen Van Vi is also coming out for the creation
of a coalition government in order to resolve the Vietnam issue through peaceful
negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam.
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Nguyen Van Vi is also coming out against Nixon's ,,Vietnamization" of
the war. Such are the basic political views of General Nguyen Van Vi. We
scored a great victory at the meeting with him; we received his agreement to
take part in a coalition government to resolve the Vietnam issue through
peaceful negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam.
Nguyen Van Vi also officially recognized the victories won by the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam, i.e. our victories.
As concerns our
contacts within the South Vietnamese governing apparatus, it is fitting to
mention here the letter from Nauyen Cao Ky addressed to us. In the letter, he
lays out his views on the course to a resolution of the Vietnam problem.
I have reported to you today on the contacts with all of these people so that
you would know how the Politburo's instructions to win over these people to our
side is being carried out.
The strong protest from their side is a result
of a growth of contradictions within Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique and of
contradictions of Nixon's ,,Vietnamization" of the war. We can use these
contradictions to improve the situation in South Vietnam and to resolve the
issue in our favor. Their agreement to enter into a coalition government will
precisely go in our favor. In addition to a resolution of the issue by military
means on the battlefields of South Vietnam, we have engaged in contacts with
several South Vietnamese political figures, who may be able to join the ranks
of a coalition government. As a result of these contacts we have gained an
understanding of the political views of these people and have expressed our
point of view on ways to resolve the Vietnam problem.
These contacts
with people who occupy high stations, prominent military and political figures,
ministers and senators of the upper and lower chambers of the Saigon parliament
provide the basis for making the following conclusions:
1. They are against the present regime of Nguyen Van Tkhieu,
considering that Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique is dictatorial, pro-fascist,
rotten and not
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9
[handwritten "192"]
capable of carrying out the leadership of the country under the
present situation that has developed in South Vietnam. They also think that
if the US withdraws its troops from South Vietnam and stops aiding the regime,
the government would instantly collapse.
2. The majority of them are
against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war, against the escalation of the
bombing of North Vietnam, and think that Nixon does not want to resolve the
Vietnam issue or the Indochina issue as a whole.
3. They consider that
the National Liberation Front has recently scored enormous victories on the
military, political and diplomatic fronts. They recognize that on the
military front we were able to win over extensive heavily populated regions.
They also recognize the National Liberation Front's great success with the
strengthening of the army, the increase in its combat ability and leadership
level, the improvement in cooperation between the branches of service and many
other areas.
We also tried to win over to our side the
category of people from the provinces and many towns who occupy less important
positions in the state apparatus. It is possible to say that they are also
ready to aid in the creation of a coalition government. They are also against
the policy of "Vietnamization", against Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique and want to
resolve the Vietnamese issue on the basis of a cessation of war.
Thus, on
the orders of the Politburo we have been preparing to conduct meetings with
various categories of the South Vietnamese population, aimed at resolving the
South Vietnamese issue through peaceful negotiations between all of the
political factions of South Vietnam. As a result of the contacts that have
taken place to win these people over to our side, conditions have presented
themselves so that these people will be able to aid us in the creation of a
coalition government and in the overthrow of Nguyen Van Tkhieu's dictatorial
regime. We see that we have chosen the correct course. This is also clearly
indicated in the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the Central Committee.
In other words, we should win these people over to our side, and bring them
into the coalition government so that we
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10
can use them to our favor in the diplomatic and political plan. In
order to create a base for the successful resolution of the issues that stand
before us. we specifically want to bring into the coalition government those
people who earlier worked in the South Vietnamese state apparatus and held or
are holding at the present a high post in the power structure.
If we are
successful in resolving these issues, we will be concluding a mammoth case on
which we will again report to the Politburo so that you are well informed on
these issues and have formed a plan of action for mission completion. Thanks to
these meetings, we are able to know who supports us and who is against us in
South Vietnam. We have also worked out a new plan for the realization of our
new intentions in South Vietnam and now know which representatives of the
present South Vietnamese power apparatus are in favor of the war.
