

**ACCOUNTING FOR POW/MIA's FROM THE
KOREAN WAR AND THE VIETNAM WAR**

Y 4. SE 2/1 A: 995-96/51

Accounting for POW/MIA's from the K...

BEFORE THE
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 17, 1996



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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ACCOUNTING FOR POW/MIA's FROM THE KOREAN WAR AND THE VIETNAM WAR

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, September 17, 1996.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:03 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert K. Dornan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. DORNAN. The Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the National Security Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives will come to order.

Obviously, there is much media attention to today's hearing. I've lost track of how many hearings we've had in the last year and 10 months. But there should be media attention to this because, in the Korean aspect of it, there was precious little media attention or follow-through on the hundreds of Americans that I'm convinced we left behind at the end of America's first stalemated, no-win war.

During the past 20 months of the 104th Congress, I have conducted a series of Military Personnel Subcommittee hearings in order to provide effective congressional oversight of the process of seeking the fullest possible accounting of American combatants who remain missing in action. It has been my intention throughout all of this to work in partnership with the Defense Department and the State Department, to bring an honest closure for hundreds of families who have not broken faith with their missing loved ones, the heroes of their lives.

My 31 years of direct involvement with these missing heroes began on May 18, 1965, when my best friend in the Air Force, and husband of my wife's best friend in the Air Force, David Hrdlicka, was shot down over Laos, while piloting an F-105 Thunderchief, the world's largest fighter at the time.

Although he was photographed as a prisoner, and interviewed in captivity by Soviet journalists, he remains unaccounted for and his ultimate fate is still unknown, as is that of his fellow captive in the caves near San Neua, Laos, Charlie Shelton, who was shot down on his 33d birthday on April 29, 1965.

I came to know his wife well, and his five children, particularly his oldest son, who is a Franciscan Catholic priest, and Marion Shelton, tragically, took her own life after 25 years of not giving up on finding out the fate of her Charlie. If he was not there to

greet her, then what a situation of her in Heaven looking down at him still a slave in some filthy cave, if he could possibly survive all these years. And people have, throughout all of history, in every part of the world, survived over 40 years of captivity, sometimes longer.

My general study of this issue began 43 years ago when, in Air Force flight training, my precadet class was briefed by an Army psychiatrist during a seminar on the brainwashing experienced by American POW's in Korea. At that time, 21 young enlisted men, all of them high school dropouts, the Koreans skillfully took advantage of their lack of education—they were all in China at that time. They had been sent from North Korea to China.

These studies that they were exposing us to as young men on the way to pilot training—I was 20 at the time—it brought about the creation of the U.S. Military Code of Conduct. This was called cadet memory. This code we were ordered to memorize as aviation cadets. And I still have it memorized.

I have since come to the conclusion that the term “mindset to debunk,” which was used to describe the performance of Defense Department analysts over the last decade and a half, is too cryptic, almost too flippant. It was coined in 1980 by my friend and college mate, Lt. Gen. Eugene Tie, the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and was repeated by the internal DIA investigations in 1986 and 1987, and then it was used again in this committee room in 1990 by Col. Michael Peck, an Army Special Forces hero, who resigned in protest and disgust as Director of the Defense POW/MIA Office.

This term, “mindset to debunk” is too imprecise to describe what I have come to believe is a lack of competence by an entrenched bureaucracy. There has been a shameful institutional performance that I think is best described as an unrelenting, predisposition to discredit and dismiss out of hand all information and reports that have merit and might lead to resolving some of the cases of Americans known to have been alive in Communist captivity and, frankly, may still be in some seemingly Godforsaken situations. I say seemingly because I don't think God forsakes anybody. He just gives some people amazing crosses to bear. I can't think of a worse cross than a patriotic, gung-ho soldier, naval aviator, Air Force pilot or crewman, or a marine pilot of crewman, loving his country and feeling that his country has deserted him for 10, 20, 30, 40 or more years.

This habit of writing off captured American fighting men, after no-win stalemate wars with the evil empire of communism, began in 1919 following the archangel expedition involving 15 allied nations sent against the Bolshevik forces in northern Russia. My own father, U.S. Army Capt. Harry Dornan, an artillery officer, was nearly sent north. He was begged to volunteer, but he had enough World War I combat points and three wound chevrons—what we now call Purple Hearts—that enabled him to avoid that ill-fated operation.

Remember, that's when Churchill said “Let's strangle the baby in the crib,” the baby being communism, which is not through killing people around the world. Consider Castro, where he first-degree

murdered four American citizens in international waters, when MIG's shot down Cessna light aircraft some weeks ago.

At the end of World War II, after Stalin's forces overran Nazi-controlled POW camps in Eastern Europe, several hundred Americans and allied prisoners disappeared into Soviet gulags, those with Slavic, Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish surnames.

During the cold war, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy—not to say those are the only ones that disappeared—throughout the cold war, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy pilots and crews, on so-called ferret missions, spy flights, around the periphery of the Soviet Union, and Central Intelligence Agency missions using U-2's and converted bombers, sometimes old C-47 "gooney birds", flew over or near Russia and over or near China and the Korean peninsula. Many of these flights involved shootdowns, and the crews, in most cases, disappeared without a public paper trail, in some cases maybe without an official paper trail. Only U.S. News & World Report has carefully logged the shootdowns and periodically does a reflective story on whatever happened to these ferret mission crews.

Then in the early 1950's, some of the best Americans of our World War II generation were called back again to the Reserves and Guard. The older edge of my generation was called up, and they were lost in Korea. Then some of the middle of my generation ended up suffering a similar fate in Vietnam. Of course, the "black hole" of Laos, where over 300 airmen, pilots, and aircrews, were lost, and not a single one returned since Theodore Dengler escaped, a Navy lieutenant, in 1964, or after the cease-fire in Vietnam, 27 January 1973. There was one man lost in Laos and, through the intercession of some U.S. Senators, he was brought out. But nobody in between.

Now, what ties together all of these tragic chapters in U.S. military history is the evil nature of communism, with its total, total disregard for human life and no military code of ethics, no officers' code, that caused an explosion at the Nuremberg trials, between General Lehausen and Herman Goering, because Goering had personally signed the execution order of 50 of the recaptured 76th that had escaped out of one of the gulags in what came to be called the Great Escape. As an officer, a World War I decorated quadruple ace, he had signed a death order to execute 50 young American pilots and crew who had known freedom for a few short days. That code of ethics is what finally broke down Herman Goering, where Lehausen yelled back in his face, "You coward. As an officer, you signed a death order of other men." And Goering, after that, knew he was going to have to pop out that cyanide pill with his tooth and kill himself.

These Communist governments, I repeat, with no military code, if they had one, they could have been dissuaded from withholding American or allied fighting men. In fact, there was a continuous strategic objective in the Communist's worldwide struggle against the allies of the free world. It was to squeeze every ounce of intelligence information out of some unlucky captured Americans, especially those with technical knowledge, highly trained pilots and electronic ferret mission technicians. The Communists, in fact, were preparing for future heightened conflict while fighting all

these lesser bloody struggles that we came to describe with the overarching misnomer, the cold war.

Despite the pleading of the patriotic families of the missing, and the numerous attempts by the U.S. Congress, during both Democratic and Republican administrations, to reestablish accountability in our Federal Government, we have been stymied by bureaucratic inertia and a lack of properly trained and motivated experts in geopolitics and in simple intelligence, strategic intelligence, an overview of the enemy intelligence.

By the way, I wrote this entire statement myself, if anybody is wondering how much staff input is in there. I am the expert on this issue in the U. S. Congress.

There has never been a systematic methodology, as I begged for 20 years, since I first came to the Hill in 1977 and met with CIA Director Stansfield Turner, there has never been a methodology led by fearless Sherlock Holmes-type investigators to build upon the successes and the mistakes of our historical record in these areas. Instead, we continue to see the corporate board approach of the Defense Department's Office for POW/MIA's, where cynics are able to rein supreme with a simple line: "That's hearsay. Get it out of my face. It's rumor and hearsay."

The so-called analysts now lurch into the future without ever taking into account the strategic goals and the intelligence lust of the evil empire and their surrogates throughout this century. They lusted to get information on how our F-86 pilots, our Sabrejet pilots, were shooting down their MIG pilots at a rate of 8 to 1. The early reports were 13 to 1. Any Communist atheist government would be intensely lusting to find out what we were doing in the air, how our pilots were trained, since now we know by released documents and the testimony of Soviet retired general officers on film, that the Russians led the major air engagements against our men in the skies above the Yalu River. Russians battled them, just as Russians battled the Israelis over the Sinai in 1970, when Russians' voices could be heard speaking over the air in panic right before the Israelis had four Russian parachutes coming down at one time, fortunately on the Egyptian side of the conflict, to be taken back by their own side.

There has always been with communism a calculated and systematic exploitation of prisoners, up to the point of beating some to death, and not quickly, in a few hours, but extended beatings over a year or so. Identical to the way the Gestapo slowly beat and tortured until his spirit gave up. The French Resistance, Makee hero Jean Moulin. Glen Cobeil in Vietnam, Jean Moulin in occupied France, exactly the same type of hero. Beaten for months. The Gestapo traded Moulin from Gestapo headquarters so they all could have a piece of torturing him, starting in the Maurice Hotel in Paris. An unbelievable story, totally unknown to American youth today, not taught in our colleges, certainly not taught by tenured Marxist professors.

Even today, despite regimes continue the cruel exploitation of prisoners. An example. The Serbian heirs of Marshal Tito tortured and then exploited for propaganda, by claiming they were missing in action, not captured, the two French pilots from the same Mirage who were shot down over Bosnia near the Bosnian Serb cap-

ital of Pale. The Bosnian Serbs deliberately said, "We don't know what happened to them", making them missing in action, denied ever holding them as prisoners—at the same time they're beating them—and then claim that the pilots had been kidnapped from a hospital. They didn't get their story straight. Our intelligence analysts told me this, at Brendise, at Vincenza and at Aviano, when I went over there twice asking about them. Obviously, they got their story screwed up when they said they were kidnapped from a hospital, meaning we had them in a hospital. Why were they in a hospital when they both had good shoes?

Only an international outcry, political pressure from the wives of these two men, taking their story from their air base in Provance north to Paris, to do what our POW wives did when I was a television host, come on a show like mine, with a sympathetic host, and get their story out. The two wives of the two pilots, Chevaux and Sovenegn, brought their story to the French people and then to the world. The wives had to do it, not the French Government. Then, finally, the government responded and, with serious threats to the Bosnian Serbs, it led to the release of the two pilots at the last minute.

In any international conflict which escalates into fighting, it is my opinion you can always tell the evil side from the more righteous side by the way the combatants treat prisoners of war. In order to preserve a viable democracy, we should remember the eloquent words which were written, in part, now vindicated, in Senate testimony, when he said he wrote this, by one of our witnesses today, Col. Philip Corso. Colonel Corso wrote, with President Eisenhower's position, remarks for part of his speech by then U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, the permanent representative to the United Nations, who spoke on the floor of the United Nation on December 4, 1954, in an effort to gain the freedom of hundreds of American servicemen—40,000 South Korean ROC forces, by the way—and American civilians, a handful, held in China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union.

Here is part of what Corso contributed to Ambassador Lodge's speech. "It is an immemorial principle of human decency that a family look after its own members. A nation must also look after its own if it is to continue to be a nation. The thing that sustains the man in uniform when he is far from home is the thought that he is supported by those for whom he is fighting. We cannot let these men down."

As Colonel Corso told me at dinner a few weeks ago, inexplicably the media, which was mainly print in those days, embryonic television, refused to pick up the story, in spite of Ambassador Lodge's speech.

In the nuclear shadow of the cold war—and this completely escaped the handful of Senators, less than a handful, three—one of the three Senators who had bothered to turn out for Colonel Corso's testimony before the Senate, waiting to tell a story after all these years—one of them completely missed this point. In the nuclear shadow of the cold war, American leaders such as President Dwight D. Eisenhower and President John F. Kennedy, were faced with what the Jesuits taught me was a classic dilemma, the horns of a dilemma. The risk to millions of innocent citizens that might

have resulted from an ultimatum threatening the use of force to gain the release of American POW's from the gulags behind the Iron Curtain and the Bamboo Curtain that had come down around most of the population of Asia.

But today, in 1996, there is no credible explanation for not utilizing our greater superpowers, vast resources, to finally keep faith with our brave men—in Korea, every one of them older than I am. Whether they're alive or dead, we must keep faith with them and keep faith with their families. Honor demands that we demand the fullest possible accounting of our heroes, even to this day.

Here is a press release put out by a World War II veteran—he looks 30 years younger than his age—the chairman of our Veterans' Committee here on the House side, Bob Stump. It says that this Friday, September 20—the House won't even be in, so I will try to do a memorial on Thursday night—is National POW/MIA Recognition Day. I've been a sponsor of this, or a cosponsor, with Ben Gilman, when we were minority members. Now he's chairman of International Relations and everything I say today I speak for my friend, Ben, and for Congressman Sam Johnson of Dallas, TX, who was 7 years a prisoner in Hanoi, savagely beaten for not easily giving up his honor and code of conduct to tape these phony propaganda confessions.

Bob Stump, in this letter, says:

National POW/MIA Recognition Day allows Americans to comprehend and appreciate the dedication to life and freedom that these brave men and women endured in the service of their country. A just nation and its people must acknowledge their survival in captivity by continuing to assure them and their families that what they sacrificed and endured in the face of adversity was not offered in vain.

In our War of Independence, the Revolutionary War, 20,000 Americans were taken prisoner. 8,500 died in captivity.

I did not know that until I had read Bob's letter.

During the Civil War, an estimated 194,000 Union soldiers, 214,000 Confederates, 20,000 more, became POWs. Between the North and South, 56,194 Americans died in captivity, some from abuse, but mostly from disease.

In World War I, 4,120 Americans were taken prisoner. Only, if you consider the number, 147 of them died in captivity, forcing a third Geneva Convention covering the humane treatment for prisoners of war.

In the Koran, it says a man's honor is tested by how he treats the helpless ex-warriors that he takes captive in battle. No one could ever perceive, nor comprehend, the absolute barbaric treatment American prisoners experienced in World War II, especially at the hands of the Japanese.

Last night I read a story of Dutch nurses told to march into the surf, two dozen. When they were up to their waist in the water, the machine guns began to kill them. God let one survive to tell us that story. Nurses on one of the islands in the Indonesian Island chain.

"No one could ever perceive, nor comprehend," Bob Stump continues, "the absolute barbaric treatment, especially at the hands of the Japanese."

"In the Pacific, 11,107 Americans, or 40 percent of those taken prisoner, died in captivity." That's 11,107 that died, some of them tortured to death. In contrast, of the 93,941 Americans taken pris-

oner in Europe, all but 1,121, or 1 percent, died. All the rest were released.

I want to get into the testimony, so I will put in the record the rest of Bob Stump's statement, the chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and turn now to my vice-chairman on this committee, a very distinguished Virginian, Owen Pickett.

STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN PICKETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today's hearing is scheduled to cover a broad range of issues, so I will be brief in my remarks.

Recent reports of the possibility of United States prisoners of war still being held against their will by North Korea demonstrate that important leads may exist that must be pursued aggressively to resolve a tragic issue that began more than 40 years ago.

It is important that we follow up vigorously on the circumstances surrounding the fates of United States Korean-war-era POW's, as well as others in Southeast Asia, and develop a comprehensive policy for dealing with the issue, because the United States Government has not heretofore conducted the kind of effort that could be expected to fully account for all these men.

The unknown extent of the reported involvement of the Soviet Union, China, and other nations in the exploitation, torture, and experimentation on United States prisoners of war from Korea and Vietnam fully justify the additional investigative work that will be required.

It is also becoming increasingly apparent that a full accounting of our prisoners and missing in action cannot be achieved until the United States has gained the full cooperation of the other nations involved.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today, and again, thank you for holding this hearing.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett.

A document just came into my possession, declassified, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It's dated October 27, 1956. I remember that month well, fighting to get back on flying status from the bailout in August 1956, out of an F-86 Sabre. October 27, 1956. That's a long time ago if you weren't born, but doesn't seem that long ago to me.

It says, "Memorandum: For the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force. Actions to obtain the release of prisoners of war." I'm only going to read the first paragraph.

"In signing the Executive order—" family members, memorize this date "—August 17, 1955, the President committed all facilities of our Government to establish contact with, support and obtain the release of all of our prisoners of war." That's from the Executive order, August 17, 1955, President Eisenhower.

"In keeping with this directive, actions have continued to obtain the accounting for Korean prisoners of war who may still be held by the Communists."

In a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, dated May 29, 1956, "You were requested to review the list currently being used in the negotiations to obtain an accounting—" that list was over 400, and today the list is considered at 389. That's at a hardcore briefing, out of 8th Army Headquarters, that 389 category-one prisoners were left behind. And that figure is low, I have since found out.

"Your review and subsequent report—" this is to the three Secretaries "—have, indeed, compiled the information readily available on many of the servicemen whose names are listed." I don't have the followup for that, but I can promise you I will get it.

Our panel; I have met with all three personally. I guess in this town that's called vetting. I would like them to stand. This is very important. We have been swearing in Congressmen and people whose honor is without question, as I believe your honor is, gentlemen, but I would ask you please to stand and take the oath. It's going to turn out to be very important.

I will be swearing all witnesses today, as I have done on all the other hearings on this.

[Panel sworn.]

We will start with Phil Corso, Colonel, U.S. Army, retired, former advisor to President Dwight Eisenhower. When some people in the bureaucracy tried to discount what you had to say, Mr. Corso, we began our document search and requested documents from the Eisenhower Library, and to date, every single thing you told me, over the phone and in that long dinner we had, has turned out to be precisely correct. Thank you for steering me to the speech you helped with for Ambassador Lodge on December 4, 1954.

Please proceed. If you have a written statement, you can abbreviate it or you may read it in full, whatever you choose.

**STATEMENT OF PHILLIP CORSO, COLONEL, U.S. ARMY
[RETIRED], FORMER ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER**

Colonel CORSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

During the Korean war, I was head of the Special Projects Branch of the Intelligence Division, Far East Command, under Gen. Douglas MacArthur. I stayed and served in the same position under Generals Ridgeway and Clark. My duties included the production of intelligence on political—counterinsurgency—and subversive activities by the enemy in both North and South Korea.

Within this framework, I was responsible for intelligence and communist activities—the North Koreans, Chinese, and Soviet—within our prisoner of war camps in South Korea and enemy camps in North Korea.

Mr. DORNAN. One interruption, Colonel. You had a long background in intelligence and you were in charge of all counter-espionage efforts in Rome, after we had liberated Rome—

Colonel CORSO. That's right.

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. And you were a colonel at 29 years of age, or a major—

Colonel CORSO. Lieutenant colonel.

Mr. DORNAN. Please proceed.

Colonel CORSO. Yes, sir. It goes back to World War II. I was trained also by the British.

In 1953, I was a staff member of the truce delegation at Panmunjom and participated in the discussion for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war. I was on the ground and met them as the sick and wounded returned.

During the course of my duties, I discovered that the entire operation on the treatment and handling of our prisoners of war was supervised, masterminded, and controlled by the Soviet Union, as was the entire operation of the war and hostilities in Korea.

I wrote a study on how this control extended into our POW camps holding North Koreans and Chinese in South Korea nominally in our control. I titled the study, "War in the POW Camps." Soviet policy, conveyed to their allies, was that a soldier taken prisoner is still at war and a combatant. They trained soldiers to be taken as prisoners and then agitate in the camps to keep the POW's in our custody under their control.

The brainwashing and atrocities against American prisoners were conscious acts of Soviet policy. Not only was it used on our prisoners, but on their own people and others under their control. The basis for their action was the Pavlovian theory of conditioned reflexes.

I had information on medical experiments, Nazi style, on our prisoners. The most devilish and cunning was the techniques of mind altering—Pavlov, that is. It was just as deadly as brain surgery, and many of our POW's died under such treatment. This was told to me by our own returning POW's. Many POW's willed themselves to death after this treatment.

My findings revealed that the Soviets taught their allies, the Chinese communists and North Koreans, a detailed scientific process aimed at molding prisoners of war into forms in which they could be exploited. Returned prisoners who underwent the experience reported the experts assigned to mold them were highly trained, efficient, and well educated. They were specialists in applying deadly psychological treatment which often ended in physical torment. The Soviet approach was a deliberate act of their overall policy which actively rejects, subverts, and destroys decent standards of conduct and the whole structure of human values.

Upon my return to the United States, I was assigned to the Operations Coordinating Board [OCB] of the White House National Security Council and handled virtually all projects on United States prisoners of war. Here I found that United States policy forbade that we win in Korea. The policy amounted to an actual paralysis and diversion of activity to force the return of our prisoners in enemy hands, including those in the Soviet Union.

Years later, I discussed this situation with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in his office, and he agreed with me. This no-win policy is contained in policy directives NSC-68, NSC-68/2, and NSC-135/3. The basis for this policy was in directives ORE-750, NIE 2, 2/1, 2/2, 10, and 11. We called this the "Fig Leaf Policy."

Recently, the CIA in news releases admitted their national intelligence estimates were wrong or not accurate.

In the past, I have tried to tell Congress the fact that in 1953, 500 sick and wounded American prisoners were within 10 miles of

the prisoner exchange point at Panmunjom, but were never exchanged. Subsequent information indicated they all died afterwards. Although I prepared a statement that was made at the Panmunjom delegation table, I was not asked even one question regarding this event by the Senate committee.

During my tour of duty as Special Projects manager of the Intelligence Division of the Far East Command, I received numerous reports that American POW's had been sent to the Soviet Union. These reports were from many sources: Chinese and North Korean POW's, agent reports, Nationalist Chinese reports, our guerrillas, NSA intercepts, defectors, and from our own returning POW's.

My intelligence centered around three trainloads of 450 POW's each. Two of these trainloads were confirmed over and over, but the third was not as certain. Therefore, the final figure was confirmed 900, and 1,200 possibly. These were the figures that I discussed with President Eisenhower while I was a member of the NSC.

The bulk of these sightings were at Manchu-li, on the border of Manchuria and the USSR. Here the rail gauge changed and the United States POW's had to be transferred across a platform to a waiting train going into the Soviet Union. These POW's were to be exploited for intelligence purposes and subsequently eliminated. The methods of exploitation were not only practiced on our POW's, but all others falling into Communist hands.

To the skeptics and debunkers, I have only this to say: By some flashback in time, I wish you could be present with me at the prisoner exchanges in Korea in 1953 and look into the faces of those sick and wounded prisoners, Americans and allied soldiers, as they came across in the exchange. If you had witnessed their sacrifices and what they had suffered by Communist hands, you would not be a critic or skeptic today.

I will close with this final remembrance. At Panmunjom, as a wounded Turkish soldier was exchanged, he peeled off his Chinese clothing and flung them at the nearest Communist guard. I asked the Turkish captain standing with me what did he say, and he answered, "Till we meet again." And many U.S. prisoners also resented the treatment that had been received.

That's the end of my statement, Mr. Chairman. If you have any questions, I will answer them.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Corso follows:]

STATEMENT OF COLONEL (RET.) PHILLIP CORSO

During the Korean War, I was Head of the Special Projects Branch/Intelligence Division/Far East Command. General Douglas MacArthur was in command. I stayed and served in the same position under General Ridgway and General Clark. My duties included the production of intelligence on political (counter-insurgency) and subversive activities by the enemy in both North and South Korea. Within this framework I was responsible for intelligence and communist activities (north Korean, Chinese and Soviet) within our prisoner of war camps in South Korea and the enemy camps in North Korea. In 1953, I was a staff member of the truce delegation at Panmunjom and participated in the discussion for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. I was on the ground and met and talked with our returning sick and wounded.

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During the course of my duties, I discovered that the entire operation on the treatment and handling of our prisoners of war was supervised, masterminded and controlled by the Soviet Union, as was the entire operation of the war and hostilities in Korea. I wrote a study on how this control extended into our POW camps holding North Koreans and Chinese in South Korea, nominally in our control. I titled the study, "WAR IN THE POW CAMPS." Soviet policy, conveyed to their allies, was that a soldier taken prisoner is still at war and a combatant. They trained soldiers to be taken as prisoners and then agitate in the camps to keep the POWs in our custody under their control.

The brainwashing and atrocities against American prisoners were conscious acts of Soviet policy. Not only was it used on our prisoners, but on their own people and others under their control. The basis for their action was the Pavlovian theory of conditioned reflexes.

I had information on medical experiments (Nazi style) on our prisoners. The most devilish and cunning was the techniques of mind altering (Pavlov). It was just as deadly as brain surgery and many U.S. POWs died under such treatment. This was told to me by our own returning POWs. Many POWs willed themselves to death.