The
meetings and contacts which we initiated were conducted with complete equality
of rights and helped us win over representatives of all strata of South
Vietnamese society to our side. This is our grandest victory, won in the course
of these contacts with the aim of resolving the Vietnamese issue.
Thus,
thanks to these contacts we understand which part of the population considers
the course we are taking to be just, i.e. we have exposed all of those who are
against Nixon's politics for the prolongation Of the war. against Nguyen Van
Thieu's clique and will join with us in the creation of a coalition
government.
In addition to the military issues, this is one of the
problems we are trying to resolve. We are therefore conducting these meetings
and contacts directed at the resolution of political and diplomatic
problems.
With the goal of realizing these aims, the Supreme Command, in
conjunction with the Governmental Council of Defense, has developed directives
for the army to prepare and conduct the "Ba Be" plan, which is scheduled to be
executed in October. The "Ba Be" plan provides for the resolution of a number
of goals. Four hundred and six individuals [406] were sent to execute the plan
in South Vietnam. These individuals had gone through sufficient training
and
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11
are well armed. Earlier, these people worked in the governing
apparatus of South Vietnam. After the August revolution, during the period of
the war of resistance against the French colonials, we left these people behind.
They actively worked for the enemy and subsequently joined various organs of
the Saigon governing apparatus. We trained and armed them well to carry out the
"Ba Be" plan before they left for South Vietnam.
The basic aims of the
"Ba Be" plan:
Elimination of all people who are resistant and oppose our
course and of those who occupy leadership positions at the province-district
level and above; a full paralysis of the will of such people.
Conduct
of activities to carry out a disruption of the Saigon governing apparatus at
the province level and below with the goal of a subsequent replacement of this
apparatus with new people. We are attentively observing those people who
oppose us and our decision with regards to this group must be very serious and
firm. This matter has an important place in the execution of the "Ba Be"
plan. We must have lists and full dossiers on these people beforehand in
order to conduct the preparatory training to quickly do away with them and
disrupt their routine.
Search for and acquire materials which testify
to crimes by Americans and their puppets with regard to the Vietnamese people,
so that during opportune conditions, we can accuse them of committing these
crimes by publishing the materials.
These are the three
basic missions for the people who were dispatched for execution of the "Ba Be"
plan. As for the time of completion, it is generally believed that it will be
executed simultaneously with the TS-6 plan (Chyong Shon-6). i.e. in the month of
October. This plan must be executed well in order to influence the course of
the Paris Peace talks on Vietnam as well as the development of the situation in
the near future. This is very important task. Its outcome may help us make a
more successful advance on the front. We need to increase the pace of
development on the front to win great victories in a short span of time.
Therefore. the "Ba Be" plan is already being executed and we are continuing to
train people to carry it out.
______
The TS-6 plan is a VNA plan of military action in South
Vietnam with the main effort concentrated in the Hue region (GRU note).
______
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[handwritten "195"]
The
pace of the plan must be increased. We have to quickly move these people from
North to South Vietnam in order to destroy a large quantity of enemy personnel.
In other words. the elimination of all traitors. reactionaries. and counter-
revolutionaries who currently make up a fairly significant part in South Vietnam
is an important mission of the "Ba Be" plan.
We must attract the neutral
forces to our side; those who are fighting for national independence from the
USA; those forces who earlier fought against the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and now
fight against the regime of Nguyen Van Thieu. We must do everything necessary
in order to successfully carry out the "Ba Be" plan.
Along with that, we
must work on the demoralization of the puppet army on all fronts. Under good
conditions, such work will lower the fighting spirit of the puppet army soldiers
in the future and increase the number of servicemen who defect to our side.
This is a basic requirement which helps us create the conditions for revolts in
the puppet army. We were faced with this matter after the victory in Quang
Tri.
Was there actively a collective anti-military uprising in the puppet
56th Regiment? No. in actuality it was not like that at the front. After we
surrounded hill 241. the Regiment command understood the futility of further
resistance and surrendered along with its soldiers. However, to increase the
effect, we announced that because of good use of propaganda, there was an
anti-military uprising in the 56th Regiment. This is a new form of stimulating
anti-military uprisings in the puppet army.