II

My findings revealed that the Soviets taught their allies, the Chinese Communists and North Koreans, a detailed scientific process aimed at molding prisoners of war into forms in which they could be exploited. Returned prisoners who underwent the experience reported the experts assigned to mold them were highly trained, efficient and well educated. They were specialists in applying a deadly psychological treatment which often ended in physical torment. The Soviet approach was a deliberate act of their overall policy which actively rejects, subverts and destroys decent standards of conduct and the whole structure of human values.

III

Upon my return to the United States, I was assigned to the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) of the White House, National Security Council, and handled virtually all project to U.S. prisoners of war. Here I found out that U.S. policy forbade that we win in Korea. The policy amounted to an actual paralysis and diversion of activity to force the return of our prisoners in enemy hands, including those in the Soviet Union.

Years later, I discussed this situation with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in his office and he agreed with me. This "no win" policy is contained in policy directives NSC-68, NCS-68/2 and NSC-135/3. The basis for this policy was in directives ORE-750, NIE 2, 2/1, 2/2, 10 and 11. We called this the "Fig leaf policy."

Note: Recently, the CIA in news releases admitted their NIE (National Intelligence Estimates) were wrong or not accurate.

IV

In the past I have tried to tell Congress the fact that in 1953, 500 sick and wounded American prisoners were within ten miles of the prisoner exchange point at Panmunjom but were never exchanged. (Subsequent information indicated that they all died afterwards.) Although I prepared a statement that was made at the Panmunjom delegation table, I was not asked even one question regarding this event.

V

During my tour of duty as the chief of the Special Projects Section of the Intelligence Division of the Far East Command, I received numerous reports that American POWs has been sent to the Soviet Union. These reports were from many sources: Chinese and North Korean POWs, agent reports, Nationalist Chinese reports, our guerrillas, NSA Intercepts, defectors and from our own returning POWs.

My intelligence centered around three train loads of 450 POWs each. Two of these trainloads were confirmed over and over, the third was not as certain. Therefore, the final figure was, "confirmed 900, and 1,200 possibly." These were the figures that I discovered with President Eisenhower while I was a member of his NSC.

The bulk of the sightings were at Manchu-li, on the border of Manchuria and the USSR. Here the rail gauge changed and the U.S. POWs had to be transferred across a platform to a waiting train going to the Soviet Union. These POWs were to be exploited for intelligence purposes and subsequently eliminated. The methods of ex-

ploitation were not only practiced on our POWs, but all others falling into communist hands.

To the skeptics and debunkers, I have only this to say: By some flashback in time, I wish you could be present with me at the prisoner exchanges in Korea in 1953 and look into the faces of those sick and wounded prisoners—Americans and allied soldiers—as they came across in the exchange. If you had witnessed their sacrifices and what they had suffered by communist hands, you would not be a critic or skeptic today.

I will close with this final remembrance. At Panmunjom, as a wounded Turkish soldier was exchanged, he peeled off the Chinese padded clothing and flung them at the nearest communist guard. I asked the Turkish Captain standing with me, "What did he say?" He answered, "Till we meet again."

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

What I would like to do is take all three testimonies before we ask any questions. But first, before Mr. Douglass and General Sejna, I would like to play for the committee—if we could turn the sets almost perpendicular to the audience, I think the audience, and particularly the family members visiting the chamber today, can see it.

This is a statement by Soviet General Kalugin, who a recent defector said knows a hundred times more than he is telling us, and he's telling us more than anybody else in the Soviet system at this time. Vogel Garnov, the Russian general who just died, the historian who at the end said that Lenin was just as evil and as much a mass killer as Stalin, wrote the book "Trotsky" right before he died, he was a valuable resource. He worked on the U.S. Commission with Ambassador Malcomb Toone, but I don't believe he knows as much about General Kalugin.

On the tape is a beautiful daughter, super intelligent, whose father was lost in Vietnam, Robertson. Unfortunately, she died, at just a young age, last year, the mother of three children, I think. She had to take the bull by the horns and go over to the Soviet Union, because our country wasn't properly investigating, as I said, like a Sherlock Holmes, and she is the interviewer of Gen. Oleg Kalugin. He was director, the director of counterintelligence for the infamous KGB, all through the 1970's. That's the Nixon years, Ford years, Jimmy Carter years.

Please start the tape. This is Deborah Robertson.

[Video presentation.]

Mr. DORNAN. Deborah went to grade school where all of my five children went to grade school, and her mom and dad were married at St. Paul the Apostle Church in Westwood—I lived across the street, and that's where one of my daughters was married. It's just unbelievable to me that Deborah has gone to Heaven.

All right. Let's take Mr. Douglass, first, Joseph Douglass, Jr., Defense analyst and author. You wrote the book "Red Cocaine," as I recall, and I quoted from it on the House floor. It was dismissed out of hand, disrespected, dismissed, by some in the bureaucracy in the Republican administration. In your testimony, if it's not already there, tell us how you first met General Sejna.

Proceed.

**STATEMENT OF JOSEPH D. DOUGLASS, JR., DEFENSE
ANALYST AND AUTHOR**

Mr. DOUGLASS. Congressman Dornan, members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen. It is a privilege to be asked to participate in your hearings.

Let me begin by thanking you for your efforts to learn what happened to all the missing American servicemen. I believe this task is one of the most pressing and moral challenges our Nation faces.

I have worked in the national security area for close to 35 years. During this time, I have worked on many very unpleasant subjects: nuclear war, chemical and biological warfare, deception, narcotics trafficking, and others.

However, I can honestly say that nothing has left me with a more profound sense of sadness, frustration and anger than has my work in the POW/MIA area. We ask our young men, many of them barely out of high school, to leave their families and friends, and to sacrifice their lives for their country, and even for other countries. They leave not knowing if they will live to return or, if they do, what condition they will be in. But they go, and relatively few complain. They believe that America places great value on human life and that whatever can be done will be done to support them in battle.

Most important, they also believe, as expressed so well in the final report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, that "the single most basic principle of personal honor in America's armed forces is never willingly to leave a fellow serviceman behind."

Most Americans, civilian and military, sincerely believe in this principle. And when the chips are down, Americans have great faith in their leaders and institutions. We may not agree with all their policies and mannerisms, but we do stand behind them, especially during a crisis.

This is why coming to terms with the POW/MIA issue is such a difficult process. None of us want to believe that this fundamental code of honor, this trust between our country and those sent to fight its wars, has been broken, repeatedly broken, not by those sent to fight the wars but by our own leaders. This is a painful realization that is very hard to reach.

But this is what I now believe, that thousands of American youth who went to war to serve their country were knowingly and deliberately abandoned after the war was over. They were not simply abandoned because they were dead; they were just abandoned, abandoned, as many of us now believe, to a life worse than death.

Nor is this where the story ends, because our government's subsequent efforts seem to have been directed first to deny any were abandoned, and then to bury information that might show what really happened to those still missing.

In short, the search for the truth has been a charade. The best description of this process that I have read is the letter of resignation written by Col. Millard Peck, who headed the Defense POW/MIA office in 1990. His letter presents a sobering eyewitness account of the mendacity and duplicity that have attended our Government's efforts to recover missing American servicemen. My experience certainly supports what Colonel Peck described.

I have been involved in POW studies since 1992, when a friend first told me about the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. He said that he thought the committee would be very interested in the information I had acquired during my work with Gen. Maj. Jan Sejna, who is here today to share with you his knowledge.

It is most important to recognize who General Sejna is and why his information is so important. General Sejna is, to my knowledge, the most important Communist official ever to seek political asylum in the West, which he did at the end of February 1968.

Before he defected, General Sejna held a variety of key positions in Czechoslovakia. He was a member of the Czech Central Committee and the Parliament, which roughly corresponds to our Congress. At the Parliament, he was a member of the Presidium, which was the inner circle, and of the Party Group, which gave the marching instructions to the Presidium and to the whole Parliament. He was a member of the bureau at the Main Political Administration, which is the party watchdog over the military. This administration also has an important role in the formation and implementation of policy.

Early in his career, General Sejna helped set up the Czech Defense Council, which was patterned after the Soviet Defense Council, which is the highest ranking decisionmaking body in areas of defense, intelligence, counterintelligence, and national security. He was the de facto secretary of the Defense Council and in charge of the Defense Council secretariat for several years.

He was first secretary of the party at the Ministry of Defense, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense, he served on the Minister's Collegium, and he was a member of the military section of the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee.

In brief, General Sejna was a member of the decisionmaking hierarchy, one of the roughly 10 or so most knowledgeable officials in Czechoslovakia. He met regularly with top Communist officials from the Soviet Union and around the world.

Mr. Chairman, I am not trying to exaggerate his importance. It is simply crucial that everyone understand where he is coming from. He was where the action was. What he has to say is not hearsay or secondhand information. It is all firsthand knowledge. He was there, he is an eyewitness, and it is his personal experiences he is reporting.

I first met General Sejna in the late 1970's. We subsequently have worked together on a wide variety of projects. I have never known him to be deceptive or misleading in describing any of his experiences as a top Communist official. Nor have I ever met anyone who had worked closely with him who did not have the highest respect for his information.

General Sejna was the first person to explain the importance of the Defense Council to U.S. intelligence. He is also the person who first laid out in detail the role of the Soviet Union in organizing and training terrorists, and who first told people about the Soviet long-range strategic plan and about their extremely effective narcotics trafficking operation. Indeed, it was during my investigations of the Soviet narcotics trafficking operation, which led to the book "Red Cocaine," that I first became aware of Soviet operations with American POW's.

I have also personally witnessed numerous efforts by people who did not like what he had to say to discredit him and his information, just as happened when I tried to bring his information to the attention of the Senate Select Committee.

As soon as I began looking into the POW/MIA problem, I concluded that General Sejna's information was of major importance, so much so that I met several times with him to conduct some very specific debriefings to confirm the depth and breadth of his knowledge.

The more I talked to him, the more I knew how important it was to bring his knowledge to the attention of the right people, yet do it in such a way that his information could be confirmed and used to learn more about what happened to the missing Americans before the Russians or the North Koreans or Vietnamese were able to learn what was afoot and silence potential witnesses, burn documents, or otherwise cover their tracks.

This is when I started to learn the real truth about our Government's POW/MIA efforts. As I began talking to people on the Senate Committee staff, there seemed to emerge, in parallel, a variety of efforts from people within the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency and elsewhere to discredit General Sejna, to sabotage his information, and to alert the Czech and Russian intelligence services about what he was saying.

In rethinking this process, I concluded that probably one of the most important points to make to you is that, to my knowledge, there has been no effort by anyone, in the Government, in any agency or official capacity, to learn what General Sejna knows, except—

Mr. DORNAN. Please pause right there for a little absorption here.

If what you're saying is true, and people at the highest level of Government believed him—so you're talking about lower level and middle level bureaucrats—they were endangering his life, given what I've learned of assassinations, with little tiny poison BB's, smaller than a BB, stuck into someone's leg on the subway. The Bulgarians were good at that. They were jeopardizing his life, correct, if they were giving information to the Czech Communist Government?

Mr. DOUGLASS. I don't think they ever gave that any concern. They hadn't in the past, to my knowledge. The problem was not—

Mr. DORNAN. That's interesting. It's the first thing that popped into my mind. So their not having any concern indicates to me that somebody shouldn't even be in that job. That's what I keep bumping into all along with this Sherlock Holmes line of mine. That's a failure of someone's brain matter. The synapses aren't working logically, to think that they could give out that kind of information and not have someone killed in this country.

Mr. DOUGLASS. That's very true. It's similar to the classified memo that they sent around—actually, it was unclassified, I believe, or classified at the time—where they talk about him being a very sensitive source, and then describe in sufficient detail that nobody could help but know who it was.

Mr. DORNAN. Proceed.

Mr. DOUGLASS. This has happened repeatedly.

There is only one exception that I'm aware of, to my statement that nobody ever talked to him to learn what he knew. That exception is that they did, to the extent necessary, assess how much of a threat he represented to the efforts designed to sweep the whole matter under the rug. That's the only exception that I'm aware of.

It is not that people debriefed him, analyzed his information, and then rejected it. They did not want to know in the first place. And, with few exceptions, I believe they still do not want to know.

Toward the end of 1992, I became so personally shocked at the efforts to bury his information that I took it upon myself to work with him to reconstruct the events related to American POW's as best he could recollect them.

The essence of his information is that American POW's, and to a lesser extent, South Korean and South Vietnamese POW's, were used by the Soviets as laboratory specimens, human guinea pigs, if you will, for training military doctors and for conducting experiments with drugs, chemical and biological warfare agents, and atomic radiation. I have prepared a fairly detailed paper based on these debriefings of General Sejna, and some of my own experiences in this process, for your use. I will leave a copy of this paper with the committee. I will not summarize General Sejna's information further because I believe he will do that himself in a few minutes.

By 1993, it was clear to me that the efforts of people in our Government had thoroughly alerted the Communist officials, former Communist officials, and intelligence services, about the emergence of Sejna's information. The possibility of surprise has been almost totally destroyed.

Accordingly, I decided to publish the essence of Sejna's information so that at least the American public could be aware of this facet of the POW/MIA problem. I also hoped that maybe the information would find its way on to the desk of that rare individual who, like Colonel Peck, was truly interested in learning what happened.

The Conservative Review published my article in late 1993. It elicited no response from within the Government, but several people outside the Government were astounded with the information, so much so that I prepared an even more detailed accounting that was published in October, 1994, and January, 1995.

While the information in these articles was extensive, it still represented only a small portion of what was available. For example, I deliberately withheld information that could be best used in tracking down additional information on American servicemen who might still be alive. I felt it was prudent to withhold this information to prevent its sabotage by the same forces that had blown the whistle on Sejna and his knowledge so effectively in 1992.

As you might guess, again there was absolutely no response from anyone in the Government. Indeed, even the news media and journalists were, for the most part, silent. But this is understandable. The charges inherent in the information are extremely serious. The use of hundreds to thousands of American POW's in gruesome medical experiments. However, while we may not like the facts, it seems to me that we have to examine them, all of them, independ-

ent of where they may lead, and even if the trail is likely to lead to war crimes of a nature not seen since World War II.

A related problem, of course, and one that you referred to, Mr. Chairman, is that no one seems to want to hold the Communists or Russian leadership accountable. Since the Soviet Union was born in 1917, few people have been willing to confront the evils of their system.

I guess one of the key questions today is, has anything changed? Is anyone today willing to confront the Russians and the entire array of former and remaining Communists? Does our country today have the moral courage to do what is right, or will the usual political and commercial interests prevail?

I cannot adequately express my own feelings on how important this task is. We owe it to all those still missing, and to all those who will be asked to serve in the future. If the United States does not take the strongest possible stand in opposition to injustices of this magnitude, how can we ever expect to put an end to them?

Thank you very much for this opportunity to share with you my feelings. I certainly look forward to assisting in any way I can to help better learn what has happened and to recover those who may still be alive.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph D. Douglass follows:]

Statement of Joseph D. Douglass before the Military Personnel Subcommittee
of the House National Security Committee, September 17, 1996

Congressman Dornan, members of the House National Security Committee, ladies and gentlemen. It is a privilege to be asked to participate in your hearings.

Let me begin by thanking you for your efforts to learn what happened to the missing American servicemen. I believe this task is one of the most pressing and moral challenges our nation faces.

I have worked in the national security area for close to thirty-five years. During this time I have worked on many very unpleasant subjects: nuclear war, chemical and biological warfare, deception, narcotics trafficking, and others.

However, I can honestly say that nothing has left me with a more profound sense of sadness, frustration, and anger than has my work in the POW/MIA area.

We ask our young men, many of them barely out of high school, to leave their families and friends, and to sacrifice their lives for their country, and even for other countries. They leave not knowing if they will live to return or, if they do, what condition they will be in.

But they go, and relatively few complain. They believe that America places great value on human life and that whatever can be done to support them in battle will be done.

Most important, they also believe, as expressed so well in the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs final report, that "the single most basic principle of personal honor in America's armed forces is *never willingly to leave a fellow serviceman behind.*"

Most Americans, civilian and military, sincerely believe in this principle.

And, when the chips are down, Americans have great faith in their leaders and institutions. We may not agree with all their policies and mannerisms, but we do stand behind them, especially during a crisis.

This is why coming to terms with the POW/MIA issue is such a difficult process. None of us want to believe that this fundamental code of honor, this trust between our country and those sent to fight its wars, has been broken, repeatedly broken — not by those sent to fight the wars but by our own leaders. This is a painful realization that is very hard to reach.

But, this is what I now believe: that thousands of American youth who went to war to serve their country were knowingly and deliberately abandoned after the war was over. They were not simply abandoned because they were dead — they were just abandoned; abandoned, as many of us now believe, to a life worse than death.

Nor is this where the story ends, because our government's subsequent efforts seem to have been directed first to deny any were abandoned, and then to bury information that might show what really happened to those still missing.

In short, the search for the "truth" has been mainly a charade. The best description of the process that I have read is the letter of resignation written by Col. Millard Peck, who headed the Defense POW/MIA office in 1990. His letter presents a sobering eye-witness

account of the mendacity and duplicity that have attended our government's efforts to recover missing American servicemen. My experience certainly supports what Col. Peck described.

I have been involved in POW studies since 1992 when a friend first told me about the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. He said that he thought the Committee would be very interested in the information I had acquired during my work with General Major Jan Sejna, who is here today to share with you his knowledge.

It is most important here to recognize who General Sejna is and why his information is so important.

General Sejna is, to my knowledge, the most important communist official ever to seek political asylum in the West, which he did at the end of February 1968. Before he defected, General Sejna had held a variety of key positions in Czechoslovakia.

He was a member of the Czech Central Committee and the Parliament, which roughly corresponds to our Congress. At the Parliament he was a member of the Presidium, which was the inner circle, and of the Party Group, which gave the marching instructions to the Presidium and to the Parliament.

He was a member of the bureau at the Main Political Administration which is the Party watchdog over the military. This administration also has an important role in the formation and implementation of policy.

Early in his career, Gen. Sejna helped set up the Czech Defense Council, which was patterned after the Soviet Defense Council, which is the highest ranking decision-making body in areas of defense, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and national security. He was the de facto secretary of the Defense Council and in charge of the Defense Council secretariat for several years.

He was first secretary of the party at the Ministry of Defense, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense, and he served on the Minister's Kollegium. And, he was a member of the military section of the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee.

In brief, Gen. Sejna was a member of the decision-making hierarchy, one of the ten most knowledgeable officials in Czechoslovakia. He met regularly with top communist officials from the Soviet Union and around the world.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am not trying to exaggerate his importance. It is simply crucial that you understand where he is coming from. He was where the action was. What he has to say is not hearsay or second-hand information. It is all first-hand knowledge. He was there. He is an eye-witness. It is his personal experiences he is reporting.

I first met General Sejna in the late 1970s. We subsequently have worked together on a variety of projects. I have never known him to be deceptive or misleading in describing his experiences as a top communist official. Nor have I ever met anyone who had worked closely with him who did not have the highest respect for his information.

Gen. Sejna was the first person to explain the importance of the Defense Council to U.S. intelligence. He is also the person who first laid out in detail the role of the Soviet Union

in organizing and training terrorists, and who first told people about the Soviet long-range strategic plan, and about their extremely effective narcotics trafficking intelligence operation. It was in my investigations of the Soviet narcotics trafficking operation that I first became aware of Soviet operations with American POWs.

I have also personally witnessed numerous efforts by people who did not like what he had to say to discredit him and his information, just as happened when I tried to bring his information to the attention of the Senate Select Committee.

As soon as I began looking into the POW/MIA problem, I concluded that General Sejna's information was of major importance, so much so that I met several times with him to conduct some very specific debriefings to confirm the depth and breadth of his knowledge.

The more I talked to him, the more I knew how important it was to bring his knowledge to the attention of the right people, yet do it in such a way that his information could be confirmed and used to learn more about what happened to the missing Americans *before* the Russians, or North Koreans, or Vietnamese were able to learn what was afoot and silence potential witnesses, burn documents, or otherwise cover their tracks.

This is when I started to learn the real truth about our government's POW/MIA efforts. As I began talking to people on the Select Committee staff there seemed to emerge in parallel a variety of efforts from people within the DIA and CIA and elsewhere to discredit General Sejna, sabotage his information, and alert the Czech and Russian intelligence services about what he was saying.

In rethinking this process, I concluded that one of the most important points to make is that to my knowledge there has been *no* effort by *anyone* one in government in any agency or official capacity to learn what Gen Sejna knows, except to the extent necessary to assess how much a threat he represented to the efforts designed to sweep the whole matter under the rug.

It is not that people debriefed him, analyzed his information, and then rejected it. They did not want to know in the first place. And, with few exceptions, they still do not want to know. This is one of the real challenges your committee faces.

Toward the end of 1992, I became so personally shocked at the efforts to bury his information that I took it upon myself to work with Gen Sejna to reconstruct the events related to American POWs as best he could recollect them.

The essence of his information is that American POWs, and to a lesser extent South Korean and South Vietnamese POWs, were used by the Soviets as laboratory specimens — human guinea pigs — for training military doctors and for conducting experiments with drugs, chemical and biological warfare agents, and atomic radiation. I have prepared a paper based on my debriefings of General Sejna and my own experience for your use. I believe General Sejna will summarize his knowledge for you in a few minutes.

By 1993 it was clear to me that the efforts of people in our government had thoroughly alerted the former communist officials and intelligence services about the emergence of Sejna's information. The possibility of surprise has been almost totally destroyed.

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The *Conservative Review* published my article in late 1993. It elicited no response from within the government, but several people outside the government were astounded with the information — so much so that I prepared an even more detailed accounting that was published in October 1994 and January 1995.

While the information presented in these articles was extensive, it still only represented a small portion of what was available. For example, I deliberately withheld information that could be best used in tracking down additional information on American servicemen who might still be alive. I felt it was prudent to withhold this information to prevent its sabotage by the same forces that had blown the whistle on Sejna and his knowledge so effectively in 1992.

As you might guess, again there was absolutely no response from anyone in the government. Indeed, even the news media for the most part refused to cover the story, I suspect because the charges and details in the information were so extensive that anyone would immediately understand that what was at issue was the perpetration of war crimes of a magnitude not experienced since the end of World War II.

The problem, of course, is that no one seems to want to hold the communist or Russian leadership accountable. Since the Soviet Union was born in 1917, few people have been willing to confront the evils of their system.

One of the key questions today is, has anything changed? Is anyone today willing to confront the Russians and the entire array of former and remaining communists?

Does our country today have the moral courage to do what is right, or will the usual political and commercial interests prevail?

I can not adequately express my own feelings on how important this task is. We owe it to all those still missing, and to all those who will be asked to serve in the future. If the United States does not take the strongest possible stand in opposition to what has happened, how can we ever expect to put an end to such atrocities?

Thank you for this opportunity to share with you my feelings. I will be happy to assist in any way I can to learn what happened and to recover those who may still be alive.

Report Prepared for Hearings of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
National Security Committee, House of Representatives

**Missing American Servicemen
Abandoned for "Foreign Policy" Reasons**

by
Joseph D. Douglass Jr.

American POWs were used as "laboratory specimens" by Soviet, Czech, and North Korean doctors during the Korean War. This information is the subject of a secret Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report that was released on June 21, 1996, by Congressman Robert Dornan.

The experiments were performed at a "Czech built hospital in North Korea." The experiments were conducted to "develop methods of modifying human behavior and destroying psychological resistance," to "study the effects of various drugs and environmental conditions on American soldiers and pilots," and to "train Czechoslovakian and Soviet doctors under wartime conditions."

"At the conclusion of the testing program a number of American POWs were executed...to preclude public exposure of the information." Up to "several dozen" unwilling participants may have been executed.

These are direct quotes from the DIA report and its covering memo. Since 1973, when only 586 out of over 2,000 missing POWs were repatriated during Operation Homecoming, the friends and families of the missing have asked, "Where are they; *please*, tell us the truth." Their ranks quickly swelled as they were joined by the families of the over 8,000 who never returned from Korea and over 20,000 who never returned from WWII.

The information on the experimental use of American POWs came to light, according to the DIA report, in September 1990 when Air Force Intelligence began questioning a United States Government (USG) source about Soviet POW interrogation techniques. DIA said they first learned about the information shortly after Desert Storm came to an end and that they launched an investigation that continued up until the date of the just-released report, April 27, 1992.

After DIA had completed their investigative effort, the source was polygraphed on the *essential elements* of the reported information and "*no deception*" was uncovered. Additionally, DIA stated that "*the source has provided reliable information to the USG for over 20 years*" and that he was "*well placed in that he personally saw progress reports on the work in North Korea that were forwarded to top leadership in the Czech Central Committee and Ministry of Defense.*" In brief, he was an impeccable source.

The DIA covering memo further explains that he "*remains a very sensitive source*" who is "most reluctant to have his identity become known or to be tied to the information he provided." The source's concern is not without reason. Just on the basis of the information in the short DIA report, there is every reason to shift from a search for missing Americans to an investigation into war crimes of a nature not seen since the end of WWII. Accordingly, the report

was “classified both to protect the source’s identity and to ensure proper security is maintained during possible demarche and follow-up investigative activity.”

According to the memo, copies of the DIA report were furnished *only* to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary for Policy, and the Assistant Secretary (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence). No copies were sent to the military departments, the intelligence agencies, the Department of State, the temporary Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, or the House POW/MIA Task Force, all of whom are normally on the distribution of POW/MIA material. DIA was concerned that such distribution “could serious impact ongoing foreign policy activities of the United States Government.”

Looking Beneath the Surface

On its surface, the report and covering memorandum present the impression that DIA was seriously concerned for the safety of the source and had mounted a detailed investigation, including an “*intensive and extensive* review of open source literature and archived intelligence materials.” They even say they tasked CIA to do likewise and to query the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Services about the information Sejna had provided.

But wait: why would anyone go to one of the organizations whose predecessor played a key role in these most heinous operations and ask for their assistance? Would not the prudent approach be to first conduct a covert investigation right up to the objective of finding any survivors and verifying the guilt or innocence of those accused of the crimes? Unfortunately, without a tremendous amount of information that the DIA is not about to provide, the reader is at a loss of what to conclude.

However, to those who have experienced the DIA/POW-MIA office in action, their memo and report are quickly seen to be a living example of the duplicity and mendacity that have characterized our government’s efforts to “learn what happened” since the end of WWII. The report and memo are clearly designed to cover the DIA/POW-MIA’s backside. The reason it was not sent to Congress had little to do with the safety of the source. Rather, it likely was not sent to Congress to avoid drawing any attention to the importance of the source, which the DIA and CIA were actively trying to discredit, and especially to the fact that the source had passed a polygraph. Moreover, the last thing DIA and CIA wanted was an “intensive and extensive” review of the evidence. Nor did either want an effort mounted to track down valuable leads.

Admittedly, these are strong words. But, are they justified? To better judge what is happening, lets look at “the rest of the story,” as Paul Harvey would say.

Who is the “very sensitive source”? While several sources have provided the same “essential elements,” including two in-place agents, in this particular case the identity of the source can be deduced from statements in the DIA memo that indicate he had defected over 20 years earlier, was from Czechoslovakia, and was “well placed.”

The source has to have been General Major Jan Sejna who had defected in Trieste to the United States in late February 1968. General Sejna was no ordinary army officer. Prior to his defection he was a member of the Czech Central Committee, the National Assembly, the Presidium, and the Main Party Group in the Presidium that told the Presidium and National Assembly what to do. He was acting Secretary of the Defense Council, also known as the Military Committee of the Central Committee, which he had helped set up in 1956 and which is

the top decision-making body, higher than the Politburo, in matters of defense, intelligence, counter-intelligence, deception, and internal security in the communist system. He was a member of the Main Political Administration that watches over the entire military establishment and of its governing Bureau. He was First Secretary of the Party at the Ministry of Defense MoD, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense and a member of the Minister's Kollegium. He was also a member of the military section of the Administrative Organs Department and was on a wide variety of government and Party committees.

Sejna was not just "*well placed*," as described in the DIA memo. He was one of the seven or eight most knowledgeable individuals at the top of the Czech nomenclatura. He was personally responsible for monitoring many of the most sensitive operations and for disseminating Defense Council decisions and operational instructions. He was also the primary MoD interface with the Soviet Union. And, *his memory was excellent*.

The DIA's description of the experiments that the military and medical intelligence doctors from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union conducted on American and other nationality POWs really does not do them justice. The DIA report leaves out nearly all the devastating details. For example, part of the training of the military doctors was amputations. American GIs were used as subjects, not much different from the horrors American POWs suffered in WWII at the hands of the Japanese. The Czechs had also built a crematorium in North Korea to dispose of the body parts and the soldiers themselves when all their parts were used up.

The soldiers were also used to test a wide variety of experimental mind control and behavior modification drugs, as indicated in the DIA report. The Korean War era propaganda films of American soldiers extolling the benefits of communism while decrying the evils of democracy were the product of exactly such mind control drugs. Another aspect the DIA left out was the use of American POWs to test biological and chemical warfare agents and their use to determine lethal and sublethal effects of atomic radiation, and to determine how much physical and psychological stress the American soldiers could endure, in contrast to the Asians, who were also among the guinea pigs.

How many POWs became guinea pigs? The DIA report refers to "several dozen" unwilling participants being executed. The only other reference to size is the DIA statement that the Czech built hospital was a "large hospital facility," with no indication of how large is large.

Just to place things in perspective, the issue is not a small handful of POWs. The hospital was designed for 200 "patients." It was often overcrowded and at one time held 600 patients. No patients were known ever to have left the hospital alive, except the roughly 100 who were still alive after the shooting stopped and still regarded as useful experimental subjects and, hence, shipped back to the Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia for more testing, another small item the DIA report neglects to mention.

The DIA report also neglects to explain that the same thing happened during the Vietnam War, with experiments conducted on American POWs in North Vietnam and Laos and with several hundred (probably over 300) American POWs shipped to the Soviet Union (this time through Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and Germany) to serve as guinea pigs for more secretive tests and experiments that could not be conducted in Vietnam. The DIA memo also neglects to explain that the Koreans and North Vietnamese also provided captured American POWs to

China for similar research during the Korean and Vietnam Wars and that the Soviets also used prisoners as experimental subjects during WWII.

When Did They Know and What Did They Do?

The DIA memo creates the impression that the first anyone knew about the Czech hospital in North Korea and experimental use of US POWs was September, 1990, when Air Force Intelligence debriefed a "USG source" on Soviet POW interrogation techniques, and that DIA only found out about the lead after the conclusion of Desert Storm (presumably in February or March 1991). Without intending to dispute this story, one has to ask why, if they knew about the source in early 1991, did they wait until the summer of 1992 to question the source, who had been a DIA employee since about 1981 and who was in an office just around the corner from DIA headquarters at Bolling Air Force Base and nearly always readily available for questioning?

I know one DIA section knew about the Czech hospital in North Korea and its use during the Korean War *no later than January 22, 1987*, which was when I briefed a group of ten DIA analysts and their group leader on Soviet narcotics trafficking strategy, whose origins are tied to autopsies conducted at the hospital. I described the role of the hospital and its use in experimenting on US POWs in greater detail than is presented in the just-released 1992 DIA report.

Less than a month later I briefed one of the DIA deputy directors and several of his key staff, including his CBW specialists, on the same subject, including the hospital in North Korea and its use.

This essence of this material was also presented in an article published in *Global Affairs* in the fall of 1987. The article was jointly authored by Gen. Sejna and myself. The material was next published in the book *Red Cocaine*, which was a detailed accounting of the Soviet international narcotics trafficking intelligence operation, in January, 1990, and that book in manuscript form had been earlier submitted to the CIA for security review and approval, which was granted in September, 1989. Following that approval, the material was briefed to a wide variety of people in the Washington, D.C. area.

From my perspective, the potential significance of the material to the fight being waged by the families of POW/MIAs to learn what happened to their loved ones emerged with a fury in April, 1992, which is when I first told a few Congressional Hill staffers, including one who was on the staff of the Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs, about the information and existence of a living, knowledgeable source with first-hand knowledge of what happened to thousands of American POW/MIAs. To bring the information to the attention of the Select Committee's Chairman and Vice Chairman, on July 20 I delivered a six-page memo to the offices of Senators Kerry and Smith. This memo described Gen. Sejna and explained the origins of the experimental program and its operational use in Korea and Vietnam. It also urged caution to avoid jeopardizing the information.

As it turned out, the Select Committee was no more interested in the information and safeguarding its use than the DIA. Almost the instant Sejna's knowledge began to surface within the Select Committee, a wide variety of CIA and DIA actions seemed to materialize, all designed to discredit Sejna, sabotage the leads for additional information, and kill proposed efforts to conduct a thorough debriefing and analysis of Gen. Sejna's information. This is when I first learned that DIA had asked CIA to contact the Czech Intelligence Service, which was the worst

possible thing one could do. It was guaranteed to cause alarm bells to sound throughout the former communist intelligence services and at that time it was *well known* that the KGB had been finding sources and silencing them. So much for the DIA's classifying their memo and report to "protect the source's identity."

At no time since I first began surfacing Sejna's knowledge about what happened to American POWs have I observed any DIA or DIA/POW-MIA or CIA interest in learning what Sejna knows. This is still true today. The only serious interest was in trying to discredit him and bury his information *without even knowing what was in the information*.

Next, DIA/POW-MIA joined forces with the CIA to go through Gen. Sejna's original 1968 debriefings to learn what Sejna might have said in 1968. This material was subsequently falsified to cover CIA malfeasance, discredit Sejna, and discourage further inquiry, about which more will be said shortly.

Their third action was to place Sejna under hostile grilling for about 8 hours, call him a liar and intimidate him in what was obviously a witch hunt. Then they put him on the polygraph, *four times in one day* according to a memo written by one of the Select Committee staff, all of which he passed. They could find *no indications of any deception*. From then on, rather than debrief him to learn more, they avoided him like the plague—they would not even speak to him or say "good morning" when they passed him in the halls.

When I first identified the sabotage taking place in April, I wrote a letter to Bob Gates, who was then Director, CIA. After referencing a long conversation we had several years earlier, which included a discussion of the "reluctance" of certain elements within CIA to pursue investigations of certain *strategic* intelligence operations directed against the United States, I told him of my concern about the POW/MIA area, the accuracy and excellence of Gen. Sejna's information, his having passed a hostile polygraph, and the continued reluctance within CIA and DIA to debrief him. I then proposed an external project to debrief him as the only solution. On May 27 I received back a *hand-written* note, which said, among other things, "I have sent the package to others *with a suggestion to pursue*."

After waiting three months and hearing nothing, I dropped another letter to Bob to let him know that no one had follow-up on his suggestion. Again, I stressed the importance of debriefing Sejna. The POW problem was at the top of my very short list of topics. This time I received a typed reply that said, "our people believe that the historic developments in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall have overtaken the need to pursue a program such as the one you have proposed. Please forgive me for not being able to go into detail; however, *I am assured that the information to which General Sejna might have access has already been fully exploited*."

Obviously, the fall of the Berlin Wall and disintegration of the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the strategic intelligence operations of interest. All still represented major threats to US national security. It was not the KGB or GRU that disintegrated. They were as alive and well as ever. In the case of American POWs, the disintegration made debriefing Sejna even more important because of the increased possibility the disintegration created to collect additional information during the chaos and confusion. Even more obvious, there is no way that Sejna's information on any of the areas I was concerned about could have been exploited, let alone fully

exploited, insofar as he had never been debriefed on any them. Obviously, who ever was doing the "assuring" was deliberating lying to Director Gates.

Because of the tremendous importance of the subjects, especially the POW/MIA problem, and because the lies were so evident, I wrote back to Gates. I got right to the point: "The question in my mind is, is it proper for me to tell you when you are being sandbagged by your own people?"

Next, I suggested he challenge the CIA to find anyone who had debriefed Sejna on *Druzha Narodov*, one of the most effective strategic Soviet intelligence operations, still active, and the one that had been the main subject of our discussion several years earlier when he had welcomed my efforts because he thought Director Casey would be able to use them to knock some sense into the heads of the CIA analysts. Then I challenged him to find one person in the CIA who would dare claim to know what was in Sejna's memory regarding American POW/MIAs. I also mentioned the Select Committee, the efforts to sabotage critical information, and the fact that the Berlin Wall had nothing to do with learning what happened to those missing Americans. My objective was to state very clearly *for the record* that his letter of September 22 "did not reflect the true state of affairs." My guess is that he never was given the letter.

A week or so later I obtained a copy of a CIA memo that had been sent to the Select Committee earlier in the summer. While heavily censored, it still provides an excellent example of the CIA's efforts to assassinate Sejna's character. The subject of the memo is "Jan Sejna." Sejna is blandly described as "a military officer attached to the Czechoslovak General Staff and a member of the Czech National Assembly. Sejna was a political officer [a carefully calculated slur] whose specialty was communist party matters." Compare this, if you will, to the abbreviated listing of positions Gen. Sejna held as presented above.

In paragraph 2 the CIA memo states: "He admitted from the beginning...that he had no hard information on intelligence matters." This is another artful misrepresentation. What Sejna actually said was that he was not involved in tactical matters like running agents (evidently what the CIA refers to as "hard intelligence") and did not know the names of agents in the United States. Rather, his knowledge of intelligence was generally restricted to the discussion of issues at the Defense Council level; that is, his primary knowledge was *strategic* level information. (In the eighteen years I have worked with Sejna and reviewed intelligence reports based on his information, the only instance where I observed efforts to debrief him on items of strategic importance was in the case of Soviet sponsorship of international terrorism, a debriefing by DIA analysts circa 1980 that the CIA mid-level officials tried to kill because they did not want to find the Soviets implicated in such a nefarious activity.)

In paragraph 5 they state that a review of their files shows that at no time did Sejna tell them about POWs, the hospital in North Korea, or medical experiments; and in paragraph 7 they provide what is purported to be a transcript of Sejna telling them in 1968 *in Czech* that he never heard anything about POWs in North Vietnam. This was one of the items that DIA confronted Sejna with at their "initial interview" and then called him a liar and accused him of inventing information.

Well now, they totally misjudged both Gen. Sejna's memory and the one primary rule he has lived by since his defection: stick to the truth, avoid speculation, and never compromise the truth. On several occasions he had been asked to "change his story so that it would be better

accepted.” He never did, and incurred the wrath of many. In this case, he told the DIA/POW-MIA inquisitors that he never said what they accused him of saying, that he did not speak like that, and that he wanted to hear the tapes. First they said the tapes were destroyed. Later they said they would be brought around the next day. Neither DIA nor CIA ever produced the tapes.

I obtained a copy of the purported transcript and took it to two Czech linguists, one an official simultaneous translator and one who had a PhD in linguistics, and asked them what they could tell me about the response. Both independently told me that it was strange because no one talked that way in Czechoslovakia. *It was archaic diplomatic Czech*, they both explained.

The only conclusion I could draw is that the CIA deliberately falsified the record and botched the job in the process! Why? Did they do it strictly to discredit Sejna, or did they find something in the record that bothered them? Congressman Dornan asked Sejna to visit with him and talk about the POW problem. He asked Sejna if he ever told the CIA about the experimental use of American POWs. Sejna replied: *Yes, he had. He had told his CIA debriefers about the use of POWs during his debriefing in 1968 but they were not interested.* Later, I called Sejna to make certain there was no misunderstanding the question. There was none. He simply told Dornan precisely what happened.

The significance of this is doubly devastating because within a year, a North Vietnamese Army doctor, Dr Dang Tan, would have defected to the South. He told his American interrogators that:

- ▶ American POWs were being treated as commodities.
- ▶ In violation of the laws, POWs were being shipped to other communist countries, including China, the USSR, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia for further exploitation.
- ▶ Drugs were being used on the POWs.
- ▶ The treatment of American POWs was inhumane.

There is no indication that anyone really cared about what Dr. Dang Tan had to say, until it became politically expedient. This information was deliberately released during a press conference on 11 May, 1971, arranged by the CIA to put pressure on the North Vietnamese. The implications of what Dr. Dang Tan were so clearly explosive that the CIA Station Chief wired CIA Director Helms, who in turn sent a high-priority memo to Henry Kissinger, with copies to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Moorer, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan, alerting them in advance to what Dr. Dang Tan was about to say. Did any of these people or their staffs take any action in the interest of American POWs, or were they all too focused on the politics of foreign policy?

“Anticipatory Discrediting”

A Memorandum for the Record, dated October 30, 1992, by John F. McCreary who was a conscientious DIA analyst and lawyer on leave from DIA to work on the Select Committee staff provides additional insight into the reception Gen. Sejna and his information received over the summer of 1992. McCreary wrote the memo because he was concerned that leaks from the Committee’s Staff Director to the DoD and other agencies were “endangering the lives and livelihood of two witnesses ... Jan Sejna [and] Le Quang Khai.”

McCreary reports on a meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission at the State Department. “The discussion featured information provided by Sejna. LeGro [another member of

the Select Committee staff] stated that *Ambassador Malcolm Toon called for his [Sejna's] dismissal*. DIA personnel defended Sejna as to his expertise on Central Europe, *but not as to his information on other areas, particularly POW-related.*" Obviously, the DIA folks did not like what Sejna had to say, nor evidently the fact that, as correctly stated in the just-released DIA memo, "the source has provided reliable information to the USG for over 20 years" and had been polygraphed after the "investigative effort" with "no deception indicated."

The Honorable Malcolm Toon later headed an entourage that went to Prague to talk to Czech authorities about Sejna's information. One of the members of the group told me a few days after they returned that the real purpose of the trip was to discredit Sejna. They were dismayed because none of the Czech authorities would say anything bad about Sejna. None of them could confirm anything Sejna said because none were in a position to know. However, one of the authorities explained their position very clearly: "Anything Sejna says should be taken with the greatest respect," he said with quiet deliberation, "Sejna was one of the few people who really knew what was happening."

In his memo, McCreary next referred to a letter from the CIA to the Select Committee "that discredits Sejna's information" evidently because his information was not confirmed by the Czech government! No mention of the fact that the hospital was confirmed and that the presence of the key Czech individual in charge of the operation in North Korea was confirmed, or of other sources that have confirmed various portions of Sejna's information, or that neither the CIA nor DIA understood the system well enough to even know how to go about confirming the information.

McCreary's conclusion encapsulates the nature of the problem in a most insightful manner. He wrote: "*As of this writing, we do not know what Sejna knows or will say under oath, yet his testimony has already been written off. This anticipatory discrediting of a Select Committee potential witness is tantamount to tampering with the evidence.*"

Further Indications of DIA/POW-MIA Intentions

Even the alleged purpose of the just-released DIA report—to provide information for a proposed diplomatic demarche to the Czechoslovakian Government—borders on the ludicrous. Why would you send a demarche to a government complaining about what a politically discredited government of twenty years earlier had done and even then one under Soviet control? But, give DIA credit. At least they did not propose sending demarches to Russia, or Vietnam, or North Korea, or China!

There was and still is only one action that ever made sense in this situation: to thoroughly debrief Gen. Sejna and proceed *covertly* to track down every leaf, and turn over every rock, to learn what happened to the thousands of servicemen left behind and, God willing, to rescue those still alive and held in captivity. The DIA/POW-MIA and their friends or co-conspirators at CIA and State have done just about everything they could to deny those abandoned men who put their lives on the line for their country their freedom and to destroy the information that the families of those missing have been begging for, some for over forty years.

But, how about the "DIA investigation" and their "intensive and extensive review of open source literature and archived intelligence material"? There is only one way to describe it: a BIG FAT LIE. As they state in their report, their investigative and analytical effort culminated with a report of investigation received from the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service in March 1992"

and that “Upon completion of the investigative effort the source was polygraphed...” which was in June or July as I recall. Only three problems.

First, they *never* debriefed Sejna. All they did was subject him to hostile questioning for roughly eight hours and polygraph him. They had no interest in learning what Sejna knew, which would require a several month intense effort. I know because I have worked at debriefing him for many hundreds of hours over eighteen years and I know what the process entails and how arduous it is.

Second, they never made any effort to learn how to track down information. As indicated earlier, other than a short visit in October by two Select Committee staffers to talk about his information and ask what agencies to visit when they were in Czechoslovakia, no one has bothered to seek his advice, and the problem is certainly not one of asking which agencies to ask, would they please search their files!

Third, there is no indication that DIA/POW-MIA ever reviewed the most pertinent archival material that might help verify and extend Sejna’s information. What they mainly looked for was information to discredit him; for example, by going back over his 1968 debriefing, a massive but useless exercise insofar as trying to learn what happened is concerned. Let them produce a list of what they did research and it will quickly become apparent how transparent their intentions were.

The Final Judgement

Am I making a mountain out of the proverbial mole hill? In the end, there is only one basis for judgement, and that is Sejna’s knowledge. Why is there no one in a position of authority who wants to know what Sejna knows?

I do not know the full extent of that knowledge because my proposal to the OSD/POW-MIA office in August, 1992, to conduct a detailed debriefing of Sejna and devise a covert plan for finding additional information was spiked, as was my proposal to CIA. However, I did spend enough time debriefing Sejna on my own in 1992 and 1993 to reach the conclusion that the failure to debrief Sejna should be viewed as much more than mere tampering with the evidence. In my judgement it was closer to treason.

You be the judge. The material that follows is the results of my preliminary debriefing of Gen. Sejna. I say “preliminary” to emphasis that this is not “the rest of the story.” It is only the beginning. This material was published in 1994 and 1995 by *Conservative Review*. It was a story no one wanted to believe, because of the implications and because of the cold water “those in the know” poured over it. Now, however, the DIA report confirms the fact that they knew, secretly did not challenge, and could find no indications of deception when they polygraphed the source.

The material is only a sampling of what is available. I deliberately avoided including information I judged to be of greatest value in tracking down more information and possible survivors so that it could not be sabotaged. I also omitted many details that concerned the inner workings of Soviet and Czech intelligence apparatus, associated decision-making processes, and their interplay. Many collateral aspects of the military medical intelligence experiments were omitted because there simply was not room.

My motivation in publishing this information was the hope of finding someone in a position of authority who was interested in seeing the “rest of the story” developed. I did not

succeed. No inquiries were ever received from anyone in the government. What better indication of their interest is there? You be the judge. The pertinent portions of Gen. Sejna's recollections follow.

Korea: The Operation Begins

Czechoslovakia's participation in the Soviet medical intelligence operation began early in the Korean War, when it was directed by the Soviets to build an experimental hospital in North Korea. The plans were drawn up by the Military Project Institute, which was part of the Construction Administration of the Czech Ministry of Defense (MoD). This Administration also contained a special department that was responsible for secret projects, especially those in foreign countries, and that managed the construction of the hospital.

Ostensibly, the hospital was built to test new medical procedures for treating military casualties and for training young military doctors. That was its cover; but not its sole mission. It also served as a special, highly-secure medical intelligence facility in which captured American and South Korean servicemen were used as guinea pigs in the types of medical experiments previously enumerated. The Czechs also built a crematorium in North Korea to dispose of the remains of those GIs who did not survive the experiments.

What happened to the soldiers who did survive the experimental procedures for treating military wounds is not known. However, in light of the sensitive nature of the facility, it is doubtful that any were ever returned to the regular POW compounds, nor did Sejna recall any report or discussion that suggested that any of those GI patients were ever returned to the North Koreans. When the existence of this hospital was brought to the attention of CIA and DIA, they were both surprised. Neither had heard of it before. This also suggests that no POWs returned from it because had they, they would have reported on the hospital in their routine debriefings by U.S. intelligence. The existence of this hospital has been confirmed by Czech authorities.

The overall operation in North Korea came under the authority of the Czech General Staff deputy director of military intelligence for strategic intelligence, Colonel Rudolf Babka. Babka was a hard-line Stalinist who had been brought in to replace a bourgeois general. Col. Babka was sent to North Korea under diplomatic cover as an official of the foreign ministry, which was only a deception. After the war, he was promoted to head of the General Staff Foreign Administration, which had both an overt and covert function. Overtly, the Foreign Administration negotiated foreign military assistance with various defense attaches. Covertly, it was a military intelligence front used to manage special clandestine overseas operations.

The experimental Czech hospital in North Korea was designed to handle two hundred "patients." In actuality, the hospital was often overcrowded. One year, six hundred patients were treated. At times the hospital was so crowded that two patients were required to share one bed. The individual who actually ran the hospital was Colonel Professor Dr. Dufek. Dr. Dufek, a former Soviet citizen who had emigrated to Czechoslovakia, was a heart specialist in charge of research at the Czech Central Military Hospital in Prague. Sejna discussed the operation with both Col. Babka and Dr. Dufek, and was present when they briefed the Minister of Defense's Kollegium on the hospital and its operation.

The Kollegium functioned as a preliminary Defense Council within the Ministry of Defense. Most issues were first discussed within the Kollegium before they went to the Defense Council. The Defense Council was the highest decision making body in intelligence, counter-

intelligence, defense, and anything of a national security or internal security nature. Its members were established by law and comprised the six most powerful strategic leaders in the nation. It was higher than the Politburo. Sejna acted as secretary for the Defense Council and head of its Secretariat from 1956 to 1964. He was a member of the Minister's Kollegium up until he left in 1968.