The political views Of puppet
army Officers captain and above are very reactionary. Previously they were
officers or soldiers in the French Army. Now they are remaining in the army and
speak in favor of the previous Saigon government. inciting counter-revolution
and anti-nationalism. They hate the revolution. Therefore, applying
propaganda amongst soldiers and especially amongst the officer corps is
difficult and varied, demanding study from all sides
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13
[handwritten "196 "]
and
a creative approach in the choice of methods and means.
The brilliant
results must be given their due: results which we in the propaganda organization
recently achieved among the High Command staff, right up to Saigon Army
generals.
We had contacts and meetings with a number of officers. For
example, with General Khoang Xuan Lain, the former 1st Regional Corps Commander.
He was very reactionary and spoke against our revolution. After the defeat at
Quang Tri, Thieu removed him, and he began to make contact with us. At the
meetings, Khoang Xuan Lain told us--if it can be said this way--a number of his
views. In his opinion, the Saigon puppet army will not be able to execute
missions which the plan of ,,Vietnamization" of the war places on the army. He
believes that the revolutionary forces will achieve victory and that the puppet
army will not be able to impede this. The Thieu regime is a dictatorship, is
pro-fascist, and does not have the support of the people. These are some of the
basic tenets expressed by General-Lieutenant Khoang Xuan Lain.
As for the
closest person to the Thieu regime--General Ngo Dinh Dzu--in meetings with us,
he expressed the opinion that even the 2nd Regional Corps will be lost and that
the puppet army will be unable at any cost to withstand us in this region, i.e.
the Tay Nguyen region. Thus, Dzu has expressed the same ideas that Khoang Xuan
Lain has. He also said that the puppet army will be unable to withstand us if
the Americans leave Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Dzu sees an increase in insurgency and
revolution in South Vietnam, an increase in authority for the National Front for
the Liberation of South Vietnam, a rise in the level of our strategic and
tactical leadership as well as in the level of combat actions. Dzu understands
that Nguyen Van Thieu is a bloody dictator, a fascist and that the regime he
created is wholly anti-democratic.
Thus, we see that these meetings with
the generals are a great victory for us and will be beneficial to us. In order
to successfully manage a resolution of the issues linked to conducting
propaganda work with the South Vietnamese Army generals aimed at awakening their
consciousness and winning them over to our side,
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it is necessary to understand that the outcome of the coming
battle depends upon the solution of these important issues. It is necessary to
attain a clear understanding among the generals that the Thieu regime will never
employ popular support and cannot exist. Such are the fundamental issues which
we should resolve in the near future.
From the utterances of the generals
set forth above, we see that the situation is developing in a direction
favorable to us. We can bring Plan "BA BE" into being, but for this we should
expand the net of communications and contacts with people who will carry out
Plan "BA BE," in order to obtain from them all necessary materials. We should
likewise search for ways to establish connections with officers and officials of
the Saigon government. This matter occupies a significant place in the
implementation of Plan "BA BE." The Supreme Command and Ministry of State
Security discussed all matters related to successful implementation of this plan
and levied new tasks upon the commands of the combat zones responsible for
implementation of this plan. We successfully inserted and deployed our forces
in all regions and are now conducting the final work in order to complete
preparatory measures for this Plan by September 30th of this year. In
comparison to other plans, the preparation of Plan "BA BE" is developing well.
This is the first time we are implementing such a plan on the territory of
South Vietnam. In the course of its realization we will acquire experience
which can help us counter the designs of the enemy at the front.
The more
savage the bombings and barrages of the enemy may become, the more victories we
should grasp at the front, because such victories will aid realization of Plan
"BA BE." We are linking great hopes to the implementation of this plan,
especially in accelerating the pace at which the offensive at the front
develops, of which I reported to you above. The favorable development of the
situation will be a huge and significant factor in the collapse of US military
designs and of the puppets at the front in South Vietnam. We must thwart the
reactionary and treacherous plans of the enemy; successful carrying out of Plan
"BA BE" will indeed help us to grasp new victories. These victories will have
great strategic significance in implementation of Plans TS-6 and
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(1) Plan S-6, which were
topics above.
The goal of Plan "BA BE" is introduction of
division into the ranks of the enemy and lowering of his will to resist.
Successful implementation of Plan "BA BE" will help us to attain successes at
the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. The nearer the victory, the more clearly
will appear the treacherous designs of the Nixon-Kissinger-Laird clique, and
likewise those of the puppet government of Nguyen Van Thieu. Therefore
implementation of Plan "BA BE" will be a great step in the resolution of many
issues in the current situation. Because of this, its significance is so
great.
For successful realization of this plan we should as soon as
possible insert our forces, in order to begin implementation of this plan in the
month of October in accordance with indicated deadlines.
In the Paris
negotiations on Vietnam we have met with a series of difficulties in recent
days. These difficulties are explained by the fact that Nixon being stubborn as
before and is trying above all to achieve a solution of the military issue and
only then to move to settlement of political issues, which will exercise great
influence on the course of development of the contemporary situation in Vietnam.
As a result of exchanging opinions in private meetings with Kissinger--Nixon's
advisor-- Kissinger, we understood that Nixon as before is being stubborn on
settling the situation which is developing today in Vietnam. To attain
settlement we should conduct careful preparation to counter Nixon's designs.
Let him understand: if he does not renounce this war, then precisely the US will
suffer defeat in it. However, Nixon is being stubborn in continuing the
aggressive war and maintaining the status quo. That is why we think, that with
the US taking such a position, peaceful solution of the Vietnam issue is not
possible. We see that the US obstinately continues aggression, while Nguyen Van
Thieu as before holds to his insolent position. That is why we are resolved to
carry out Plan "BA BE," the realization of which will be a turning point in the
settlement of the situation at the front.
This would be our first
military thrust on the front aimed at resolving the complicated political issue
at the present stage.
I) Plan S-6
-- Plan for military operations in the Saigon region (footnote of the
GRU)
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Until this, the Supreme Command had never tried working out a plan
similar to the plan "Ba Be".
Over the course of six months, we prepared
to execute this plan. During this time, we gathered everyone who should take
part in its realization, and then conducted a thorough training of them. The
intelligence directorate of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of
State Security conducted the training of these people. We well understand that
the better the training of these people is conducted, the fewer the losses we
will suffer and the faster we will be able to attain execution of this plan.
Thus, once again evaluating the plan "Ba Be", the thorough training which is
now going on, and which will be realized jointly with the plan TS-6 in October,
it can be said that its successful realization will assist us to attain new
great victories at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. These are very serious
issues which we must devote constant attention to.
Yesterday the State
Defense Council directed the Supreme Command to conduct a conference for the
cadres responsible for training and carrying out this plan. At this conference,
the forms, means and methods were stated, which were worked out according to the
organs and confirmed at a Politburo session.
We can now say that we have
achieved great successes and we are convinced that this plan will be realized.
Presently, this plan is being carried out. We have already succeeded in
inserting a portion of our comrades into South Vietnamese territory- We
succeeded with difficulty in certain areas and for this we had to procure all
possible means. In other areas, this operation was carried out more
successfully, and now our people are occupying stable positions in the puppet
governing apparatus.
Dear Comrades! In summing up what is stated above,
it can be said that we are going in the right direction in carrying out our
plans, especially the plans TS-6 and "Ba Be", and also in training for the
realization of our plan S-6, the realization of which is slated for the near
future.
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[handwritten "200 "]
In addition to these issues, in accordance with the instructions from the
Politburo, I will also report to you today on American POWs captured on the
various fronts of Indochina.
The work with American prisoners of war has
always been within the field of vision of the Politburo and has been reflected
in its decisions, such as decision No. 21 DST dated 23 Mar 71, and decision No.
21 E dated 4 Apr 72. Both of these decisions concern the issues of exploiting
these American POWs captured during the war. This disturbs the public opinion
of the whole world and of the US. There are various thoughts on the American
POW issue. Some of these are correct, others are not, but even among us there
are a number of comrades whose opinions differ from the opinion Of the
Politburo. These comrades are not taking into consideration the particulars of
the developing situation nor the inherent difficulties in their judgments. These
opinions harm us in our search for methods of resolving the American POW
issue.