Roughly eighteen Czech doctors were involved in the North Korean operation, and over twenty Russian doctors. In preparation for their assignment, several of the Czech doctors were given special training in atomic radiation and its effects on the human body at the Institute for Nuclear Medicine in Moscow. These were the doctors who conducted the radiation experiments in North Korea. Each of them was required to sign a statement saying that they volunteered for this assignment. For these experiments, radio-isotopes were brought to North Korea from the Soviet Union for use in radiating the GIS.

Experiments Following the Korean War

In 1954, after the Korean War armistice was in effect, the Soviets decided to terminate the operation and turn the hospital over to the North Koreans. This decision was made by the Soviet Defense Council and then coordinated with the Czech Defense Council.

As part of this decision to terminate operations at the hospital in North Korea, the POWs who were of no further use — that is, those whose mental or physical impairment had significantly diminished their utility as good medical subjects — were killed and their remains cremated. Those who were being used in experiments that were not completed or who were still of experimental value — roughly one hundred GIS — were shipped to the Soviet Union where the experimental work was to continue. For example, one of the experiments to be continued would determine the long-term effects of sub-lethal doses of atomic radiation. To the Soviets, “long-term” usually meant several decades; fifty years was typical. In the case of sub-lethal radiation effects, the Soviet interest included effects of radiation on the soldiers’ reproductive organs and on their subsequent children and grandchildren.

The POWs that were shipped to the Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia were transported by air in four roughly-equivalent plane loads. They first stopped in Prague, where the GIS were given medical exams before being sent on to various experimental medical test facilities in the Soviet Union. The stopover typically lasted about a week. Its purpose was security — to “break the trail,” so that the Soviets could subsequently deny any claims that POWs were shipped to the U.S.S.R. from North Korea. That is also why the experimental hospital was a “Czech” hospital. These deceptions were all part of a carefully designed plan to mask the movement of GIS to the Soviet Union and to mislead people, including most of the Czech and Soviet participants, about what was really happening.

In May 1956, Sejna was appointed Chief of Staff for the Minister of Defense. Shortly after he received this appointment, General Major Kalashnik from the Soviet Main Political Administration came to Prague to discuss the importance of non-military weapons. Sejna was present at the meeting when Kalashnik discussed five important examples of such weapons: ideological offensive, which meant good deception and propaganda; good foreign policy designed to split the West; isolating the United States; economic and social chaos; and *a new view about drugs and other chemicals that can affect the minds and behavior of millions of people*. Kalashnik’s visit and lecture served as a precursor for a Soviet request for the Czechs to

provide medical support for the experiments that were being run in the Soviet Union on the American POWs. Kalashnik's mission was to explain the importance of this research and justify the need for Czech participation.

After General Kalashnik returned to Moscow, the formal request for medical assistance in the experiments came into the Czech Ministry of Defense from the Soviet Defense Council. The Czech decision in response was prepared by Sejna, working with Minister of Defense General Lomsky and under the guidance of the ever-present Soviet MoD Advisor, in this case General Major Bojkov. The medical aspects of the plan and preliminary staffing recommendations were prepared by five specially-cleared officers at the Health Administration of the MoD's Rear Services Administration.

In assembling the overall plan for presentation to the Czech Defense Council, Sejna personally reviewed the files and decision documents for the operation in North Korea, including the original Soviet Defense Council instructions that initiated the operation and those that terminated it. It was in the originating Soviet Defense Council order where the direction to conduct the operation so that "*no one ever would know*" was set forth. Sejna's review of this history was included as part of the plan.

When the Czech plan was completed, it went to Moscow for review and approval. The head of the Soviet military Health Administration personally brought the plan back to Prague. The only problem he had with the plan was its timetable. He wanted the process of selecting and clearing the doctors accelerated. All the doctors had to be specially cleared by both Czech and Soviet military counter-intelligence. The Czechs had wanted to avoid drawing any undue attention to the process for security reasons and, thus, avoided using any emergency measures to speed up the process. The Soviet official came to Prague to help them accelerate the process without employing any observable emergency measures. He came personally because in very sensitive operations, such as was this one, telephone communications were not allowed.

After the plan had received the Soviet blessing, it was placed on the Defense Council's agenda, which Sejna prepared as working secretary, for discussion and decision. The Council reviewed the Soviet request that had initiated the action, the seven projects the Czech military doctors and scientists would be working on, the administrative and security measures, and then approved the plan and the money for the project.

Once the plan was approved, the personnel selection process — mainly to select the doctors and scientists who would be involved — commenced. The task was one principally of the Czech military Health Administration, assisted by the Administrative Organs Department, which was the powerful Central Committee department that had authority over the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI). Both Soviet and Czech military intelligence and military counter-intelligence were involved. Military intelligence had overall authority and military counter-intelligence, which was a component of the Interior Ministry, was responsible for security.

When the doctors and scientists had been selected and cleared, the list was submitted to the head of the Soviet military Health Administration, who was the individual personally responsible for the medical aspects of the plan. Following his approval, the list was sent to the Czech Defense Council for the final decision, which by this time was mainly a rubber-stamp approval. Roughly fifteen doctors and scientists were approved. The doctors came from the

Central Military Hospital, the College for Military Doctors, and the Air Force Scientific Research Institute at Hradack Kralove where many of the experimental drugs had been developed. The scientists were from the Academy of Sciences.

The operation was top secret. Aside from the Defense Council and the doctors who were involved, very few people had access to the operation or knew what it was really about. Specifically, the only ones who knew were the Chief of the General Staff, Chief of Rear Services (Gen. Lt. Evzen Chlad), and the heads of the Health Administration (Gen. Maj. M. Cerny), Central Military Hospital, and Air Force Scientific Research Center. The doctors went as a group to the Institute for Nuclear Medicine in Moscow. The doctor in charge was the head of the Air Force Science Institute. They were accompanied by a military counter-intelligence officer. Once in Moscow, they split into three groups. One stayed in Moscow at the Institute and the other two groups went to two different locations.

The Institute for Nuclear Medicine was the jumping-off point because of the political plan (that is, deception) that had been devised as a cover. The cover story maintained that the doctors had gone to Moscow as students to study the effects of nuclear war on soldiers. Everything was prepared for their courses — instructors, organization materials, schedules, and so forth. But it was all a fake, designed to mislead people about the real reason behind the doctor's mission, which was to investigate the effects of chemical warfare agents and drugs, biological organisms, and nuclear radiation on the captive GIS.

The results of the experiments performed on the captive GIS were presented during the annual review of the intelligence plan for the next year and in special, highly-classified reports. These reports discussed the improvements in chemical and biological warfare capabilities and knowledge of radiation casualties that had been achieved in the experiments. Sejna recalls one report on the tests that he read in 1959 or 1960. The tests were discussed in three categories: chemical warfare, biological warfare (including viruses), and radiation.

One of the discussions in the chemical warfare section was focused on the side effects of some of the drugs. In the drug research programs, for each drug under development, there was a parallel program to develop drugs that would reverse the effect (antidotes) and drugs that could defend people against the use of such drugs (prophylaxes). One of the more difficult problems in this search was caused by side-effects of the experimental drugs. The side-effects were often irreversible and, in many cases, seriously debilitating. Where the prisoners were judged to be of no future value because of the side-effects, they were killed. Only a few were retained to see if ultimately the side-effects would disappear. Sejna suspects those few were placed in mental institutions for long-term (that is, twenty to fifty years) observation.

In the radiation section, casualty exposure levels were discussed along with the results of the search for drugs that would, in effect, enable soldiers to continue fighting even after having received lethal radiation exposures. With the captive GIS in the Soviet Union, these tests were not limited to the use of radioisotopes. The Soviets also used the atomic reactor at the Institute for Nuclear Medicine in Moscow to radiate the GIS.

Still further, the best and most relevant information was obtained by securing GIS at spaced intervals along the ground and then subjecting them to the full force and fury of actual atomic bomb explosions at Soviet atomic test ranges. In addition to their interest in radiation exposure, the Soviets also tested the effects of atomic bomb over pressure and thermal radiation

on the GIS and the psychological effects of all three — over pressure, atomic, and thermal radiation — on the GIS. They also tested the effects of various drugs on exposed GIS to learn if some of the radiation effects could be temporarily countered, thus extending the useful life of the soldiers, and to observe how long the soldiers who were exposed at the higher levels could survive.

(As early as 1963, specialists within the U.S. Atomic Energy Community knew that the Soviet knowledge of the effects of high levels of radiation exposure on humans was greater than the U.S. knowledge. The unchallenged assumption was that the Soviets had gained this experience as a consequence of accidents and poor safety standards. While that may have been the case, it is now evident that there is another more reasonable explanation; to wit, their use of captive GIS in radiation dose experiments. Additionally, on March 20, 1994, *60 Minutes* had a special segment on the Soviet use of civilian communities in radiation experiments in which the communities close to detonations were *deliberately* exposed to low level direct radiation and subsequent fallout to test the effects of nuclear war on civilian communities.)

Vietnam War: Setting the Stage

American POWs also were used for medical experiments by the Soviets and Czechs during the Vietnam War. The cornerstone for this activity was laid in 1960 when the North Vietnamese Chief of the General Staff (CoGS) and roughly ten senior officers visited Prague and Moscow in search of military assistance. The North Vietnamese believed that the only way to unify the country was through military action. They wanted military assistance to prepare them for a major offensive drive to capture South Vietnam. This was when the Soviets first agreed to supply the North Vietnamese with weapons. As head of the Defense Council secretariat, Sejna was their host and focal point for scheduling meetings and discussions.

During this visit, there was one particularly sensitive meeting. The only participants were the Vietnamese CoGS; his Czech counterpart, General Otakar Rytir; Czech Minister of Defense General Lomsky; Soviet Advisor General Aleksandr Kushev; and then-Colonel Jan Sejna. In this meeting, General Kushev, explained to the Vietnamese general how American POWs had been used for medical research during the Korean War and how valuable this use had been. One of the items of cooperation the Soviets would like to receive in return for providing military technology, Kushev continued, was more American POWs for medical experimentation. The Vietnamese CoGS agreed and used the opportunity to press for even more military assistance. Kushev then stressed the need to begin organizing immediately to use the captured American servicemen to avoid the types of delays encountered at the beginning of the Korean War.

The North Vietnamese general suggested that it would be a good idea to keep any Americans who were captured and selected to be sent to the Soviet Union separate from other POWs. General Kushev agreed and the decision was made: Soviet, Czech, and Vietnamese military counter-intelligence officers would meet and draw up plans for the secure management of American POWs who were to be sent to the Soviet Union from the instant of their capture until they were deposited in the Soviet Union. Military counter-intelligence had the lead because it was responsible for security in the military. In the communist system, military counter-intelligence was generally a component of the Ministry of Interior, and as such was located outside the military system. In the Soviet Union, it was a component of the KGB. In

Czechoslovakia, it was in the Ministry of Interior, which also was where civilian intelligence was located. As was typical in the communist system, everyone watched everyone else.

Work on the plan commenced immediately following the return of the Vietnamese CoGS to Hanoi. In Czechoslovakia, CoGS General Rytir was personally responsible for the effort. In the Soviet Union, that person was Marshal Matvey V. Zakharov, the Soviet CoGS. In Czechoslovakia, the officials under the CoGS who were responsible for specific areas were the first deputy to the Minister of Interior (Josef Kudrna), he head of military counter-intelligence (Gen. Maj. Josef Stavinoha), the chief of military intelligence (Gen. Maj. Oldrich Burda), and his deputy for strategic intelligence (Gen. Maj. Vasil Lalo). Similar officials from North Vietnam participated in the project.

The plan was completed in approximately six months, at which time Czechoslovakia received that portion of the plan which pertained to the Czech part of the operation. As set forth in the plan, the overall operation was the responsibility of Soviet military intelligence, or GRU. The individual in charge was the special deputy to the Chief of the GRU in charge of strategic intelligence. Similarly, in Czechoslovakia the plan was organized under the deputy chief of military intelligence for strategic intelligence, just as it had been in the Korean War. Security was provided by military counter-intelligence, which actually came under civilian intelligence.

The security plan specified that the decision on which POWs were to be used for medical experimentation would be made as soon as they were captured. This process was initiated by a Soviet request in which they would identify the number of specimens desired. They also would specify race requirements and rank. In the latter case, the Soviets were interested in older officers as well as younger officers because they wanted to test the effects of mind-control drugs on people from different age and rank categories. The older officers were generally regarded as the more "reactionary" and, as such, especially important subjects to test. Based on Soviet "requirements," the North Vietnamese military counter-intelligence would go into action and begin collecting appropriate new American POWs as candidates.

The potential candidates would be isolated from all other prisoners. As will be seen, at this point, the POW had received a one-way ticket to oblivion or to death. The next action was a joint Soviet-North Vietnamese psychological debriefing of the potential candidate to determine whether the candidate was the type of individual who might make trouble. If the POW was considered psychologically dangerous, then he was to be immediately liquidated. He was not to be placed in normal POWs compounds because that would risk security of the experimental program; better to simply kill him.

(One of the surprises when 586 American POWs were repatriated in 1973 was the absence of any amputees. The question "Why?" has never been answered. The explanation might be that such operations were conducted in special military hospitals, the same ones in which various medical intelligence experiments and training were conducted. Any POW entering such a hospital logically would never have been permitted to leave because the risk that would pose to the operation. This also appears to have been the policy in the Korean War hospital from which no patients are known to have left alive, except those shipped to the Soviet Union for further experimental use.)

The plan also set forth the security measures for storage and transportation of the approved POWs, specified the clearances that were required for all personnel who would be

working on the project (for example, guards, drivers, pilots, doctors, and so forth), described in detail the procedures for medical exams for prisoners in route to the Soviet Union (these were performed in Prague), and listed the names and ranks of all military intelligence and counter-intelligence officers who were cleared to work on the project.

One of the initial products of the plan by decision of the Defense Council was the establishment of a special MoD-Mol commission. Its purpose was to coordinate the various questions that different agencies wanted directed to the POWs and to issue integrated directions to military intelligence and counter-intelligence interrogators. The CoGS General Rytir headed the commission, which was composed of the first deputy Minister of Interior, the chief of military intelligence, chief of military counter-intelligence, and chief of the 2nd Administration of the Ministry of Interior, which was the Czech counterpart to the Soviet KGB intelligence. The interrogation instructions were split into two different components -- one for normal POWs and one for those POWs who had been selected for medical experimentation. Other countries, such as East Germany, were also involved in interrogations. This coordination was handled by the Soviets.

The pilot plan was placed in operation in 1961. The first Soviet request was for specimens of any age or race. The Soviets had run out of test specimens and wanted new ones so that they could resume their experiments as soon as possible. The first shipment of American POWs occurred in August. Gen. Sejna does not recall whether this initial shipment was composed of soldiers or civilians, which would not have been, strictly speaking, POWs.

This shipment created an emergency situation because there was almost no advanced notice. The Czechs did not learn about the shipment until the plane carrying the POWs was in the air and headed toward Prague. At about 1:00 in the afternoon, the Soviet Advisor General Kushev brought a cable to Minister Lomsky, who immediately summoned Sejna to his office. As soon as Sejna arrived, Lomsky called President Novotny and told him that Sejna was headed over with an important cable. Sejna delivered the cable to Novotny and then proceeded to organize the quarters for the POWs and the North Vietnamese and Soviets who were accompanying the shipment. The POWs arrived at 3:00 p.m. the following day.

Included in this shipment were, as Sejna recalls about four or five South Vietnamese, who were housed in the villa close to the castle, six or seven Americans, who were housed in the military intelligence villa on Sluna street, and one American, about 42 or 43 years old who was isolated from the other Americans and housed in the villa at Rusveltova #1 and who Sejna personally observed.

This was a quick in and out operation that lasted only two days. The plane waited at the military airbase until the POWs had been examined and then flew them to the Soviet Union. This shipment was different from subsequent respects because of the South Vietnamese and the relatively large number of older Americans. This was the only time that Sejna recalls when South Vietnamese POWs were sent through Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. With respect to the American POWs, the Soviets were somewhat displeased with the shipment because there were too many older men. Their preference at that time was for the younger men.

(According to the U.S. government, the first American POW was not captured until August 1964. This is more word games by U.S. officials, because this official position on the first POW deliberately ignores the civilians, CIA agents, and military involved in so-called black

programs in Southeast Asia who were lost. The U.S. government policy is clearly revealed in the book *President Kennedy: Profiles in Power* by Richard Reeves. Military pilots were being recruited for service in Southeast Asia in 1961. They were asked to read and sign a statement whereby they acknowledged that they would be wearing civilian clothes and that their "government would disclaim any knowledge" of them if they were captured.)

This first shipment of POWs was accompanied by the Vietnamese deputy chief of the General Staff for military intelligence, General Major Quong. (The name could have been Kwang, Kuang, or Quang. Sejna did not know the spelling, but believes he would recognize the individual's photo. There is good reason to believe this is the individual identified in the highly publicized GRU document that was found in 1993.) Quong was accompanied by two staff officers and KGB (military counter-intelligence) escorts. This group went along with the POWs to make certain the operation was secure, and to quickly resolve any problems that might emerge on this maiden voyage. Sejna hosted the entourage.

The North Vietnamese were housed at a special villa that was maintained for use of foreign dignitaries by the Defense Council secretariat that was under Sejna at that time. The Soviet escorts stayed with their plane, evidently standing guard over other sensitive cargo that was being transported from North Vietnam to the Soviet Union. As soon as the POWs were processed, about two days, they were put back on the plane and whisked away to Russia. As Sejna recalls, the North Vietnamese stayed for five working days. He attended one meeting with Minister Lomsky that was held in Lomsky's office. Lomsky welcomed the North Vietnamese and instructed them to work directly with the Czech CoGS and chief of military intelligence to correct any problems. General Quong said he was pleased with the arrangements that had been made and, especially, with the manner in which the operation had been organized so that participation by the normal bureaucracies had been eliminated.

The discussion then focused on the U.S. pilots and their importance. One of the points Minister Lomsky made was that the pilots were different from the ground forces in their ability to handle stress. Because of this type of difference, U.S. pilots were priority POWs for their research program. As an illustration of the problem the Soviets were about to have with the North Vietnamese, General Quong responded that if you do not think the U.S. pilots are nervous, just wait until we finish with them. General Lomsky countered with an explanation that what he was referring to was the ability to handle natural stress, not un-natural stress.

The people who were present at the meeting, in addition to Minister Lomsky, Colonel Sejna, Soviet MoD advisor General Kushev, and General Quong, were the Soviet advisor to the Czech military intelligence, the head of Czech military intelligence (Gen. Oldrich Burda), and the Czech CoGS, Gen. Otakar Rytir. At that time, most of the Czech strategic leadership was on vacation at a special resort at Orlik on the Vltava River. A special meeting of the Defense Council was held at the resort, at which time Minister Lomsky informed the Council that the operation had begun and then described the preparations that had been taken.

Over the next two years, the operation was run as a low-level test program in which the procedures and plans that had been developed were tested and improved. The immediate objective was to get all the "bugs" worked out so that full-scale secure operations could be commenced quickly when the war expanded. The second shipment, which was even smaller than the first, came in the spring of 1962 and the third, Sejna believes, came in November or December 1962. The first large shipment of twenty to twenty-five captives occurred in 1963.

This 1963 shipment was the first time the POWs were housed in the military counter-intelligence barracks, as will be subsequently described, rather than in the villas.

During this trial period it became clear to Sejna that Czechoslovakia was not the only Soviet surrogate staging area for the movement of POWs from North Vietnam to the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1962, Sejna attended a meeting of the Warsaw Pact military leaders, which would later be known as the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact, in Moscow where he learned that Vietnam War POWs were shipped from North Vietnam to North Korea, and thence directly to the Soviet Union. The Chief of Staff from North Korea was attending the meeting as an observer. During the discussion the North Korean general suggested to the Soviets that the experiments be performed on the American POWs while they were in North Korea and avoid having to fly them from North Korea to the Soviet Union. Soviet General A. I. Antonov, who was deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, declined the invitation, saying that such a practice would constitute an unnecessary security risk. If the experiments were run in North Korea, he explained, the Chinese were likely to learn about the tests and this was unacceptable to the Soviets. This meeting took place shortly before General Antonov's death in June 1962. It indicates that the plan for moving American POWs through North Korea likely was worked out at the same time that the operation for moving POWs through Czechoslovakia was planned and that it started at about the same time as the Czech-Soviet operation began; that is, in 1961.

Sejna suspects that East Germany may also have been involved in using American POWs in chemical agent experiments, although he had no direct knowledge. The reasons for his suspicions are clear. He knew the East Germans were involved in interrogations of American POWs using experimental drugs. They also were heavily involved in the development of mind-control drugs and chemical warfare agents, which he knew because of data sharing agreements the Czechs had negotiated with the Germans. East German security was even better than Czech security, including that of German military medical facilities. Finally, The German Minister of Defense, General Hoffmann had discussed some of their experimental results with Sejna as early as 1964, indicating the Germans were involved well before 1964, and, when the Soviets presented drug experiment results, East German results were usually included.

The importance of the drug development programs was also raised by the Soviets at the 1962 spring meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Commission (PCC). Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet President, gave a speech in which he emphasized the importance of new developments in drug technology and the possibility of testing these developments. He emphasized the need to increase funding in these projects and directed every country to take a careful look at their scientific capacities to identify additional scientists who could be put on the projects. He did not mention at this open meeting the use of POWs as the way in which the developments would be tested.

As their response, the Czechs conducted a thorough examination of their own drug efforts in preparation for the five-year plan which was being organized for approval in the fall of 1962. The Soviet guidance to them was quite specific. They were directed to expand their efforts. It was essential, the Soviets stressed, to be ready to exploit the supplies of American POWs that would accompany the growing war in Southeast Asia. There was no knowing how long the war would last. Hence, it was doubly important to make maximum use of the opportunity right from the start.

The Czechs examined the number and types of scientists and doctors who were available, how much money would be needed to expand their effort, what drugs were in development and the extent to which the development process could be accelerated, how long it would take to develop new drugs, and what possibilities were available to steal related technology through espionage. They then undertook a comprehensive assessment of what would be required to speed the process. In discussing the possibilities with Czech President Antonin Novotny, the head of the Academy of Sciences complained bitterly. The Czechs could not do much more, he said, because the Soviets themselves caused most of the delays. It took forever for the Czech scientists to obtain feedback from the Soviets on the effects the drugs had when tested on the POWs. Second, and even more serious, the Czech doctors and scientists did not have direct access to the POWs. All they received were the Soviet reports on the tests, and they considered those reports inadequate. They needed to be able to monitor the tests directly.

Novotny took these complaints and presented them in a letter to Khrushchev. The letter was prepared under Sejna's direction by his secretariat. The letter expressed the need to get results back quickly and allowed as how the Czechs would like to be more involved, but were constrained because they did not know the details of how the Soviets were using the POWs. We recognize, Novotny's letter continued, that Czechoslovakia is too small a country in which to do testing on the POWs, because they simply could not hide such work for ever. However, for Czechoslovakia to do more, the Czech scientists and doctors would need better access to the testing of drugs on POWs.

The problem was the Soviet KGB penchant for secrecy. They did not want anyone to know where the POWs were being held. Following Novotny's letter, the process did improve, but the Czech doctors still were not allowed to go to the locations where the POWs were being held. Rather, the POWs were brought to the Czech doctors so that they could observe the effects of the drugs first hand. Another problem that delayed the program, but which was not raised by Novotny in his letter, was the Soviet expropriation of the Czech ideas, and Soviet deception in reporting test results, particularly when they did not want the Czechs to know which drugs, or combinations, were the most effective — perhaps because the Soviets intended the drugs for use against all potential opponents, including their own allies, a practice the Czechs would see pursued in the emerging Vietnam War.

Vietnam War: Transition From Pilot Program to Full Scale Operations

Preparations for expanding the war effort formally began toward the end of 1963 when the formal Soviet-North Vietnamese agreement for Warsaw Pact assistance was signed.

This Soviet-North Vietnamese agreement was presented to the Warsaw Pact officials who attended a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in late 1963 or early 1964. Sejna was present at the meeting. The Soviet General Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, personally attended the meeting and gave a talk during which he explained to the Committee officials that an agreement had been reached with North Vietnam. A top secret part of the agreement specified that all Warsaw Pact countries would negotiate separate bilateral agreements with North Vietnam.