Dear comrades! The American POW issue is very complex. The
peoples of the world [world opinion] and the peoples of our fraternal socialist
nations [allied popular opinion] as well as our [people] want to know the exact
number of POWs located in North Vietnam. Allow me to inform you specifically
on this matter. We have captured a very large number of American POWs on the
fronts of Indochina since the time that the US introduced their troops into
Vietnam, escalated the air war against North Vietnam, and expanded the total
scope of their aggression by spreading this aggression onto the territories of
Laos and Cambodia. At first, the number of American POWs was not large and
world public opinion paid little attention to them. The number of American POWs
in North Vietnam grew day by day after 5 Aug 65 when the US imperialists started
massive air bombing and off-shore bombardment by the 7th fleet of the territory
of North Vietnam, and after having expanded their aggression onto the
territories of Laos and Cambodia. The number of American POWs in the DRV has
not been made public to this day. We have kept this figure secret. At today's
Politburo session, I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number of American
POWs.
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[handwritten "201"]
The total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of Indochina,
i.e. in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, comprises 1205
people. Of them, 671 people were captured in North Vietnam and
143 aviators [were captured] in South Vietnam. This means the total
number of aviators, and diversionists [special operations] (American advisors
on diversionary ships and divers), captured on the territories of North and
South Vietnam comprises 814 people. In addition, from other categories of
American servicemen in Indochina, we have captured 391 people, including:
283 in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia and 43 in Laos; 814
and 391 comprise 1205 people.
Here is more data on the 1205 POWs.
We have captured 624 American aviators in North Vietnam, to include 7 colonels,
85 lieutenant colonels, 183 majors, i.e. the total number of senior US Air Force
_and Navy officers comprises 275 people. The 624 American aviators include 3
astronauts, i.e. three people who have completed the necessary training for
space flight, for instance, Jim Katlo, who was captured in the vicinity of
Hanoi. This figure also includes 15 US Air Force aces having more than 4000
flight hours each: Norman Klarvisto, Karmet, Jim Intist Shasht and others. This
is the specific data on American aviators captured in North Vietnam.
Among the other 47 prisoners captured in North Vietnam, there are 36 advisors of
diversionary detachments who were inserted in the border region between the DRV
and Laos; lone diversionists who were conducting reconnaissance of our main
transportation routes from helicopters and reconnaissance ships; and several
seamen who abandoned their ships that we damaged and whom we picked up.
Therefore the figures 624 and 47 add up to 671.
In South Vietnam we have
captured 143 US aircrew members, mainly helicopter aviators and some jet
aviators.
Among the 391 American POWs captured in South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, we have 9 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels and 52 majors. The
remaining officers are captain and below,
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[handwritten "202"]
as
well as American enlisted soldiers.
Thus in summary, I want to remind you
again that the 1205 American POWs presently in prisons of North Vietnam
include:
624 aviators captured in North Vietnam;
143
aviators captured in South Vietnam;
47 diversionists and other American
servicemen captured in North Vietnam;
391 American servicemen of other
categories, which includes 283 captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and
43 in Laos.
All of them are presently in prisons in North
Vietnam. Currently we have 11 prisons where American POWs are held. We used to
have 4 large prisons, however after the American attempt to free their POWs from
Ha Tay [Son Tay] we expanded this number to 11. Each prison holds
approximately 100 POWs.
Seven Air Force colonels captured in North
Vietnam and nine colonels of various branches of service captured in South
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (16 officers in all) are being held together; through
them, we are attempting to gain an understanding of the current situation which
has developed in the American Army, extract the material and information we
need. and determine our position toward them.
We are also holding 104
American lieutenant colonels in one location and are attempting to extract
information, secret information about troop dispositions and information
concerning the US Defense Department from them.
We have 235 majors
concentrated in two locations.
Thus we have dedicated special
prisons for senior officers of the American Army: one for colonels, one for
lieutenant colonels and two for majors. The rest of the POWs, captains and
below, were placed in other prisons.
A few words about the political
views and attitudes of American POWs.
There are 368 POWs who have
progressive attitudes.