Following this meeting, the Soviets individually instructed each of the Warsaw Pact countries as to what the nature of their assistance to, and agreement with, North Vietnam would be. The Soviet official in charge of coordinating these agreements was Leonid Brezhnev. In the

case of Czechoslovakia, the formal notification came in the form of a letter from Khrushchev to Czechoslovakia's President, Antonin Novotny, as Sejna recalls, with the specific details contained in a separate lengthy communication to the Czech Ministry of Defense. In his letter, and in parallel discussions, Khrushchev stated that the American soldiers had been most useful in the past and that there were many new drugs and chemical and biological warfare agents under development that needed testing. It was in these communications that the Czechs were directed to negotiate arrangements with the North Vietnamese so that the medical experiments using American POWs could be continued.

The negotiations between Hanoi and Prague for Czech military assistance were completed in early 1964. The primary Czech official in the negotiations was Vladimir Koucky, who was the Czech Central Committee secretary in charge of foreign policy. While the negotiations on the surface were conducted by the North Vietnamese and Czech officials, behind the scenes the Soviet advisors in Hanoi and Prague directed the Czech negotiators.

The use of POWs was a special part of the agreement, which was negotiated by the Czech CoGS, General Rytir. It included provisions for using American POWs for "medical research" in North Vietnam and the field-tested plan for exporting selected POWs to the Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia for research and for intelligence cooperation. The intelligence cooperation portion of the agreement referred to captured officers who could be persuaded to defect and to assist the Soviets in their analyses of U.S. military capabilities, technology, and war plans.

The agreement specified that the selection of POWs would be a joint Soviet-North Vietnamese effort. The North Vietnamese agreed to provide captured South Vietnamese as well as American soldiers for medical research in North Vietnam. This was done to enable the Soviet studies on ethnic differences and vulnerabilities unique to Asians to be continued. However, the agreement stipulated that experiments on South Vietnamese would be performed only in North Vietnam; that is, the South Vietnamese POWs would not be exported to the Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia. (It became clear to Sejna from various reports that the Soviets did have an ample supply of South Vietnamese POWs that they used in experiments, and, thus, probably shipped them through another country en route to the Soviet Union.) The Czechs and Soviets agreed to provide medical equipment, experimental drugs, biological organisms and viruses, and, naturally, doctors and medical support personnel.

The conditions in North Vietnam were quite different from those in North Korea because the North Koreans were surrogates controlled by the Soviets while, in contrast, the North Vietnamese were determined to remain in control themselves and not become either Soviet or Chinese puppets. When the Czech-Soviet military assistance programs expanded in North Vietnam in 1964, numerous disagreements arose. Problems were encountered, largely because the Soviets pushed hard to expand their participation and exert controlling influences, while the North Vietnamese worked to block Soviet efforts to expand their presence. This was true in the POW medical research programs as well as in the more traditional types of military assistance. As an example of one problem in the medical research area, the North Vietnamese wanted final approval on the specific doctors who would participate, while the Soviets did not want the North Vietnamese to have any background data on the doctors that might reveal which ones were from military intelligence. As regards traditional military assistance, the Soviets and Czechs wanted to deploy "volunteer" officers, such as pilots, to the war effort so that they could gain combat experience. Additionally, where the Soviets provided military equipment, such as air defense

missiles, they wanted to place technicians at those bases. The North Vietnamese strongly opposed these efforts. They wanted to limit the Soviet presence because they were secretly sharing Soviet technology with the Chinese. Also, they wanted the defeat of the Americans to be a clear North Vietnamese victory.

The principal problem in the medical experiment program, from the Soviet perspective, was one of forcing the Vietnamese to accept a scientific approach to the experiments. The Vietnamese did not have the medical or scientific understanding needed to run valid and useful tests. The Vietnamese were, in the Soviet eyes, simply too crude. They were more interested in extracting vengeance than in conducting scientific tests. Furthermore, the Vietnamese were inadequately trained in psychology. While they understood the psychology of Asians very well, they did not have a good knowledge of the psychology of Westerners. This knowledge was crucial to the tests because many of the experiments were designed to test the effect of experimental drugs on the American psyche. Moreover, they did not understand the importance of stress and its relation to the testing process. That is, understanding the effects of drugs on soldiers under extreme stress — designed to simulate the stress levels expected in an all-out nuclear war — was one of the Soviet objectives. This was one of the reasons behind the psychological and physiological stress experiments; namely, to enable testing the effects of experimental drugs on soldiers under extremely stressful conditions.

Another example was illustrated by a visit General Quong paid to Prague and Moscow in late 1964. Quong visited Prague and Moscow several times to deliver reports on the POW operations and to conduct planning sessions with the Soviets. On his visit in late 1964, he met with Minister Lomsky specifically to complain that the operation discriminated against the North Vietnamese. He believed more of the medical research should be done in North Vietnam and that the North Vietnamese should have the results of the research conducted in the Soviet Union. He also wanted to press for the opportunity to use POWs for strategic intelligence; that is, he wanted to hold POWs, turn them, and then return them as spies. The Russians opposed the idea because they would be unable to control the North Vietnamese in the operation, and, besides, they already had their own plan in operation, which was focused on recruiting American military personnel in South Vietnam and in Australia, where Americans often went for rest and recreation. They felt those were better places to recruit agents because the POW route was too obvious and too easy for the Americans to detect.

Regarding the Vietnamese interest in the experiments conducted in the Soviet Union, the Soviets were very careful not to let the North Vietnamese (or other allies) have access to much of their research, especially the research on mind-control drugs, which utilized POWs. The reason was simple: the Soviets planned to use the drugs against the North Vietnamese (and other allies) to help keep them under control. They also planned to use the confusion-producing drugs on the Chinese technicians who were in North Vietnam to steal the Warsaw Pact technology that was on loan to the North Vietnamese.

To resolve the many problems, a second agreement was negotiated in 1965. These were difficult negotiations and required the personal participation in Hanoi of several high-level Czech officials. Specifically, even Josef Lenart, the Czech Prime Minister, and General Vaclav Prchlik, the chief of the Main Political Administration, went to Hanoi to conduct the negotiations, with the sensitive intelligence aspects handled by General Prchlik.

The agreement that Lenart and Prchlic reached with the North Vietnamese dealt with many aspects of military assistance. Elaborations on the POW experiments were, as before, a secret part of this agreement negotiated by Prchlic. Under the "medical research" portion of the agreement, procedures for selecting the doctors were established. Additionally, the agreement stated that the experiments in North Vietnam would be run by the North Vietnamese doctors in their hospitals. Czech and Soviet doctors would participate by providing guidance (supervision) and all experimental data would be available to them for their use in monitoring the various tests.

Experiments on POWs in Laos and China

As soon as experiments on U.S. POWs had commenced in North Vietnam, negotiations were held with the Laotians to gain their participation as well. Sejna personally worked with General Sin Ka-po, who headed the communist forces, and General Kong-le, who headed the "neutralist" forces, on matters respecting Czech operations in Laos. The Czech/Soviet agreement for the use of POWs for medical experiments was negotiated with General Sin Ka-po. Laos was generally more complicated than North Vietnam because of the government instabilities. Thus, most arrangements were run through the Party system than through the government. Again, military intelligence was in charge. Two liaison officers from Laos were stationed in Prague to handle coordination. Laotian security was very good, Sejna recalls. The Laotian approach to security was quite simple. If there was concern that someone was a security risk, that individual was killed.

In Laos, both Soviet and Czech doctors worked directly on the patients. There were two "hospital" facilities where experiments were performed in Laos. The Czech doctors described the conditions at these facilities as "primitive." This was not bad, reasoned the Soviets, because combat was often conducted in primitive conditions and, thus, operating under such conditions was good experience.

Generally, there were three Czech military doctors in Laos, five to seven in North Vietnam, and a larger number of Soviet doctors in both locations. The usual tour of duty for the Czech doctors was six months. All doctors who worked on this program first had to pass detailed special background investigations, involving both Czech and Soviet military counter-intelligence, before their participation was approved.

In addition to their use as medical guinea pigs, American POWs were also used for testing the effectiveness of "interrogation" drugs. Interrogations of captive GIs were conducted in Laos, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Czech interrogations were run by military counter-intelligence, which was then under General Josef Stavinoha. The interrogations, like all other activities, were supervised and controlled by Soviet officers. Experimental drugs were used in interrogations. The East Germans were similarly involved. The East German Minister of Defense, General Heinz Hoffmann, once remarked to Sejna while the two were off on a fishing trip in 1964 that the new drugs tested on the Americans were "one thousand percent more effective than physical means of persuasion."

In addition to serving as guinea pigs for the Soviet medical intelligence program, the American GIs were also used by the Chinese. The Chinese had an experimental program as early as the Korean War. The North Koreans provided American POWs to the Chinese as well as to the Soviets. The Chinese and Soviets shared data on the various experiments and their results. The Soviets criticized the Chinese program as being too extreme. That is, the Chinese were

strictly focused on the use of weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, the Soviet interest was more focused on the development of new drugs and their use to triumph over the enemy without war.

Czech military intelligence was also aware of the continuation of the Chinese medical research using American POWs during the Vietnam War. Czech military intelligence had identified the movement of American POWs in Chinese trucks or buses headed toward the Chinese border. Additionally, a senior Czech military intelligence officer who was undercover in China as a military attache reported on a Chinese request to share information on continued medical test programs. The Chinese official complained to the Czech "attache" that even if there were developing antagonisms between their two countries, some cooperative activities should continue, for example, he suggested, the joint research on American POWs. We are continuing this research, he said, and asked, why don't we continue to share results of this research? There is no reason to keep your program secret. We know the American POWs are being sent to the Soviet Union for research. Information exchange on these research programs would be of use to both our countries.

Movement of American POWs to Russia

To complement the experiments run in Laos and North Vietnam, each year during the Vietnam War scores of selected GIS — those who were the most healthy — were shipped back to the Soviet Union for use in more highly classified, sophisticated, and long-term experiments, again through Czechoslovakia (and other countries such as North Korea and East Germany) to break the trail. Up until his defection in 1968, General Sejna was knowledgeable about the shipments and personally supervised portions of the operation. There were generally two or three shipments of POWs each year, always by air. While the airplanes were manned by the Soviet military, for security and deception purposes the planes always bore the insignia of some country other than the U.S.S.R.; for example, Bulgaria, or Rumania, or Hungary.

The flights used the secure Czech military airbase at Zatek, which was roughly forty kilometers from Prague. Special security measures were in effect when POWs were on the base. Military counter-intelligence took over base security. All unnecessary personnel were excluded from the base. Transportation to Prague was provided by the Ministry of Defense special transportation battalion. Special buses whose windows had been pained over were driven to the planes. The POWs were unloaded directly onto the bus(es). Once loaded, the bus(es) left the air base by a special entrance manned exclusively by specially cleared military counter-intelligence guards.

From the airbase, the POWs were driven directly to highly secret military counter-intelligence barracks at Pohorelc in Prague. Normally, twenty to twenty-five POWs constituted a "shipment"; although, on one occasion, in the fall of 1966, there was a large shipment of about sixty POWs.

As a cover story, the POWs were referred to as students or foreign soldiers who were visiting Czechoslovakia for specialized training. The barracks area, which was where foreign soldiers often stayed when in Czechoslovakia for training, was considered a very safe place to hide the POWs because they could be tightly secured yet their presence could be easily explained as just some foreign students temporarily in Czechoslovakia for training.

Often, a small portion of a shipment, say three or four POWs, would be separated from the main group and housed at the Defense Council secretariat villas on Rusveltova street and Korejska street. The military intelligence villa on Sluna street was also used when needed. Once, there was a special shipment of only two or three POWs who were also housed in these villas rather than the barracks and during the large shipment of 60 POWs in 1966, there were six or seven "special" POWs. These select POWs were usually ones who had decided to cooperate with the Soviets or who were sick and needed to be isolated. The cooperating GIS were selected from the POWs who were regarded as "progressive." In all cases, great care was exercised to isolate these people, not only from the main group, *but from each other as well*. In the case of the 1966 shipment, Sejna recalls the problem they had finding enough villas to house these special POWs and keep them separated.

From his position as first secretary at the MoD, Sejna was present several times when the vans unloaded the POWs at the military counter-intelligence barracks and personally visited the POWs there and at the various secret villas to ensure that the operation was going according to plan. While most of the POWs were American, there were exceptions. Sejna recalls that, prior to his departure, two Australians were processed along with the American POWs and sent to the Soviet Union.

As was the case following the Korean War, Czech doctors participated in the medical experiments using Vietnam War POWs in the Soviet Union. The most important experiments were those dealing with the development of mind-control and behavior-modification drugs, the testing of biological warfare organisms, and tests of the effects of nuclear radiation. Mind-control drug experiments were designed to examine the effectiveness of a wide variety of drugs that would influence human behavior and mental capabilities. The effect of such drugs under different stress conditions was also examined, as previously noted. The Soviets also conducted tests to determine how the effects varied according to age, race, and intellectual background. In the latter case, they wanted to know if the drug effectiveness when given to officers was different from what it was when given to soldiers. One of the more important findings that Sejna recalls was that the drugs that were used to influence beliefs were found to be more effective when used on men with higher educational achievements. That is, it was easier to mold the minds of the intellectuals than the minds of the "primitives," to use the Soviet expression. Special substances (drugs and well as biological organisms) designed for use as assassination weapons were also tested. One of the objects of these tests were to develop substances that would result in the appearance of death from natural causes.

One of the highest priority biological warfare test programs was the testing of unique diseases for which there were no known cures and accompanying tests of experimental treatments. Efforts were also underway at that time to develop new strains of viruses that acted quickly and could disable groups of people within twenty-four hours of exposure. Off-site laboratory support for the various Soviet research projects, such as blood and tissue sample analysis, was provided by a variety of hospitals, including the Czech Central Military Hospital.

Experiments involving the physiological and psychological effects of electro-magnetic radiation -- low frequency to microwaves -- on the human specimens also were run during the Vietnam War era. In the late spring of 1967, the Soviets stressed the importance of this electro-magnetic research to the chief of the Science Administration of the Czech Ministry of Defense.

The subject was so important that, upon his return, he gave a talk on the subject to a high-level group of Czech officials, which included the members of the Minister's Kollegium.

(It is interesting to recall that ten years later, U.S. news media began carrying reports that the Soviets had been deliberately bombarding the U.S. embassy in Moscow with low-level microwave radiation, and that this had been going on since the 1960s. What they did not report was that the U.S. had conducted research into the effect of low-power microwaves in the mid-1970s. This research was motivated by the Soviet radiation. The tests that were run on laboratory animals, including primates, showed that such radiation could be used to impair short-term memory, totally erase task-oriented training, and induce a wide variety of physical effects such as heart fibrillations and cellular disorders.)

One of the reports that Sejna recalls reading in late 1966 was based on the POW experiments. Its subject was "the effects and improvements in special destructive weapons for use in preparation for war [that is, during peacetime] and during war." This report covered the results achieved roughly between 1959 and 1966. One of the principal topics was the analysis of autopsy results. The focus was on the physical destruction of organs such as the heart, brain, nervous system, and so forth. The data base included two hundred to two hundred and fifty examples. How many cadavers this referred to Sejna could not recall. The effects of both chemical and biological agents on the destruction of organs were considered, and recommendations for further research were formulated. The principal recommendations were directed to the development of drugs and biological organisms that would destroy specific organs at a faster rate.

The most important findings were directed to the nervous system. There, the critical concern was to "gently degrade" an individual's ability to function, but not to destroy it. The idea was to sabotage an individual's ability, but not so much that the individual was taken out of his job, placed in a hospital, and then replaced by a new, fully-capable person. The report also discussed the problem of delivery of the chemical warfare drugs. There were two different targets: individuals and groups, which roughly meant officers and soldiers. Those whose performance they wanted to degrade, but not so much that they were removed from their jobs, were the officers. The problem was how to separate the delivery of different agents. It was alright if drugs intended for officers were delivered to soldiers, but the reverse was to be avoided. What was especially curious in this analysis was the presence of experimental data that had been collected in operations run against U.S. military forces based in Germany and in Okinawa.

The American POWs were also used by the Soviets for testing new narcotic drugs. As indicated earlier, one of the most important Soviet and East European strategic intelligence operations was international drug trafficking. Czechoslovakia was one of the lead Soviet surrogates in this operation, as described in detail in the book *Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America* (Clarion House, 1990). The development of better drugs was part of the Czech chemical warfare program, where by "better" was meant drugs that produced better and longer lasting highs, drugs that were cheaper and easier to produce, and drugs that were more rapidly addictive. The experimental drugs developed in Czechoslovakia were first tested on prisoners, and then covertly field tested on university students, particularly those in West Germany. They were also tested on American POWs in the Soviet Union, which Czech intelligence preferred because it was operationally much easier than the university student approach. (The use of unwitting students in various drug experiments also was described to the U.S. Senate Judiciary

Committee on March 30, 1976, by former Moscow State University student Luba Markish and former Professor David Azbel. Students were used without their knowledge in tests of a wide variety of biological and chemical agents without concern over resultant deaths or incapacities. The results were simply explained as natural "student's accidents." Azbel identified poison gases that acted on the brain and nervous system as the Soviet's priority research interests in those experiments.)

As an indication of size, in the late 1960s roughly fifteen Czech doctors and about eight scientists from the Czech Academy of Sciences were involved in the POW research projects in the Soviet Union. The experiments that involved Czech doctors and scientists were carried out at roughly twenty different institutes in the Soviet Union. The medical experiments also involved a variety of East European doctors and scientists who, along with the Czechs and their Soviet counterparts, were formed into project teams. This was common practice for scientific research in priority areas. To better focus their efforts *and to improve security*, the Soviets built a special institute in the Moscow area where the scientists involved in drug, chemical, and biological warfare research could be concentrated. There was a special department at the institute for POW research.

(Interestingly, 1971 was when the American Psychiatric Association first condemned the Soviet misuse of psychiatric facilities with respect to political prisoners. Various drugs were used to "treat" the mental diseases characteristic of dissidents. In 1978 the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) also condemned Soviets for its continued practices, which it equated to torture and the unwarranted use of "chemical lobotomies." Rather than face censure and expulsion, and rather than change its ways, the Soviets withdrew from the WPA in 1983.)

Planning for Security In Anticipation of War Termination

There was yet another agreement with the North Vietnamese that was of special significance and that is particularly important in estimating what likely happened after Sejna left Czechoslovakia in 1968. In roughly 1967, the Soviets encouraged the North Vietnamese to open a second front; that is, a diplomatic front. At that time, the Soviets knew the war had to end sometime. They also recognized the political climate in the United States was growing opposed to the war. Accordingly, they concluded the time was ripe to begin planning for the end of the war. As part of their planning, the Soviets decided that if a cease fire were negotiated, all evidence of the experimental medical programs, and that included the POW subjects themselves, had to be either destroyed or removed to the Soviet Union. Most of all, they wanted to make certain that any evidence that showed either the Soviet or Czech involvement in medical experiments was removed to the Soviet Union; for example, medical records and equipment such as that associated with the testing of biological organisms and viruses.

Again, they encountered strong North Vietnamese resistance. The North Vietnamese were not concerned about ending the war. They saw the war as a mechanism for destroying American imperialism and, thus, wanted the war to continue. Tough negotiations were required to bring the North Vietnamese around to the Soviet view. The argument that won the North Vietnamese over was the problem of "stay-behind" agents. The United States could decide to end the war by pulling out at any time. When they did, the Soviets argued, there would be a large number of stay-behind agents that would be able to migrate to the North, and those agents might find out what had been happening. The North Vietnamese agreed and the Soviets and North

Vietnamese signed an agreement to begin planning for the evacuation of records, equipment, and specimens that remained at the end of the war. When the war would end was a North Vietnamese decision. Hence, the plan was keyed to the North Vietnamese decision to terminate the war. Until then, the experiments and related activities would continue.

This is when the planning for the eventual termination of the experimental programs in North Vietnam began. It involved very few people, but all the critical agencies were represented: the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Military Intelligence Administration, Air Force, Health Administration, Central Military Hospital, Administrative Organs Department, and military counter-intelligence. The Czechs were involved in these negotiations because the movements of material and people to the Soviet Union at the war's end was to be through Czechoslovakia.

As before, the critical aspect of the planning was security. All measures were employed to assure the secrecy of the operation. As originally stated by the Soviet Defense Council when the operation began in 1951, *no one was ever to know about this operation*. That was the guiding philosophy, from beginning to end, and that is why simply asking the Czech or Russian intelligence services to, "Please search your files," goes well beyond merely being naive.

Where Do We Go From Here?

The conclusion implicit in the above material is simple: There is a great deal of information available on what happened to missing American servicemen. That presented above appears to be extensive, which may be why it tends to frighten people, yet it is less than half of what I learned from Gen. Sejna, and my debriefings were only preliminary. The problem is how to track down information such as that contained in Sejna's mind and *what to do with it and when*.

At first glance, the heart of the problem would appear to be DIA/POW-MIA. As will be seen, however, DIA/POW-MIA is only part of the problem, the lowest ranking part.

On February 20, 1986, an interagency Task Force was formed to review operations of DIA's POW/MIA division. Their review revealed "*serious* shortcomings in every important area: attitudes, management, procedure, organization, and leadership." Specifically:

Unhealthy attitudes are evident in the deeply defensive mindset which promotes a rigid inflexibility toward criticism and an adversarial approach to those with strong dissenting views. There also tends to be a strong moralistic bias at work which manifests as a preoccupation with everybody's motives and unrealistic expectations with regard to source accuracy. This could also be termed the "Mindset to debunk." Additionally, an attitude of resignation toward outside events seems prevalent at all levels and contributes to a noticeable lack of persistence in problem-solving and initiative generation. Management, by and large, is preoccupied with minutia and preservation of the status quo and forward thinking is a rarity.

Five years later, on 12 February, 1991, Col. Millard A. Peck, Chief of DIA's Special Office for POW-MIA resigned. In his letter of resignation, he explained his motivation for accepting the posting as head of an organization with a bad reputation: the political challenge inherent in the contentious POW/MIA arena, his own concern as a Vietnam War veteran, and what he saw as an opportunity to help clear the Government's good name. His plan was to be

“totally honest and forthcoming on the entire issue and aggressively pursue innovative actions and concepts to clear up the live sighting business.”

The buzz saw he quickly encountered shattered his faith in the system. Consider the following extracts from Peck’s letter of resignation:

- ▶ I became painfully aware...that I was not really in charge of my own office, but was merely a figurehead or whipping boy for a larger and totally Machiavellian group of players outside of DIA.
- ▶ That National leaders continue to address the prisoner of war and missing in action issue as the “highest national priority” is a travesty. From my vantage point, I observed that the principal government players were interested primarily in conducting a “damage limitation exercise”, and appeared to knowingly and deliberately generate an endless succession of manufactured crises and “busy work”.
- ▶ The mindset to “debunk” is alive and well. It is held at all levels, and continues to pervade the POW-MIA Office, which is not necessarily the fault of DIA.
- ▶ It appears that the entire issue is being manipulated by unscrupulous people in the Government, or associated with the Government. Some are using the issue for personal or political advantage and others use it as a forum to perform and feel important, or worse. The sad fact, however, is that this issue is being controlled and a cover-up may be in progress. The entire charade does not appear to be an honest effort, and may never have been.
- ▶ The policy people manipulating the affair have maintained their distance and remained hidden in the shadows, while using the Office as a “toxic waste dump” to bury the whole “mess” out of sight and mind to a facility with the limited access to public scrutiny.
- ▶ I have seen firsthand how ready and willing the policy people are to sacrifice or “abandon” anyone who might be perceived as a political liability. It is quick and facile, and can be easily covered.
- ▶ I feel strongly that this issue is being manipulated and controlled at a higher level, not with the goal of resolving it, but more to obfuscate the question of live prisoners, and give the illusion of progress through hyperactivity.
- ▶ From what I have witnessed, it appears that any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was, in fact, abandoned years ago, and that the farce that is being played is no more than political legerdemain done with “smoke and mirrors”, to stall the issue until it dies a natural death.

Without question, between 1986 and 1991, the situation did not improve. If anything, it became worse. This is the same system I encountered in 1992. There is only one reason this situation is allowed to persist: *The people in charge want it to persist.*

One would like to think the situation today is different. Certainly, there are some conscientious people who are trying to learn what happened. But, they are a very small minority. Most of the effort is devoted to wheel-spinning, at a cost of roughly \$100 million per year. The Joint Russia-US Task Force is exactly the type of travesty Peck spoke about, as are all the efforts

to dig through the remains of crashed airplanes. As Peck explained, they keep people busy, out of harm's way, and through hyperactivity create the illusion of progress.

Several years ago I had the privilege of addressing a meeting sponsored by one of the public POW/MIA organizations. The head of the DIA Task Force Russia, Maj. Gen. Bernard Loeffke, was another of the speakers. He explained their joint efforts with Russian counterparts to track down information in Russia, efforts that included *sharing information* with the Russians. I was well aware of prior testimony by Al Graham describing the Russian efforts to silence witnesses and destroy evidence. As Gen. Loeffke and I were walking off the stage, I said to him, "Tell me General, why would anyone with information of value give it to your task force?" His answer was short and frank. "I wouldn't," he quietly replied.

Consider the DIA efforts to declassify POW/MIA information in response to President Clinton's order that all material be declassified by Veteran's Day, 1993. Why is the DIA report on the use of American guinea pigs just now surfacing in 1996? Why did DIA not release the material in a press conference and distribute with it all other related material they say they reviewed in their "intensive and extensive" investigation? Even the just-released report is incomplete. The report states that "More detailed information...is listed in the enclosure below." But, no "enclosure below" was released along with the report and its covering memorandum. Does the DIA simply not care, or are they *still* deliberately making everything as difficult as possible for those Americans who do care?

There still has been no effort by DIA to debrief Sejna on his complete knowledge of what happened to American POW/MIAs. Proposals to conduct such a debriefing have been spiked within DoD and within CIA. Once the "essential elements" of his knowledge surfaced, and a hostile polygraph was unable to identify any deception by Gen. Sejna, the only serious interest evidenced by DIA and CIA was to discredit Sejna and *to avoid questioning him further*.

Why? What were—*ore*—they afraid they might find? Certainly there remain some errors in my presentation of the information derived out of the preliminary debriefing I conducted in 1992 and 1993. That was unavoidable because of the limited time available to me. But, would anyone with half a brain suggest that the over-all story explaining what happened to thousands of missing Americans, all first-hand knowledge by a "well placed" senior Czech official who was present and in center of the Czech portion of the operation, is a fabrication, the product of an overactive imagination?

Why does the U.S. Government want not to know the "rest of the story"? Aren't they even a slight bit curious? Are they simply too frightened about the possible implications? Are they merely striving to avoid possible retaliation by the "National leaders" and "policy people" who operate from positions "hidden in the shadows" that Peck wrote about? Are the problems surfaced by Aldrich Ames much larger and more profound than any of those in positions of responsibility want to acknowledge?

How can so many influential opinion makers exhibit so much concern about the war crimes in Bosnia while turning a blind eye to Gen. Sejna's description of what happened to American POWs and others missing in action in Korea, North Vietnam, and Laos.

How can so many former high-level U.S. officials, both military and civilian, sleep at night knowing they abandoned American servicemen to a fate worse than death—or is that why they just don't want to know what Sejna knows?

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Douglass.

I would be registering more shock, but I'm not hearing this for the first time because of our meeting in my office some weeks ago, and some limited dealings with you over the evil empire's interest in drug running.

It's amazing that some aspects of the media keep flogging a dead horse on American intelligence agencies purportedly being involved at the highest level, up front, with drug running, which is an absurd story. But they've never shown any interest in the Communist world using drugs to their end. And yet we have a country in this hemisphere, down in Colombia, where a thousand or more police officers have been killed in the line of duty in the last year, in the world's first terrorist-narco operation. The insurrectionists down there fund their whole operation through narcotics. This has only happened in the last decade.

Thank you for your statement.

Well, General, one prelude comment before you start with your statement. When I was having dinner with Colonel Corso, in an aside to me, discussing your treatment at the Senate, he recalled—and I believe you're 82 years of age?

Colonel CORSO. Eighty-one.

Mr. DORNAN. And as my dad used to say, as sharp as a steel bayonet. He said that if he had been treated the way you were treated before the Senate Committee, he would have gotten up and walked out. I can assure you that you're not going to be treated that way here today. There is just too much at stake, and no one has had the guts to come forward and try and question your testimony over the years directly. It's always been sub rosa, beneath the scenes, and it has been beyond discrediting. It's been real character assassination.

Having said that, please proceed, General.

STATEMENT OF JAN SEJNA, FORMER CZECH GENERAL OFFICER

General SEJNA. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be here.

I am 28 years in the United States. A few times I'm supposed to go to testimony to the Congress. Every time I didn't understand it because I thought the Congress was on top of everything. But I realized there were some other forces which had major influence to stop any testimony.

Mr. DORNAN. General, if you would hold your testimony for a second, is there anybody here from the Defense Missing in Action/POW office? Please identify yourselves. The man in the back, that's one, two, three, four, five.

I see a pencil in two hands. Please take careful notes here. You're going to have to live with this, gentlemen. I was hoping, since there are 89 people on the payroll over there, and 11 empty slots, I was hoping 50 would be here today. But I'll settle for five.

Proceed, General.

General SEJNA. But finally, thanks to you, after 28 years, nobody stopped it and I make it to the U.S. Congress.

Ladies and gentlemen, when I defected, I did a mistake. Today we call it an honest mistake. I came to the United States and I

thought I would explain these kinds of things, that policy is the major strategy of deception. I didn't agree with the policy. Don't make aggression mad; don't provoke them because it will be disaster. Be friendly with them. And it was a major mistake.

I never had a chance to explain completely the strategy of the Soviet Union, and I think, until Mr. Reagan through the White House called the Soviets by their real name, evil, and forced them to take down the Berlin Wall, things, to me, didn't look very good.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Berlin Wall, and the electric fences around Czechoslovakia and other countries, really covered an evil operation against all people and against the free, democratic countries.

In Soviet planning, two wars dominate the planning. First, there was the general nuclear war, which was the responsibility of the military. Even all civilian construction was under the control of the military. Second, there was a political and intelligence war, the revolutionary war, as it was originally called.

This war was planned in many details, infiltration of the government, the press, sabotage, subversion, deception, narcotic traffic, organized crime, the training of terrorists, terrorism generally, and compromise political and business leaders.

The major targets were industries, allies and democratic countries, and, of course, as I heard personally from Khrushchev, the major targets were the United States because, as he said, the United States was the major rock in the way to communism in the whole world, and as he said, if we move the rock away, the door for communism will be opened everywhere.

I like to point out these things because, as I said when I went to the United States, I didn't understand really the policy. In the beginning when I heard it and saw people, even from the Congress and politicians on TV, I thought all of them are KGB agents. I was wrong. I think some of them didn't understand what's going on between the Soviet Union and the United States. I think the part of the deception strategy was also how to use POW's from Korea and Vietnam and Laos.

Ladies and gentlemen, I don't say any fantasy. I was there. I participated in that. I was in charge of some operations, and what I'm saying is the truth. Even if the people who tried to find out the truth about POW's have very, very strong enemies, stronger maybe than we are, I think one day the truth will come out and I hope that these people will at least apologize.

Some people who call me liar, and even ask the Defense Department to fire me, and thanks to the Defense Department, they said no, against these people I will file suit, ones I will present my friends with more facts about the POW's.

Ladies and gentlemen, except what my friend, Joe Douglass, said about me, I just want to add that I was a colonel when I was 27. I was already in the Parliament and our Central Committee. I was general when I was 40, and I want to tell you one very important thing.

In 1968, February 25, I kissed the last time Brezhnev and 3 days later I was in United States. I think he never forgot that kiss.

When the war was over in Korea, there were still a hundred American prisoners in Korea, and as probably you know already

from the press, and Czechoslovakia very well, because Czechoslovakia built a military hospital in Korea, in the beginning of the war. They called it a "gift to the Korean people".

The major purpose for the hospital was to train Czech doctors, and Russians, for the war. But generally, it just covered deception. The top secret purpose of the hospital was to experiment on Americans and South Koreans. The POW's were used to test the effects of chemical and biological warfare agents and to test the effect of atomic radiation.

The Soviets also used the American prisoners to test the psychological and physiological endurance of American soldiers. They were also used to test various mind-control drugs. Czechoslovakia also built close to the hospital a crematorium.

Ladies and gentlemen, I was shocked when I learned 2 years ago that some agency of the United States Government asked Czechoslovakia if it is true what I said about the hospital. The Czechs said yes, we built the hospital, but we didn't test American prisoners. Forty years after the war in Korea, we find out the hospital was there.

Mr. DORNAN. How? How did we find out it was there?

General SEJNA. They asked Czech intelligence if it is true what I said, and Czech intelligence said yes, the hospital was built there.

The Americans and South Koreans were very important to the Soviet plans because, as I told you, the United States was their worst enemy to the Communists, and that is why they want to be sure they understand the mental and physical condition of American soldiers.

The Soviets were deadly serious in their preparation for nuclear war and in their development of various drugs and chemicals that were to be used in the revolutionary war, and this included detailed tests on the people from the United States.

At the end of the Korean war, it was made a decision of the Soviet Defense Council to do everything possible to cover any operation in Korea which was prepared by Soviets and other satellites, and especially to cover the tests which were performed on American soldiers.

Ladies and gentlemen, I learned about these things not just from the documents, like the Secretary of Defense Council, but also from the doctors and my friends who were in Korea. They participated in the tests.

The Czech scientific institution, military, they participated in the analysis. They got analyses from the Soviet Union because the tests continued when they took American prisoners to the Soviet Union and, after then, what was the Vietnam war. I was personally present when American prisoners of war were shipped through Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union, where they were tested in the military hospitals for any other diseases because the Soviets didn't trust too much Koreans.

Between 1961 and 1968, when I left Czechoslovakia, I estimate at least 200 American POW's were shipped to the Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia. I don't have any evidence of the participation of East Germany or other countries, but there's no question that East Germany participates very much because they have expe-

rience from World War II, when the Nazis tested many drugs on human beings.

Finally, I want to say that I will do everything I can to help people to try to find out the truth about POW's. It doesn't matter if somebody wants to make me homeless or whatever, because I think it is just one country, the United States, which worries so much about each individual, each American citizen who was lost anywhere. I am shocked because it has taken so long to really do something and to find out the truth about American prisoners in Korea.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for the opportunity to be here. [The prepared statement of Mr. Sejna follows:]

Statement of Jan Sejna
Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel
of the House National Security Committee

September 17, 1996

Chairman Dornan, ladies and gentlemen, it is a privilege to be here this afternoon.

It is heartwarming for me after so many years to find people who are sincerely interested in events that actually happened in various communist countries that were under the rule of the Soviet Union.

In 1968 I was forced to choose between following instructions I received from Moscow and doing what I believed to be best for my country, Czechoslovakia. At the time, I was first secretary of the Party at the Ministry of Defense and chief of staff to the Minister of Defense, in addition to numerous other positions. The Soviet Union was preparing to invade Czechoslovakia, and I choose to alert the Czech leadership and refused to follow the Soviet plan as directed.

A week later, I learned that my immunity from arrest as a member of the Parliament had been lifted and I was about to be arrested. I believe my arrest had been directed personally by Soviet General Yepishev. After thirteen years in high-level positions, I knew precisely what that meant, and along with my son and his girl friend, who later became his wife, I fled through Yugoslavia to Trieste, where I went to the U.S. consulate and requested political asylum. In two days I was in the United States.

To understand the events of interest today, it is essential to understand that back then the main mission of all organizations in the Soviet empire was to destroy democracy and bring people everywhere under the yoke of communism.

Two wars dominated our planning.

First, there was general nuclear war, which was the responsibility of the military. Even civilian construction projects had to be approved by the Defense Council to make certain they all contributed to the war effort.

Second, there was the political and intelligence wars, the world revolutionary war, as it was originally called. This war was also waged according to a very detailed and complex strategic plan. This war involved infiltration of the government and press, sabotage, subversion, deception, narcotics trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, compromise of political and business leaders, and many other activities, all designed to destroy competing social systems. The primary targets were all industrialized countries and the most important enemy was the United States.

I want to point out that in these and other activities, the Soviets ruled their empire with an iron hand. All directions and controls came from Moscow. People undertook independent actions at their own risk, and the penalties were without any regard for human rights or dignity.

I know, because I was there. In the 1950s and early 1960s I was in charge of the Defense Council secretariat. From 1964 on I was first secretary at the Ministry of Defense. In my various official capacities I was constantly meeting with Soviet officials, receiving instructions, and relaying those instructions to various Czech agencies and departments.

It was in the process of responding to Soviet directions in about 1956 that I first became aware of the use of American and South Korean POWs by Soviet and Czech doctors.

I certainly would not pretend to know what happened to all the missing POWs, but I do know what happened to many of them. In brief, hundreds were used in Korea and in Vietnam as human guinea pigs.

At the beginning of the Korean War, we received directions from Moscow to build a military hospital in North Korea. The advertised purpose of the hospital was to treat military casualties. But this was only a cover, a deception. The Top Secret purpose of the hospital was to experiment on American and South Korean POWs.

The POWs were used as bodies for training military doctors in field medicine -- for example treating serious wounds and conducting amputations.

The POWs were used to test the effects of chemical and biological warfare agents and to test the effects of atomic radiation.

The Soviets also used the American GIs to test the physiological and psychological endurance of American soldiers. They were also used to test various mind control drugs.

Czechoslovakia also built a crematorium in North Korea to disposed of the bodies and parts after the experiments were concluded.

The Americans and South Koreans were not the only humans used as guinea pigs. Thousands of prisoners within the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia too, were also used.

The Americans and South Koreans were very important to the Soviet plans because they believed it was essential to understand the manner in which different drugs, and chemical and biological warfare agents, and radiation affected different races and people who had been brought up differently; for example on better diets.

The Soviets also wanted to know whether there were differences in the abilities of soldiers from different countries to stand up to the stress of nuclear war and keep on fighting.

The Soviets were deadly serious in their preparation for nuclear war and in their development of various drugs and chemicals that were to be used in the revolutionary war, and this included detailed tests on the people from the various countries that were their enemies. Because America was the main enemy, American POWs were the most highly valued experimental subjects.

At the end of the Korean War, there were about 100 POWs who were still considered useful for further experiments. I believe all others had been killed in the process of the experiments because I do not recall ever reading any report that indicated that any of the POW patients at the hospital left the hospital alive -- except the 100 that were still alive at the end of the war. These 100 were flown in four groups first to Czechoslovakia, where they were given physical exams, and then onto the Soviet Union.

I learned about all this from the Czech doctors who ran the hospital, from the Czech military intelligence officer in charge of the Czech operations in Korea, from Soviet advisors, and from official documentation that I reviewed in the process of responding to a Soviet request for Czechoslovakia to send medical doctors to the Soviet Union to participate in various experiments being run on the POWs who had been transferred to the Soviet Union. I also reviewed reports on the results of autopsies of the POWs, and received briefings on various aspects of the experiments.

While what I have just said describes what happened in Korea, I want to point out that the same things happened in Vietnam and Laos during the Vietnam War. The only difference is the operation in Vietnam was better planned and more Americans POWs were used, both in Vietnam and Laos and in the Soviet Union.

On several occasions my office was responsible for organizing the shipments of POWs and their housing in Prague before they were shipped to the Soviet Union. I personally was present when American POWs were unloaded from planes, put on buses whose windows had been painted black, and then driven to Prague where they were placed in various military intelligence barracks and other secure buildings until they were shipped to the Soviet Union.

Between 1961 and 1968 when I left Czechoslovakia, I would estimate at least 200 American POWs were shipped to the Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia.

I believe there were others who were shipped to the Soviet Union through North Korea and East Germany, although I have no first hand knowledge of those transfers. I know that many were given to the Chinese for experiments during the Korean War, and Czech intelligence reported that the North Vietnamese also provided American POWs to the Chinese.

In closing I want to emphasize that this operation was conducted at the highest level of secrecy. Information on this operation was labeled State Secret, which was higher than Top Secret, and no one who did not have a real need to know was aware of the operation. When I was there, my estimate is that fewer than 15 people in all of Czechoslovakia were aware of the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. I will never forget the written directions on the original Soviet order that started the operation in 1951. It said that the operation was to be conducted in such a way that "no one would ever know about it."

I am only sorry that it has taken so long to find some people here in American who are interested in the Soviet operation designed to use American POWs.

Thank you for the opportunity to tell you those things that I know happened. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, General.

A couple of facts and one question, and then I will hold my questions until my colleagues have asked questions of the panel.

When I first met with you in my office, you told me that when you first got here, and this country was being torn apart the month you arrived, we all had our memories jogged with the film at the Democratic Convention in Chicago a few weeks ago. Both of our political parties basically put on a 4-day infomat commercial, so the media needed something to talk about at the Republican Convention, and it was trying to stoke the fires of the abortion argument, and at the Democratic Convention it was glorifying a traitor—in my opinion, a traitor—State Senator Tom Haydon, and following him around and showing this old film and calling it a police riot.

But when you were first here, the rioting was going on at the Democratic Convention, Hanoi's SIOPS operations were being coordinated at that point out of Cuba, and Czechoslovakia was invaded with tanks right while the Democratic Convention was going on in 1968. You told me that when you told your interviewers—and now I know why you think they were KGB agents and couldn't believe their stupidity—never underestimate dumb—they asked you about the rifles in an average Czech Army platoon. They got you to a minutiae. And every time you told them about live American prisoners coming from Vietnam through Czechoslovakia—we call that laundering when money is involved, and to break the trail is the way you put it—and then sent to the Soviet Union to disappear forever, that they told you they weren't interested.

I want you to tell me a little bit about that. And then when you told them, as the chief of staff secretariat of their equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about warfighting plans for a possible world war III, through a preemptive strike by Soviet tank forces, they also told you, "well, we're not interested in that. Tell us about the rifle that the average soldier carries in a Czech infantry platoon."

Do you think they were questioning you along those lines to test your veracity, and if that was so, why did they never return to the larger themes of world war III or live Americans getting the Dr. Mengele-Auschwitz treatment or the Japanese loathsome, hellish unit 731 at Harbin, Manchuria, treatment. Tell me something about those initial visits. And I tell Americans listening through television, or family visitors in the room that will carry the word back to the other families, what they did when they thought they had sucked all the intelligence value out of you—which was shockingly minimal, given your position and your status. They gave you \$50,000 and maybe that was real money in 1968, and sent you up to Lake George, NY, to run a golf course or something, and you warned them that you were a military man, you didn't necessarily have business skills, and that you would lose all that money forthwith, and you did.

I just wanted people in the audience to know, instead of putting you on the payroll immediately, they sent you off with \$50 G's to Lake George, NY, a beautiful area of my colleague, Gerry Soloman.

I might add that if you were a homosexual traitor, like Kim Philby, Andrew Blunt, Burgess, or McLean, you would have gotten a colonelcy in the CIA or the equivalent would be senior executive staff, a free apartment inside the beltway, and taken care of for

life, I just want people to understand, who don't read these intelligence stories as I do, the difference between our two systems.

But just tell me the highest level of person who was your contact man in the CIA, your interviewers, and why they resisted these overwhelmingly serious themes only to question you about minutiae?

General SEJNA. Mr. Chairman, I have to say, if I'm talking about people who interrogate me, who work with me, there were some people who I would say were the smartest people who we have in the United States, people from the CIA and other agencies, and then there were some idiots, I'm sorry to say, because—For example, it's not just about the rifles. Can you imagine, in my position, I will remember how many rifles are in a company or platoon?

They asked me to paint on the paper—how do you say it?

Mr. DOUGLASS. The insignias?

Mr. DORNAN. The rank, which is available on charts at any intelligence office in the Pentagon.

General SEJNA. I said you can go to a Prague bookstore and buy it. I think they probably test me if it is true I am general, if I know how it looks or not. Maybe.

Mr. DORNAN. How long had it been since you had fired a rifle?

General SEJNA. Pardon me?

Mr. DORNAN. How long since you had fired a rifle. When you had defected, how long since you, as an officer, had fired a pistol on a range?

General SEJNA. Before I defected, probably 20 years.

Mr. DORNAN. Just one other example of some of the trivia they asked you about.

General SEJNA. Yeah.

Mr. DORNAN. Give me one other example of some of the trivia. Epaulets, rank, the structure of a platoon, how many rifles in a Czech infantry company.

General SEJNA. You know, Mr. Chairman, I must say the problem was I don't want to make myself important because any defector tries to be more important than others, you know.

Mr. DORNAN. I understand.

General SEJNA. But I think they were probably shocked because they had never had such a high defector, and probably because sometimes even the warrant officers worked with me and asked questions. They were so nice. They told me, look, we have this question, for example, about chemical weapons. OK, I can discuss the general decision on how to use chemical weapons in the war and so on, but they asked me the technology, how to make the chemical weapons and all this, and I was not a professor or chemist or whatever.

They said, look, we have to say something because, when we come back, if we say you know too much, they say how is it possible he knows too much? If he says he doesn't know, they give us hell and they say he was general and he doesn't know? This guy tries to compromise somehow and work with me together to say something.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, many times I was really shocked because these people didn't understand the communist system. They told me, look, you was general; how do you know about the political

system? They don't know that in Czechoslovakia or Russia, the general officers are in Central Committee. They are in the Parliament, as I was. If you are not politically involved, you were never a general. It's that simple.

So I think it was absolutely a misunderstanding, and I must say I am sorry for such stupid questions. It was just a waste of time.

Mr. DORNAN. It comes to mind in a Georgetown restaurant how a Polish defector, Yurchenko, just got up out of the restaurant and said "Goodbye. I'm going over to the Polish Embassy. I'm out of here, "Goodbye." Victor Blenko, who brought a MiG-25 to Japan, was allowed to flounder around. He got one look at the hardcore pornography and prostitution at the so-called tenderloin area of San Francisco and he drove all the way back across the country to turn himself in, probably to execution, but fortunately called his CIA handler at the last minute and was dissuaded from it. And he still is a valuable intelligence asset and not used by our Government.

I have to ask a question of Colonel Corso. It just jumps into my mind. Did the Eisenhower administration know anything about the fate of our missing men, the ones that went to the Soviet Union? Did you ever have a clue, until you heard General Sejna, about these medical experiments?

Colonel CORSO. Yes, I did.

Mr. DORNAN. You did hear that?

Colonel CORSO. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Please tell us about that.

Colonel CORSO. I was getting reports that came from enemy territory in Korea, that they had some sort of a hospital up there where General Kamil, the Soviet, was heading all the interrogation and brainwashing. They had a hospital there where they were actually experimenting on our prisoners Nazi style. I put that in my statement.

Mr. DORNAN. Nazi style. Go ahead.

Colonel CORSO. We sent out agents to try to get the information, and I never did get much information on the hospital itself. But I did keep receiving, over a period of time, reports that this was happening. But the main reports that I did receive was how they were conducting their brainwashing technique. But there were other medical experiments that I was getting information on, and I passed that on to C.D. Jackson and other administration officials when I was at the White House.

Mr. DORNAN. Please explain who C.D. Jackson was.

Colonel CORSO. C.D. Jackson was—

Mr. DORNAN. He's now deceased.

Colonel CORSO. He was from Time Life magazine, and he was actually equivalent to a Cabinet member, a special assistant to the President. He was my immediate superior.

Mr. DORNAN. You don't get any higher than—I think that's George Stephanopoulos' title, Special Assistant to the President. That means you have access to the Oval Office just about any time you want it.

Colonel CORSO. C.D. Jackson came originally on the Psychological Strategy Board, which later became the Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council, that I was on.

C.D. Jackson had access to the President's office almost always. In fact, I would say 90 percent of the time that I saw President Eisenhower, C.D. Jackson would call me and I would go with him to see the President.

Mr. DORNAN. How often do you think he saw the President, C.D. Jackson?

Colonel CORSO. Oh, from what he told me—I used to sit with him quite often, since he was my superior—he would see him two or three times a week possibly.

Mr. DORNAN. So this was discussed in the Oval Office?

Colonel CORSO. Yes. He was close to the President.

Mr. DORNAN. One thing comes to mind. I tried to get the records for the Japanese demonic medical facility, unit 731 at Harbin. I tried to get the records and it was a disgraceful coverup, because some of the Japanese who had amputated limbs, trained their medical doctors to amputate first one limb, then another, and finally a torso is lying there with some poor GI's looking up to God, "What's become of me?" Then they would operate on their intestines and kill them. It seems unbelievable, but it happened. And some of the doctors who did this have committed suicide. Meanwhile, they ran medical schools in Japan.

The records were all up at Fort Meade, our Chemical Warfare Center, and I had a hell of a time in getting them in 1977, 1978. They're still classified. It even infringed a little bit on the reputation of MacArthur, who was trying to turn a bashida warrior code, Shogun system, into a democracy, and he achieved wonders doing that. But we did not have, in depth, the war crimes trials in Japan. People were losing interest because it came after Nuremberg.

But in the Japanese tests at Harbin, what they would do is say, "How would anthrax react on a blond or a redheaded American, Brit, or Australian soldier? How would they react on Koreans, and is there a difference between Koreans and Chinese." They would work different medical experiments on different racial types. I look at you, Phil, but I wanted to ask this of General Sejna.