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[handwritten "203"]
They
understand very well that this war is unjust and unpopular on their part. They
condemn the American administration and express a strong protest against this
war. We will be able to release these 368 POWs first. if as a result of the
struggle of the progressive peoples of the world. including the American people,
a favorable international environment will develop, forcing Nixon to move toward
a resolution of the Political issue. We are carrying out work with this category
of POWs to explain to them the aggressive nature of the war being conducted by
the Nixon administration and the nature of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and also
to make them understand the unjust character of this war which is inflicting
great damage on the American people. One can assert that this group of POWs is
progressive in their political views.
There are 372 of the POWs who hold
neutral views, i.e. their political outlook is not fully progressive. yet not
too reactionary. We plainly see that they still do not clearly understand the
role of the American administration in unleashing the aggressive war in
Indochina.
The remainder of the POWs hold reactionary views. In spite
of the work carried on to explain to them the real state of things, they have
not changed their reactionary views.
The following is a summation:
-- 368 POWs holding progressive views can be released
first;
-- 372 POWs hold neutral positions;
-- 465
POWs hold reactionary views.
All the POWs among the senior
officers hold reactionary views, i.e. they do not condemn Nixon, they do not
protest his policies, and they distort our course of action. We understand that
these officers come from rich families. Their reactionary views are precisely a
result of this.
We well understand that the American POW issue has great
significance for the resolution of the South Vietnamese problem. We must
continue propagandistic and educational work.with the American POWs, leading to
their understanding
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of the nature of the aggressive war which the US is carrying out in
Vietnam, as well as the senseless obstinateness of Nixon, which only delays the
release of POWs and their return to their homeland. Soon we will free several
POWs in order to put pressure on the Nixon administration, observe his reaction
and the reaction of the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good
intentions in this matter.
Thus, the 1205 American POWs captured on the
fronts of Indochina (in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), presently
kept in prisons in North Vietnam represent a significant force in the American
army, a basic part of which is made up of American aviators.
The large
number of American aviators imprisoned during the time of Johnson and Nixon
inflicted huge damage on the US Air Force. This should cause the US government
and Nixon himself to reflect. We intend to resolve the American POW issue in
the following manner:
1. The US government must demonstrate compliance, i.e. a
cease fire and the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu, and then both sides can begin
discussing the matter of returning POWs to the Nixon government.
2.
While the American side is resolving the above-mentioned problems, we can free
several more aviators from the number who are progressively inclined. Nixon
should not hinder the return of these aviators to their homeland and not
undertake any disciplinary measures toward them.
3. Nixon must
compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted on it by this
destructive war.
Here then are the principles on the basis
of which we may resolve the American POW issue. However, Nixon continues to
resist resolving the Vietnamese question, thereby delaying the resolution of the
American POW issue.
I have reported these specific figures and
fundamental aspects of the American POW issue to the Politburo. But we also have
these comrades who do not understand this problem correctly.
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[handwritten "205"]
It is
necessary to resolve this issue taking into account settling the military and
the political aspects of the Vietnamese problem. If we take a path of
concession toward Americans and release POWs, then we would lose much. That is
why our point of view on this issue remains the same: this issue must be
resolved on the basis of military and political aspects of settlement.
Holding 1205 POWs creates certain difficulties for us, but more importantly, the
loss of 1205 POWs, particularly aviators, is a great detriment to the American
Army, particularly the US Air Force. At the same time, we were able to collect
data about American weapons and also valuable scientific materials about the US
Army, for instance, material on how to use different types of weaponry,
tactical/technical characteristics of aircraft, Air Force directives, as well as
materials about other types of armament of the US Army. We have been able to
uncover US intentions in the international arena and on a number of other issues
which are related to war in Indochina.
That is why we are convinced that
our position concerning POWs has and continues to be correct. If we could
successfully resolve the POW issue, then the other issues would not exert any
influence on our policy toward the US. That is why we are now concentrating on
the successful resolution of this problem on the collection and study of
materials from interrogations of American aviators who were shot down over North
Vietnam and American scientists captured in this war, particularly Air Force
specialists, as well as scientists in other technical areas. Their loss is a
major liability for the American Army, because in no other war have there been
so many captured Americans as there are in this war of aggression.