Did I not read in some of your statements that there seemed to be some interest on how American officers responded to drugs, higher educated people, mind-control drugs, how enlisted men reacted, and how people of different races reacted, South Vietnamese prisoners, through Czechoslovakia and into the Soviet Union.

General SEJNA. Yes. As I said, they had an interest in different races. For example, how do drugs react on black and white, let's say, Afro-Americans or Asians, because it was the war would proceed to Asia and were even talking about global war or in Europe or American territory.

When they shipped these prisoners to the Soviet Union, they separated the officers. They separated American officers on how to use the drugs which controlled the mind and chemical weapons. So all these things were scientifically orchestrated, with different groups and different positions, different ranks, and so on.

I must say, for example, in the testimony from the Soviet Union, they came to the conclusion, which I remember right today, when they checked those soldiers, 20 percent of the American soldiers already passed many heart attacks, as they called it.

Mr. DORNAN. Had gone through heart attacks, induced heart attacks?

General SEJNA. Yes. The Koreans, just 1 percent. So they came to the conclusion that it is necessary to do something to even make the rate higher in case the World War starts, to use chemical weapons or drugs or whatever, because the American soldier, because I guess the life in the United States is different than in Korea, were a very easy target for such diseases—heart diseases and so on.

As an example of how they go into all the details on these things, and especially about the officers, they came to the conclusion, as more intelligent was the human being, they are better targets for the drugs to control his mind. If you were, I am sorry to say, so primitive, it was a different approach on how to read you, how to control your mind, how to make you not fight and simply give up. Different things were approached to the officers and staffs. So it was a very, very scientific planning for all this stuff.

Colonel CORSO. Mr. Chairman, may I add something to that right now?

Mr. DORNAN. Phil, just 1 second. I want to ask this question or I'll forget it.

I approached President Reagan in December 1984. I had just made a comeback to the House. About 90 people had been defeated around this place and tried to come back, and only two of us have made it. So, I was in a good frame of mind and thought I would pick up my work on this issue again.

Bobby Garwood was out there still floating around after 4 or 5 years, the corporal from Vietnam who had carried a gun, and I was just reading in the book "POW" again how in one of the horrible camps in the northern part of South Vietnam, how he had kept prisoners captive and spoke fluent Vietnamese, and then conversely would sneak food to some of the Americans to keep them alive while lecturing with them to cooperate with the North.

But I asked Bobby Garwood if he would take sodium pentothal and he said yes. So I asked President Reagan if the Government would consider giving Bobby Garwood sodium pentothal. And President Reagan turned and said, "Well, Bud, how about that?" Bud was Col. Bud McFarland, his National Security Advisor. It was never done.

General, when you were telling this to your initial briefers, at the height of the cold war in 1968—Khrushchev had been out of power for about 3½ or 4 years—alarm bells should have gone off in the intelligence community. The intellectual impact should have been deafening, these alarm bells. Somebody should have suggested to you that you take sodium pentothal.

A quick story of how this works. One of the top all time test pilots for Lockheed Aviation was a test pilot named "Fish" Salmon. He bailed out of an F-104 Starfighter, which was our first Mach 2 airplane. He remembered nothing. He bailed out at high speed in an inverted spin.

They gave him sodium pentothal, and I watched this on Lockheed film. They give him sodium pentothal and it recalls and brings back his memory in such detail that he begins, in the sodium pentothal state, to relate what was on the instruments that

he's looking at in this inverted spin right before he ejects. It was valuable to the test program for what was then the world's fastest fighter, a missile with a man in it.

Would you be willing—I know you're in your sixties, and I don't know if the doctors would say it's dangerous, but you have already passed a polygraph test—

General SEJNA. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. And a 3-star general said "no deception noted."

Would you be willing to take sodium pentothal, "truth serum" it's called in slang?

General SEJNA. Sure.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, I'm not going to forget the 17th of September, 1996.

Colonel CORSO, let me ask you this. Did the U.S. DOD track carefully during this period the results of the brainwashing? Were they talking to my friend, Bud Mahuron, who had been held in solitary, in a pit in the ground for 18 months, that signed a germ warfare confession?

Colonel CORSO. Yes. During this period, I wrote the speech for Dr. Mayo on brainwashing when they accused us of bacteriological warfare—

Mr. DORNAN. For Doctor who?

Colonel CORSO. Dr. Charles Mayo at the United Nations. This was mostly on brainwashing and the techniques that they used.

During that period I got my hands on a film at CIA—

Mr. DORNAN. I have those documents, by the way.

Colonel CORSO [continuing]. Which was titled "Silvery Dust". This film was made by the Soviet Union. It showed the exact experiments that they did on human being to condition the reflexes of a human being.

Also, in Korea, the Department of Defense furnished me 90 returning ex-prisoners of war before I wrote that speech. These prisoners of war told me that, once a prisoner came under this treatment, in many cases, they knew—they would watch the prisoner, and if they could get to him, because the prisoner would will himself to death, they could almost time the time he was going to die. And doctors even told me this, that came back as prisoners. The man would just give up.

When they did this, they tried to get their hands on him, to try to make him walk and bring him out of it. If they couldn't get to him, the prisoners actually told me that they could call the time of death. This was a result of these experiments on mind control, or the Pavlovian conditioned reflexes.

In fact, Congressman, if you see pictures of prisoners, at times they have a blindfold. They walk them around from place to place. The purpose of the blindfold is not to break the conditioning. So they blindfold them when they move them around before they get them to get on the radio or something or confess. This was actually practiced by the Soviets, and this film, "Silvery Dust," was made by them and proved that they were doing it on their own people.

There was one picture there, one face, that they would have a man on his back. He had his mouth open and a tube would be coming down to his mouth. They would roll a pellet of food down and

he would open his mouth at the strike of a bell, like they did with the dogs, Pavlov's dogs.

As I say, this speech was given by Dr. Charles Mayo at the United Nations, which covered the whole conditioned reflex system. It was so bad that at times it was just like shooting the prisoner.

Mr. DORNAN. I will yield to my colleagues here. Just two quick questions that may trigger questions for them.

General Sejna, did you ever talk to any of the doctors?

General SEJNA. In Czechoslovakia?

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

General SEJNA. Oh, yes, surely.

Mr. DORNAN. And you were never asked by anybody in the U.S. intelligence community to identify or look at any pictures of doctors?

General SEJNA. No.

Mr. DORNAN. No. 2, did you ever see any of the reports or records of the experiments that were coming back to Prague?

General SEJNA. Sure. Of course, because most of them go to the Defense Council and everything goes through my hands.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say one more thing. It would also be interesting to check what human beings the Soviets use when they test nuclear weapons, because I saw some films which they showed us. They test their nuclear weapons with the horses and human beings and things. I tell you, I would not be surprised if these people were American POW's. I would not be surprised.

Mr. DORNAN. Where they killed 10,000 of their own citizens with anthrax tests, first printed in Readers Digest, and some people in our intelligence community dismissed it and then, after the Iron Curtain came down, it turned out to be true.

When you talked about people being blindfolded, two thoughts came to mind, and then I will defer to my colleagues. I pictured our Doolittle Raiders. I found a picture of me and Jimmie Doolittle together last night. His raiders were blindfolded, wherever they took them around Tokyo, to and from the courtroom and everything, keeping them disoriented.

I was thinking of the Cateen Forest massacre. People used to say about European Jewry why would people go like sheep to the death camps, why wouldn't they revolt. That question was answered for me clearly when the officer corps of Poland, intelligent, college graduates, brave men who would charge tanks on horseback, all they had to do was not feed them for 3 weeks. This is also what the Croats did to the Serbs and the Serbs to the Croats just a couple of years ago. When you don't feed someone for 3 weeks, and then you keep them blindfolded, they become disoriented, their whole body metabolism changes from not eating, and within weeks they were able to take 5,000 Czech officers and put them on a barge, take it out to the Baltic and sink it. They would take others into the woods, pull their coats up over their heads, and then fire a bullet into the back of their head. This was all determined, by the way, by Germans, and the Red Cross called into Cateen because what was a bullet hole doing on the back, inside of these coats, and then they realized the method they had used.

When you starve people, and when you disorient them, all of us become like sheep under this conditioning.

The book title comes to mind that I read as a young man, the "Theory and Practice of Hell".

Could I ask one thing. How many family members are in the room today? Leave your hands up. If you've heard of any of these horrors before, put your hand down. If you're hearing them for the first time, leave your hands up.

So all of the family members had known about some of this horror that the general and Colonel Corso are speaking of. This is tragic, that you would find this out and the Congress would be deaf to these stories, and so would the majority of our intelligence community.

Colonel CORSO. Congressman, there is one more fact. They starved the prisoners and the people they had under their control to put them under conditioning. But our own prisoners told me that, in addition to that, they used the excess food method also. Give a man who's starving for a long time and all at once give him too much food, that was a method of conditioning, very strangely.

Mr. DORNAN. Painful distention of the stomach and other things.

All right. Let me turn to my vice chairman here. You can answer that in a second, general, please. Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel Corso, in your statement at the bottom of the first page, you make reference to a study that you wrote.

Colonel CORSO. The "War in the POW Camps?"

Mr. PICKETT. It says, "I wrote a study on how this control extended to the POW camps."

Colonel CORSO. Yes.

Mr. PICKETT. Is a copy of that report study still available?

Colonel CORSO. That was written—I wrote that in the Far East Command, and General MacArthur approved it. It was put out in booklet form. I wrote that in Korea when I took charge of intelligence inquires at the camp where they captured our general. I found the chief man down there and questioned him. He was a Soviet officer named Pac Sag Non. And then I found out how they systematically used our prisoners.

When they were taken prisoner, they were still considered combatants, and they were treated as such. The Geneva Convention to them didn't have any meaning whatsoever. I wrote that study, and Eden waved it on the floor of Parliament. And right after that, the British asked for the return of some of their prisoners, which some were given back. I don't know how many because I didn't have the figures.

But that study should be available. The title is—it was printed with the Far East Command logo on the front, and the title is "War in the POW Camps." They conducted war in both ours and their POW camps.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you.

The other question that I have, you were involved in this issue of the American POW's at the very outset during the war, when the events were actually taking place.

Colonel CORSO. Yes, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. And you were a part of that.

What happened to U.S. policy that we went so far afield and did so many things wrong and were unable to focus the required attention on getting our military people back?

Colonel CORSO. Well, Congressman, in Korea, when I was at Panmunjom, I was sitting there and I could hear the fighting going back and forth. When they tried to influence our decisions at Panmunjom, they would attack.

One night, a Marine colonel who bunked with me asked what was the matter with me, and I told him I hope I get back to Washington and find out who these people are that are betraying our boys. General Walker even said that they knew our commands before we even attacked. So that was one of the first times that I used this phrase, that one of our prayers was answered.

Six weeks later I was sitting in the White House staff, the only place where I could find the information, and I found it. Later on I testified in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee on this.

Our policy was not made to win the war. Our policy—I call it the policy of paralysis and diversion. First the policy would paralyze our actions, and then they would divert it away from the POW issue, for example.

There was not anything that I found—and I didn't deal with the CIA at all—there was nothing there on prisoners, even when I was at the White House. They weren't in the business. There was nothing in policy that said at the time, when I was searching the National Security Council papers, and the National Intelligence Estimates by the CIA, which stated that we would take any action for our returning prisoners. Nothing at all. It was silence. It didn't even say let's not get them. It said nothing.

We tried to bring this up, and I did discuss this with the President, who was sympathetic. But the real policymakers, as I told Robert Kennedy when I went to see him with my testimony—and I had three sessions with him—I told him when I first met him—he had my testimony on his desk—and I told him, “Mr. Attorney General, if you and the President think you make policy, you're mistaken.” Very strangely, his answer was, “I know that, Colonel. Let's discuss it.” I was still in uniform when I met Robert Kennedy on my testimony.

So there was nothing in our policy that said—in fact, General Clark, when he found out about the 500 sick and wounded which I mentioned, General Clark wanted to restart the war to go get our prisoners, he was so angry. Of course, policy forbid him to take it.

Later on I wrote a study, too, that said what MacArthur never knew. Our policy was so that we couldn't go after victory. The clichés in there were such that they just paralyzed everything that we tried to do. We couldn't win that war.

Later on, when I was with the National Security Council, I went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I showed them what paper was written—and I can name the General, but he's a good friend of mine—and I told him to be careful and I'll try to block this National Intelligence Estimate because it will be the same thing—at the time we called it Indochina; it wasn't Vietnam. I said it's going to be the same thing in Vietnam. Well, he did nothing about it and it became policy. So I went back over one day and I told him you

live with it now. Another 50,000 dead. Well, I was a little wrong. It was 58,000 instead of 50,000.

We had exactly the same policy on Vietnam that we had on Korea. There was no difference. Only the words were different, but they meant the same thing. In part, we called this the "Fig Leaf Policy" that, in my terms, was a policy of paralysis and diversion. That's what it was. And this went on for many years. In fact, I think it's still on today. I wouldn't doubt it, although I've been away from it for many years.

Mr. PICKETT. Do you see this failure to have an aggressive policy to recover the POW's as a failure of the civilian leadership or the military leadership?

Colonel CORSO. Civilian leadership. They were the policymakers. Remember, Congressman, in those days there were strong moves for civilian control of everything, in McNamara's time. In fact, in the Army we had the atomics, and we were going to put a man on the moon in 1961, and they took all that away from us, and gradually took away our atomics and everything from the military, from the Army. The policy was to try to get civilian control and make the military kowtow to everything. We used to talk about this quite often, and it can't be in the military, in war.

This is what happened to us in Korea. We were stopped. MacArthur, they were right when they said he disobeyed policy. He did when he tried to win the war. Our policy was not to win that war. The same thing in Vietnam.

Actually, I named some of the policy papers, the numbers of them, and they still exist. They can be seen. Maybe they're still top secret, I don't know, because I've been away for many years. But they are there, and I went through these myself.

Mr. DORNAN. We're looking for them and we're finding them.

Mr. PICKETT. General Sejna, in the series of events that you have made reference to, about the U.S. prisoners being used for medical experiments, what kind of records were maintained of these activities? The Communist Government it seems liked to keep records on everything. If there are records, where would they be and who would have them?

General SEJNA. This I tell you, sir. When the representatives of some agency of the United States Government go to Czechoslovakia and they looked for some evidence, mostly to prove I lie, not to prove what is true about the POW's, I have some friends there and they said they told them you are 2 years late and you should go to Moscow, because this evidence is there. They have evidence about each soldier, what drugs they used, what was the results of the medical examination and so on.

Some of them were done by Czech doctors, some of them, most of them, were from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union give us some results because, otherwise, our researchers and scientists cannot proceed with the scientific research. But after the collapse of communism, or before communism collapsed, I heard they were supposed to take it to the Soviet Union and the KGB.

I was thinking, when they go there, they will go to me and ask me, look, if we go there, to whom do you think we can go, who we can ask? It was a secret for me because they go there. I learn it from friends in Czechoslovakia. Of course, if you ask the Minister

of Defense, who absolutely supported the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops, you ask him about such evidence and he says I never saw any evidence, which to me is not fact. He didn't see it, so——

Mr. DORNAN. Which to me is not what?

General SEJNA. To me it is not any fact, because he was not at that time the Defense Minister. He was commander of a platoon or a company and he was in support of the Russians. What do we expect he will tell us? He will tell us yes, it is true? This is really a joke of what happened.

I think this is supposed to be done again, orderly, and to people who have knowledge about it. I hope some are still alive. Maybe some not. Some like Colonel Bobka, who was officially in Korea, but he was an intelligence officer and he wouldn't probably tell us anything because he was a devout Stalinist.

But there are some people who were, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, fired and punished, and in some instances I am sure they would be willing to talk. But you must know to whom you go, what you're asking, not making him scared he will be punished again by somebody. It simply should be a different approach.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Pickett, would you yield for just one second?

Mr. PICKETT. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. DORNAN. Because this is integral to what your questioning is.

Please tell this room, and the American television audience, what you wrote in your testimony about your image of Americans. It was that they were tall, rugged, and it came from seeing cowboy movies as a young man. We forget that Hitler saw "Gone with the Wind" and critiqued it to Eva Braun, in color, on the porch of Berklasgarten.

Your image of Americans was tough and strong, and you saw with your own eyes these transferred American POW's and you were shocked at how dazed and weak they appeared. I want my colleagues in America to know you're stating before a U.S. congressional subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, that you physically saw them, you were close to them. Did you speak to them?

General SEJNA. I didn't speak English at that time, but I saw them and I was there in the barracks when they took them from the airport.

I can tell you that I know America generally from the Soviet information and propaganda and from the Hollywood movies, so we always thought Americans can do what they want; they are tough guys. And when I saw these guys, they were like sheep. You know, they were simply finished. For sure, they even don't know where they are.

I tell you, before they transferred into Czechoslovakia, we had a meeting and my Minister asked Marshal Grechko how we can feed them, because they are supposed to stay 2 days. He said don't feed them too much because we test them for how the drugs are working in the war. In the war, they will not eat too much. The Minister told him, as we know, the Koreans treat Americans like dogs, and Grechko left and said they deserve it, but still, the Koreans

don't eat them, because people say they eat dogs. So he said they treat them very bad, but they still don't eat them.

Mr. PICKETT. Can you identify, General, for this committee, the specific Czech military unit that had responsibility for oversight of these prisoners?

General SEJNA. The major responsibility was the individual service and the Scientific Institute of the Air Force, because they did the major testing, and also the Central Military Hospital in Prague.

Mr. PICKETT. And did you ever have occasion to—and would you be able to provide the same information as to the specific Soviet military unit that was receiving these prisoners?

General SEJNA. Yeah. It was all this—like the main medical administration, military administration. They got their orders from the Soviets, the main medical administration at the general staff, and they proceeded in Czechoslovakia. So all of them were connected to the same counterparts in the Soviet Union.

Of course, the Soviet Union was the Academy of Science that participated, because many things they keep even secret from us, because you know how the Soviets are secret. Even if people who know about these things were checked by Soviet military in the region. You cannot put anybody through this business if the Soviet military counterintelligence wouldn't approve it, because they didn't want this information to go to the West or whatever.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Colonel CORSO, you have referred to the so-called big switch and the little switch. Regarding the little switch, there were 500 sick and wounded that were not returned. Can you tell us what happened to them?

Colonel CORSO. My later information said that almost all of them died.

Now, the way I found out this information—and I wrote the presentation that was given, that same day, almost, I think the next day, at the delegation—Admiral Daniel gave it. He was the No. 2 man after General Harrison. The Chinese general had a pencil in his hand when he heard this and just snapped it in half, that was presiding.

The way I found out the information was two ways. We had a Korean colonel as a member of our delegation. He came to me and gave me the information that he got from the workers who had built a pagoda or something where the prisoners came through from the Communist side. We built a little one and they built a bigger one. He told me that the civilians had told him there were 500 Americans sitting out there, an estimate.

Then later that—

Mr. DORNAN. How many miles from Panmunjom?

Colonel CORSO. About 10 miles, within 10 miles.

Then the same day our prisoners started to come through. I was there meeting them, and I shook hands with a lot of the boys and talked to them. I had the Korean colonel with me, standing with me all the time, because we had become friends during the period of negotiations, and our own boys told me that there were sick and

wounded Americans not 10 miles from the camp, and none of them were exchanged.

Later on I presented this, as I said, wrote it at the United Nations, and General Clark got his hands on it and got really angry. That's when he wanted to restart the war. Those boys were never exchanged. The reason for it, were they holding them as hostages for bargaining, or maybe they were too sick and wounded to exchange and they wanted the newspapermen to see it, I don't know the reason why they didn't exchange them. But they didn't give them to us, did not.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Skelton, could I ask a follow up on that?

Mr. SKELTON. You bet.

Mr. DORNAN. One of the dumbest things Jane Fonda ever said in her life was that—when we returned North Vietnamese prisoners, there were many amputees among them, amputees because of excellent medical care. The nurses in the hospitals up in I Corps, when I went there as a journalist, told me that North Vietnamese were no more immune to the malaria of the south than Americans were, and that they all had stomach worms. So when they were wounded, they were immediately infected. So we amputated some arms and legs.

In North Vietnam, if an amputation was required, the person ended up dying. They didn't bother. They took out elbows, took out bones, took out one Army Green Beret's—so much of his bones that his hand, according to Dr. Floyd Kirshner, who survived this hell, was a sack of fluid hanging at the end of his arm. But he miraculously survived.

The young men you were talking to, were there any amputees? Were there any mentally walking wounded, described as "zombies"?

Colonel CORSO. At the Senate committee, Senator Grassley asked me that question. My answer was that I was there from the beginning when the first men, the sick and wounded, first came over, until the last one came in. I didn't see one soldier with crutches, which wasn't—which couldn't be.

Mr. DORNAN. I didn't tell you the stupidity of Fonda, when she said, look, they took better care of our POW's—when they fattened up through January 1973, and there were no amputees, head injuries, or no catatonic people like Glen Cobeil or—let me look at this list of four that disappeared, and they think Cobeil was—a B-52 pilot captured in December, said he thought he saw Cobeil sitting alone, catatonic, on a bench in the Heartbreak courtyard in Hanoi. But Ron Stewart, Norm Schmidts, James J. Connell, and John—well, Freddie Frederick died of cholera up at Dogpatch. But the other three were known to be in the system in 1970. They hadn't been tortured but they had mental problems. They kept them behind for sure.

So this confirms what I thought, and how stupid Jane Fonda was, that the North Vietnamese going back with crutches and amputations, it was so stupid—it was like we cut their limbs off but they took better care of our men.

Colonel CORSO. Ours did not come across like that.

Mr. DORNAN. I'm on Mr. Skelton's time here. I'm sorry.

Colonel CORSO. My estimate was, one of the reasons I think they didn't come back was because they were too badly wounded and it wouldn't have looked good, with the newspaper men there with cameras. So those boys never came back. It was just that simple.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Colonel.

I'm intrigued, going back to your previous testimony, by the comment made by the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, when he said he knew that he was not making the policy.

Who made this policy?

Colonel CORSO. On April 9, 1962, I was still in the military, and I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Senator Dirksen was presiding, and Senator Dodd was there, Senator Keating, McClellan, and I laid all this out. It took me 2 days to lay this out, how policy was made, the people that made it. In fact, until today, that testimony is still top secret after all these years.

Mr. SKELTON. Is it top secret at this moment?

Colonel CORSO. It's still top secret. The CIA will not want it released because they say of implications. In fact, when I asked a few years back if they released it, they said we've got to protect the source. I told him, wait a minute, I'm the source. I don't want to be protected. [Laughter.]

Mr. DORNAN. Sick laughter.

Colonel CORSO. So it still hasn't been released. It's still top secret.

Mr. SKELTON. Would it be above top secret, or just top secret?

Colonel CORSO. It was top secret. Of course, they say that too many names are there. Well, those are the people who made this policy, and I figured they should be made to answer for it.

Mr. DORNAN. And most of them are dead.

Colonel CORSO. Because that was directly what was involved on why our prisoners weren't given back.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, maybe at a subsequent moment—

Colonel CORSO. Maybe it would be worthwhile for the committee to try to get that testimony.

Mr. DORNAN. We will.

Colonel CORSO. It's still classified.

Mr. SKELTON. That's my suggestion.

Colonel CORSO. They won't even give it to me. And it was my testimony.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, you're looking at two of the better Democrats in recent history, and if they take over the chairmanship of this committee, nothing will change. We will pursue those records.

Right, gentlemen?

Colonel CORSO. If you do, Mr. Chairman, I would like to see my own testimony, because—

Mr. DORNAN. Well, your memory is so good that you don't have to see it, but it will be interesting to see if we get it.

Go ahead, Mr. Skelton.

Colonel CORSO. It's still there.

Mr. SKELTON. I think the answer is obvious, that this information should be made available to us, either in a classified forum or not.

I have a question, Colonel, and I'm not sure exactly how to word this, because we have different administrations and maybe in your answer you can pinpoint the various administrations with which you dealt, so please put that in the back of your mind when you answer this question.

Mr. Douglass has made some allegations that the official policy of the United States is to suppress the fullest possible accounting of our POW's, and yet we have a record of efforts made by the U.S. Government to obtain the fullest accounting.

Can you comment on the accuracy of Mr. Douglass' conclusions? Can you explain this disconnect insofar as each of the administrations is concerned?

Colonel CORSO. As far as the policy was concerned—and I go back to my conversation with Robert Kennedy, Attorney General at the time—our Government had a group, something like the British had, sort of an elite. From that group came the national intelligence estimates, which were done at CIA, from a Board of National Estimates. Those reports were consistent, always classified, for policy.