The
1205 American POWs kept in the prisons of North Vietnam represent a large
number. For now, we have officially published a list of only 368 POWs. The
rest are not acknowledged. The US government is aware of this, but they do not
know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps only assume an approximate number
based on their losses. Therefore in accordance with the instructions from the
Politburo, we are keeping the number of POWs secret.
We continue to
collect and study materials from interrogations
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of POWs in order to have a basis in specific circumstances to expose
US designs in the Indochina war of aggression as well as in other matters.
Collection and study of these materials has provided us great assistance in
studying the scientific discoveries of the US, in developing methods to counter
contemporary weapons, including chemical, which have inflicted great harm upon
us in this war.
I reported to the Politburo several fundamental aspects
related to the matter of American POWs, namely: concerning the policy we are
implementing on this matter, I gave the specific number of American POWs seized
in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
We still have among
us Comrades who think: why do we keep these POWs and not take advantage of the
Nixon proposals? Do we really want to resolve this matter after all? It needs
to be noted that such a point of view is profoundly mistaken. This is not
political bargaining but rather a key condition and serious argument for
successful resolution of the Vietnam problem. That is why the matter of the
American POWs has great significance in exposing Nixon's designs in this
aggressive war in Vietnam. We are completely unanimous in this matter and
condemn individualistic mistaken views current among us on this matter. We
firmly hold to our position -- when the American government resolves the
political and military issues on all three fronts of Indochina, we will set free
all American POWs. We consider this a very correct course.
Dear Comrades!
I have reported the following matters to Politburo sessions: the course of
our party on the general offensive conducted in South Vietnam from March 30th to
the present; our errors and deficiencies in the offensive and summing up results
of the offensive in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; positive and negative
aspects of the offensive; immediate plans of the enemy and our operations;
analysis of errors permitted in strategic and tactical leadership; our contacts
with political figures of South
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Vietnam from the Saigon regime; the matter of American POWs, captured
on the three fronts of Indochina.
Today on assignment of the Supreme
Command, the State Defense Council and the Military Committee of the Politburo,
I reported to you on these matters so that the Politburo could study these
problems, could express its opinion on them, and set forth forms and methods for
their resolution- Soon the State Defense Council, together with the Supreme
Command will study The matters related to carrying out new operations at the
front. Th. State Defense Council assigned the Supreme Command, and the latter
in turn the General Staff. to address matters related to the development of new
military_ plans for the year 1973. At the present time these plans are being
worked out with the goal of preparing the necessary forces for their
implementation- We are occupied with matters of mobilization and training of
reinforcements for all three Indochinese fronts. We should mobilize 250.000
men, 200.000 of which would be sent to South Vietnam and 50.000 to Laos and
Cambodia.
Summing up this report it is necessary to say that I have
touched on the fundamental features of the situation which has developed in
South Vietnam, on our difficulties and successes, and also on the difficulties
existing for the enemy- I set out our plans and our course, and also
illuminated a series of matters which the Politburo assigned to the State
Defense Council and Supreme Command. At the next Politburo session. I shall set
forth matters touching upon the present situation in Laos and Cambodia and views
on its development-
Presently, the situation is turning out quite
favorably- The peoples of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have decisively
frustrated the plan for "Vietnamization" of the war and identical plans being
implemented in Laos and Cambodia. We hold high the invincible banner of
Marxism-Leninism!
We are carrying out the precepts of Ho Chi Mirth. The
war of resistance against American imperialists for the salvation of the
Fatherland will yet be stubborn and hard, yet we will definitely grasp victory.
We will decisively frustrate the plans of Nixon or anyone who takes his place
and continues the aggressive war! The course of our party is assuredly correct.
Our people are heroic
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people. Our forces are heroic forces!
The three countries
of Indochina, closely united one with another, will fight to the last drop of
blood for the freedom and independence of their Fatherlands. The Vietnamese
people will fully carry out its international duty toward the fraternal peoples
of Laos and Cambodia!
To the current session of the Politburo I wish
successful work. I have completed the presentation of the report.
The brochure contains 24 pages of text RKSS/I 2235-24. II.72, Title page and
cover order No 00/817
For Official Use Only