In one particular instance I saw one of those NIE's, and it became national policy, where the Army, Navy, and Air Force descended its entirety. It had become national policy. Those were the bases of policy. They were supposed to be based on hard intelligence. Instead, they were based on preconceived concepts and maybe some ideology. This was one of the battles that we fought. In fact, it almost cost my general his job at one time.

Mr. DORNAN. Which general?

Colonel CORSO. Arthur Trudeau.

Within this policy, the framework of this policy, it entered into every facet of putting pressure on the Soviet Union and their satellites. In every case, the policy was in different phases. This policy went on from the 1940's almost to the eighties, almost. Maybe it's still going on. I don't know because I've been away from it and I don't have access to the classified papers any more.

But this policy stopped, and we called it paralysis and diversion. It paralyzed every effort against the Soviet Union, such things as fear of general war, a nuclear holocaust, we shouldn't put pressure on the Soviet Union, we shouldn't try to detach a satellite. Those things were consistent. We shouldn't be strident against the Soviets. That was policy that was written, and I put this in all my testimony, the people that made the policy, their names.

And the media went along with this. Within that framework fell our prisoners of war. I discussed this with Robert Kennedy. Because we couldn't put pressure on the Soviet Union or the satellites, we couldn't—they had our prisoners and we couldn't put pressure on them. That was it. Our policy forbid us from doing it. If you did it, you were disobeying national policy.

I wrote an article one time on what MacArthur never knew. MacArthur was not there to win in Korea. He couldn't, according to national policy. They had in the policy papers that Korea was an inconclusive operation. Who said that? I don't know where it came from, but it came from the national intelligence estimates, which were classified.

The way policy worked, usually, the State Department policy planning staff would send a paragraph over to CIA, that they wanted a policy on this. Now, the national intelligence estimates, the CIA, was supposed to base that on hard intelligence. In fact, it wasn't hard intelligence we found out later. It was based on what they thought, their conception. Like the general said, he said they were idiots. They weren't idiots. Some of these people were very intelligent men.

I had one defector tell me that he thought he defected to the FBI, and when he went in, he was sent to the CIA and a man came in and interrogated him. He pointed and said, my God, you're one of ours. The man laughed at him. Now, this was way back.

The NIE's would be circulated around, and my general got in a problem, when he was Chief of Army Intelligence, for the simple reason—they used to send that to us on Friday afternoon, and want the comments by the next morning, so that we wouldn't take exception to them and checking intelligence.

Mr. DORNAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. I just had a document put in front of me—and I've never seen it before—and it confirms everything Colonel Corso is saying.

A U.S. Senator, in my party, got up and walked out on Colonel Corso, after making a statement that he never knew Eisenhower personally—that's interesting; I met him once. He said, I have—and he repeated the word four times—many, many, many, many friends who knew General Eisenhower, and I just can't believe any of this, and he got up and walked out before you had given your full rationale of why General Eisenhower saw himself in this classic dilemma of a box, of how much a threat you put upon this Communist puppet state of North Korea, when Stalin—well, Stalin died within days, March 5, and Eisenhower had been sworn in January 20.

Colonel CORSO. And they never exposed Stalin's death, because it was suppressed in our Government.

Mr. DORNAN. But here is a document—and I'm going to pass it to you, Mr. Skelton. It still has "secret" at the top. Usually they're supposed to cross it out, when it says declassified with deletions, and it was only declassified October 4, 1992, not even 3 years ago. It's dated November 9, 1953. It goes to the Department of State, gives all the names of the people it went to, the Department of Defense, CIA—there are no names for the CIA.

It then says, "UN POW Atrocities Program", and the title is the "Operations Coordinating Board", just what Colonel Corso is telling us. Then it says "OCB, Colonel Corso, Mr. Toner, Colonel Hurst", this is probably jogging your memory, "Mr. Norberg."

What does OCB mean?

Colonel CORSO. Operations Coordinating Board.

Mr. DORNAN. Oh. OK. It's your memo.

Colonel CORSO. It's part of the National Security Council.

Mr. DORNAN. Down here it talks about emphasizing the McCurren theory, since Stalin insisted—and it goes on to talk about the McCurren theory. Then on page 4 the Army Fact Sheet on Communist Treatment of U.S. POW's, Mr. McKnight—now,

that's the Department of State man—referred to the Department of State comments on this fact sheet to the effect that a supplemental instruction sheet would be issued.

Then it says 'Fig Leaf'. Just what you're talking about, which seems to have offended so many people in today's intelligence community dismissing you—

Colonel CORSO. That gentleman got suspended later at the State Department.

Mr. DORNAN. McKnight did.

Colonel CORSO. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Here's just a brief paragraph on Fig Leaf.

Mr. Bloch—he was probably referred to earlier in the memo, but not at the top, "Mr. Bloch raised the basic issue of whether or not there was anything left of the 'Fig Leaf' with regard to not confronting the USSR directly. Mr. McKnight," who you say was suspended later, "had been at a meeting with representatives from FE, NEA, and P * * *" Is P the President's office?

Colonel CORSO. Yeah.

Mr. DORNAN. What's FE, do you know?

Colonel CORSO. FE. It might be Far East Command. I don't know.

Mr. DORNAN. Maybe it would jog your memory if you saw it.

"* * * in which they had revised the existing guidances and had agreed that they are appropriate. We have evidence of Soviet participation in the Korean war, and this can be used in the output."

The evidence? The evidence is now general officers in uniform, telling how they flew, showing pictures of themselves that I saw on a BBC documentary, of them showing photographs of them like U.S. Flying Tigers in the winter of 1941, with all of their uniform regalia removed, in Chinese uniforms, fur hats, boots, on their way to fly MiG-15's against our—

Mr. SKELTON. Is it 1941 or 1951?

Mr. DORNAN. Well, 1941 was when our Flying Tigers did this, and these guys were copying our Flying Tigers 9 years later, in 1950-51. There's photographs of them in Beijing on the way to fly out of North Korean air bases after they pushed us south again. Amazing.

Go ahead. Back on your time.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

I would like to ask each one of you this question. General, I would like to start with you, if I may. And I'm not sure this has been asked.

Based upon your experience, do you believe there are any American prisoners of war or missing in actions alive today in Korea, Vietnam, or elsewhere? General, we'll ask you first.

General SEJNA. Yes, I believe they are in Korea, Vietnam, China, and Russia.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. Douglass?

Mr. DOUGLASS. Yes, there's not much question in my mind. I believe they're alive, also, in Russia, China, Korea and Vietnam.

Mr. SKELTON. Colonel Corso?

Colonel CORSO. Congressman, I'll use myself as an example. I was on the ground when the prisoners came across at Panmunjom. I'm 81 years old and I'm still here. Those boys could be around yet.

Mr. SKELTON. So your answer is yes.

Colonel CORSO. Only the conditions they lived under, of course, reduces that chance. But at my age, I'm still around. Some of them were strong boys, most of them, and they could still be around. Not many of them, but there could be some there.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Colonel Corso—I mean this quite seriously, and it sounds humorous—you have had a far more dangerous diet, we all have, in this wealthy country, to your health, than somebody living without salt, on what we think is a subsistence diet, but we're dealing with the body that comes from the savanna in Africa, and a simple diet of hunters and gatherers might sustain better health than all of the high cholesterol food that you and I have been eating ever since Panmunjom.

Colonel CORSO. It could be, yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me turn to Mr. Lewis of Kentucky.

Mr. LEWIS. Colonel Corso, let me just say that I think this is going to be one of the most shameful periods in the history of this country.

Has there been an active suppression to keep this particular information from being brought out?

Colonel CORSO. No. I think it came in the framework of our policy. The framework of our policy is that we put no pressure on the Soviets. I think it came within that framework. I don't think it was actually people getting together at a table and saying, "Let's not give our prisoners back." I think it just happened because policy governed it. It said don't put any pressure on them, and they had our prisoners.

If we don't put any pressure on them, they do what they please with them. And what did they do? They exploited them. Even in the meeting I had with President Eisenhower, it wasn't as the newspaper said it. What he suppressed was the intelligence aspect of this. They took our prisoners and actually took their identity. They would interrogate them and take every facet of their life, and then take that and give it to the Soviets and play them back.

We knew about this. That's what we were suppressing. That was the intelligence aspect. We called it look-alikes and sent back as agents and saboteurs.

Mr. DORNAN. You discussed that with President Eisenhower?

Colonel CORSO. Yes, sir, I did. I discussed that with the President. That was what we decided, the intelligence aspect, because we were still after these people, trying to get them. The President agreed. But the President never did suppress the numbers. He told me I could release them. I had a figure of 900 or 1,200. The President told me to go ahead. I asked him. I sent them to the Department of Defense and up to the United Nations. It was not held back. So the newspaper stories were not right.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Lewis, this is what the Senators did not wait to hear. They stomped out of the room, as though it was their brother involved. When General Van Fleet, a four-star commander, had a West Point son, tall, intelligent, handsome, who was held be-

hind, imagine how they would treat the son of a four-star commander. General Van Fleet said in 1954 or 1955, there was a time when America would have sent a carrier battle group into the harbor at Wonsan and said one word—it sounds very Teddy Roosevelt—"produce." And he lived to be 100 years of age, never knowing the fate of—He only died in 1992, 1 week younger than my father.

Colonel CORSO. The British did something like that and they got prisoners back.

Mr. DORNAN. They did? I never heard this.

Colonel CORSO. They got some back.

Mr. DORNAN. As the French got some back from Vietnam while we were there.

Colonel CORSO. They protested to the Russians, and they got prisoners back. We never did lodge a protest.

Also, Congressman, we're all confronted with numbers, how many prisoners were in Soviet hands. This confusion of numbers, I would like to explain it.

When I received reports of prisoners in Communist hands, and I had a figure, from time to time I would see reports where a prisoner died or a prisoner escaped, was missing or something. That information was not kept in the intelligence channels. That was sent to G-1, personnel. Personnel kept the records of missing men in action, not G-2, the intelligence division. So I would send that information to G-1. They would take it on their list.

My list came from the combat zones. A lot of times it was estimates, but after it was confirmed and reconfirmed, I would arrive at a figure and put that in the reports and send it by teleconference to the Pentagon. So you will almost always find two sets of figures. One of them is the personnel figures and the other is intelligence figures.

Many of the skeptics take those figures and try to debunk everything. They don't know that G-1 is responsible for missing prisoners, not G-2. We were responsible for the intelligence aspect, what they're doing, where they are, and how they're treated. G-1 kept the figures on people missing in action.

So when you run across the numbers game and the skeptics come up and say, "Oh, that figure is different than this one", you see why. There are two sets.

Mr. LEWIS. Colonel, this is my next question. How did the Government reduce the number from 944 down to 430, and then down to 388 POW's that—

Colonel CORSO. I don't know. I never reduced anything like that with my figures in intelligence. Unless I had reports to reduce it, I didn't. I didn't use a slide rule. I used the reports that came to me from all sources in Korea, and there, if I thought the report was accurate and had names of people, the places and camps they were in, then I would reduce a figure on intelligence and send that information to G-1, the personnel people.

Maybe that's the way it happened, but I don't know. I can't answer you, Congressman. I never heard of those figures. I never compiled figures like that, and I was responsible. Where do they come from? Maybe they have confused the two, as I tried to explain, of personnel and intelligence. They are different.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. Colonel, hindsight being what it is—and this is a difficult question, sir—what would you do over again different, if anything?

Colonel CORSO. I don't know, Congressman. I tried everything I could at the time. I got in bad and people were sniping at me. I was attacked in the newspapers, and even attacked on the floor of the Senate and the House because of this problem.

What would I do? I wouldn't do anything different. Just keep pushing and try to get those boys back. After all, they were my companions. I was one of them. When I looked at the boys coming across at Panmunjom, I thought that, but for the grace of God, there go I. I did my best to try to get them across, and at the White House I think I influenced the President to try to do something about it. And he did. But let's say the cards were stacked against him with the policymakers. I would do nothing different than what I did.

Mr. DORNAN. One of the reasons that you two gentlemen—did you testify, Mr. Douglass, on the Senate side?

Mr. DOUGLASS. No.

Mr. DORNAN. One of the reasons you were disrespected was that part of the staff over there was compromised, compromised in the sense that they had a preconceived agenda, they were leaking memos back and forth to some offices in the Pentagon, and they didn't want to hear from you. I don't know how you got called, unless it was by my courageous friend, Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire. They just didn't want to hear from you. So that's why there was no followup. So you waited 40 years to testify to the American people, and nothing came of it.

I want to do something unusual here, and it's probably going to get him in hot water, but I understand that some action may already be underway to silence him and take him off active duty. But would Commander "Chip" Beck please come up and take that fourth seat there? I want to ask you a question about your experience in counterterrorism. I believe you went down to Florida and first interviewed Colonel Corso as a followup by the Senate Committee.

Commander Beck, you're trained in counterterrorism and you had known Buckley, William Buckley, who was murdered while held as a hostage, sorely beaten to death over months, until finally he gave up the spirit, he mentored you, did he not, in some way, in Lebanon?

Commander BECK. That's correct, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Does all of this seem plausible to you, with your training in counterterrorism and tracking the Cubans for several decades throughout numerous countries in the world, and in some of those countries you actually confronted them?

Commander BECK. I had planned to get into this when our panel meets, but what I have heard here from Colonel Corso and General Sejma and Joe Douglass tracks very well with what I was trained in.

I spent 23 years in the clandestine service, as well as 33 years in uniform total, and I have seen what the other side does to us, in places where it wasn't even supposed to happen. It's very inter-

esting, in listening to these gentlemen and their historical perspective, and it tracks very well with what I know to have happened in other parts of the world and other operations.

I think there was a very big, clandestine, covert operation aimed at exploiting our prisoners of war from World War II, through Korea, the cold war, and into Vietnam. It was all connected. It was related.

Mr. DORNAN. I wanted an overlap of panels here, because one of the amazing things about getting information out to the American people is that the cameras start shutting down—we're already down from six to four. They always have like a 3 o'clock deadline. I wanted a committee overlap here.

I understand you became a friend to Victor Blenko, the aforementioned MiG-25 pilot who, without a thimbleful of fuel left, went off the end of the runway in Japan when he brought us the first MiG-25, to the point where he has painted your house and you have become very close friends.

But Victor Blenko, if I remember reading one of your reports, told you that, as a Soviet fighter pilot during the Vietnam period, they were getting information of air battle tactics that were so accurate and so timely that he just assumed it came from the interrogation by the Soviet Army military of our pilots.

Did I get that impression right?

Commander BECK. Yes, sir, very much. Victor Blenko, who defected 20 years ago this month, in fact, has been my friend for 12 or more years. We have even worked together in the past.

We have discussed the POW issue probably over the last 6 to 8 years, just as officers who worked on different sides. Victor, while he admits that he doesn't have direct knowledge, he said, "Look, when I was a young pilot—" and he defected in 1976, "I was an instructor pilot in the Soviet Union, the Russian Air Force, and we used to get requirements. We would send out requirements on air combat maneuvering, dogfighting tactics, ACM and other requirements that were of interest to the Soviet Air Force. We would get back incredible briefing on those things within 2 weeks."

He said, "I know the way the system works." It just seemed impossible to him that this information could have been sent from the Russians to the Vietnamese, have some Vietnamese translate it into English, debrief the English-speaking pilot, and go back all the way up the system. He said it had to have been by GRU officers speaking directly to American pilots.

He said there was precedence for this in Korea. He said he knew the way the system works. That's what he thinks happened. And even though he thinks it happened, that becomes part of the mosaic that I think we need to get into when we try and find out what happened to the POW's. There's a big mystery here.

I know how covert operations work and how they're conducted, how they're covered up, on both sides, in the intelligence fields.

Mr. DORNAN. What did you think of the Kalugin tape? Had you ever seen that tape before?

Commander BECK. I just saw it for the first time about a week ago. My supervisor, Norm Kass, showed it to me.

I find that amazing. I understand it was done about 4 years ago.

Mr. DORNAN. Is it credible, what he's saying?

Commander BECK. It's very credible. I made some notes while I was watching it, that I——

Mr. DORNAN. Hold right there, because the next panel is coming up.

I am going to implore the conduit to the American people, for the sake of these families, to please go call your bosses and ask if some of the cameras couldn't stay. I'm loathe to dismiss you gentlemen because I have more questions, but I have to because of this 3 o'clock camera deadline.

You are available to come back, and you live in Florida, Colonel Corso?

Colonel CORSO. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. And you live where——

General SEJNA. Any time.

Mr. DORNAN. All right. I'm not through with this.

But on the next panel—and there's no paralysis or deception here. I'm thinking of three D's: discrediting, disrespecting, and dismissing, before the diversion, the paralysis and diversion, to use your term, Colonel Corso.

The next panel will be panel two. Panel three wanted to go first, so that they could give their statements, all massaged for public relations value, the cameras are on, they flee the room and leave hardly anybody to listen to the followup. But I said "No way" when General Wald asked me if his people could go first, "because they're so busy." So busy doing what, with 89 people? So busy doing what? That they couldn't have 50 of them here, with this stunning, startling testimony.

Some people from DPMO came in late, so I hope—I'm assigning them, as a U.S. congressional chairman, to read every word of the testimony here today. I'm assigning you that. Read it [applause].

The next panel will be just you, Mr. Bell, Mr. Garnett Bell, former special assistant for negotiations, joint task force—full accounting, who spent over 2 years in Hanoi, and was director of that office there, the first American into Hanoi to run that office, and Mr. Jay Veith, POW/MIA researcher and analyst.

I have a three-star lady general who wants to say hello to me for 1 minute, so, gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony, General, Mr. Douglass, Colonel Corso. And we'll be hearing from Mr. Beck in about an hour, I guess. The witnesses are dismissed. Thank you very much.

General SEJNA. Thank you very much.

Mr. DORNAN. I literally want to take about a 2-minute break, if Mr. Veith and Bill Bell would please come forward.

[Recess.]

Mr. DORNAN. The subcommittee will come back to order. We need Mr. Bell and Mr. Veith at the witness table.

We will start with Mr. Bell. If you have an opening statement, you can abbreviate it or submit it for the record. It's your call. The same with Mr. Jay Veith.

Let me formally give your titles. Mr. Garnett Bill Bell, former special assistant for negotiations in Hanoi, joint task force—full accounting, and Mr. Jay Veith, POW/MIA researcher and analyst. I have had a chance to have Mr. Bell before the committee several times, and I've had a chance to talk to you in person, Jay.

Mr. Bell, if you would go first with your statement, please.
 One second. Please rise.
 [Panel sworn.]

STATEMENT OF GARNETT E. BELL, FORMER SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NEGOTIATIONS, JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING

Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today regarding an issue of utmost national importance and priority.

As a veteran of the Vietnam war, and as a former POW/MIA expert, I am encouraged that although our Government has moved rapidly forward to do business as usual with a very determined former adversary, there remain at least some members of this traditionally prudent institution who remain determined to find the truth concerning our missing men.

I welcome the opportunity to share with you what I have learned over some 30 years of involvement with Indochina, especially the country of Vietnam. Learning the intricacies of Vietnam has been a long, arduous process, and I feel that there is much more for all of us to learn.

Our Government officials being assigned to the area today will find that, in reality, little has changed. If I was asked to give advice to any young official going over to work with the Vietnamese on this important issue, I would first of all suggest that he study carefully the voluminous records available detailing how the Communist Party of Vietnam has dealt with this issue in the past.

I would recommend to him that, this clear record notwithstanding, he should always try to be objective. If encountered doubt, I would beseech him to give the benefit of that doubt to the missing man. Concerning a proper working relationship, I would advise him to be familiar but not friendly. Perhaps most importantly, I would emphasize to him that he should always remember that he is going to Vietnam to work with the Vietnamese, rather than for them.

In Hanoi, during 1992, I was replaced by a young infantry officer with a degree in physical education. At that time, a visiting senior member of the new Task Force-Full Accounting from Hawaii invited me to remain and do some type of unspecified work in the new office.

Mr. DORNAN. What month was that, when the infantry officer was to replace you?

Mr. BELL. That was April 1992, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. April 1992.

What rank was he, a captain, a major?

Mr. BELL. A lieutenant colonel.

I was told that if I remained in Vietnam, I would soon learn that "POW/MIA work can be fun." Since I held the belief that POW/MIA work was a very solemn and serious matter of the highest national priority, and that my primary mission was to lay bare the facts and let the facts speak for themselves, I declined to become part of this new effort.

Although resources, both human and material, were increased greatly, and although activities were rapidly expanded, actual results began to diminish and our Government quickly found itself in

a vastly weakened negotiating stance. While the opinions of those experienced in negotiating with and working with the Vietnamese experts were ignored, the opinions of young, inexperienced personnel recently arriving in Vietnam were readily accepted. At the same time, a very small number of our former POW's began to cite their long periods of captivity during the war as having provided them with the expertise and background necessary to make sound recommendations regarding our Government's handling of the POW/MIA issue and the development of relations with Communist Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, please do not misunderstand me on this point. I believe that any man who answered our Nation's call to duty and served honorably in Vietnam deserves credit for his service. This is especially true regarding our former prisoners of war.

But there is, nevertheless, one point we should all pause and reflect on from time to time, and that is the fact that many of our troops who served as grunts lived under extremely miserable conditions on a daily basis. Those who returned for second and third tours of duty in leech-infested swamps never knew from one moment to the next when their head might explode from a sniper's round, or when their arms and legs might be blown off by mines.

I can't speak for all grunts, and I'm somewhat ashamed to admit it, but I have seen the time when I would have been willing to give almost anything in order to be able to crawl into a dry prison cell and be provided a bowl of pumpkin soup. In my opinion, although service as a POW or a grunt is both admirable and commendable, it does not automatically qualify either to give advice on highly technical matters such as POW/MIA.

During 1992 and 1993, we found ourselves in a position where we were represented on the ground by young, inexperienced personnel, and guided here in Washington by a small number of personnel who had literally spent years in Vietnam during the war but who were isolated from the outside world. This, too, may provide to be a valid point for evaluation by not only this important committee but other committees dealing with the foreign policy aspects as well, because the fundamental question needing an answer is: Does an individual gain profound insight concerning the geography, language, culture, ideology and thought patterns of the inhabitants of any country, especially regarding the leadership, if he is confined to a windowless room and permitted to meet only with those who are professionally trained to employ psychological techniques designed to influence his behavior?

I believe that, in this regard, our analysts here in Washington have consistently underestimated the Vietnamese, especially their capability for proselytizing and psychological warfare. During a symposium on Vietnam held in April of this year at the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict, at Texas Tech University, my colleague, Mr. George Veith, and I presented a research paper entitled, "POW's and Politics: How Much Does Hanoi Really Know?" I hope that all members of this committee will find the time to read this detailed paper, which we believe sheds more light on the issues of proselytizing and propaganda by Vietnamese Government experts.

I might add that the foreign affairs element of the National Liberation Front, code named CP-72, was positioned only 90 miles off the coast of Florida during the war, and their personnel worked closely with the Cuban government in manipulating the antiwar movement here in the United States.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Bell, just read that last statement one more time. I want that to sink in. I want to absorb that.

Mr. BELL. I might add that the foreign affairs element of the National Liberation Front, code named CP-72, was positioned only 90 miles off the coast of Florida during the war, and their personnel worked closely with the Cuban government in manipulating the anti war movement here in the United States.

Mr. DORNAN. That is a stunning statement. I thought I knew about Soviet trawlers tracking our carriers. I thought I knew something about the Pueblo affair. I thought I knew something about men being beaten for 3 weeks in Korea during the Vietnam war, when pukey little traitors told them that they were giving the finger, that it was not a Hawaiian greeting sign, the Pueblo crew, so they got them beaten. They called it Hell month. And I thought I knew something about how Col. Ted Gise, tortured, extracted confessions, showed up on posters outside of his base at Homestead in the seventies because he was trying to bring to court martial eight collaborators and traitors.

I had no idea that the National Liberation Front, not the North Vietnamese Army out of Hanoi, had an intelligence ship in Cuban waters—or was it in our waters, Mr. Bell?

Mr. BELL. This is an organization of the foreign affairs element on the ground in Cuba.

Mr. DORNAN. I see. You meant 90 miles on the ground in Cuba, manipulating the whole antiwar effort, here and worldwide. The Cubans, in other words, were a coordinating arm for the Kremlin?

Mr. BELL. They were coordinating a worldwide movement at that time, but the National Liberation Front was represented in Cuba by CP-72, yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Proceed.

Mr. BELL. Many of the propaganda themes directed at influence groups here in our own country were developed from information gathered by CP-72 and the Cuban interrogation experts who were involved in exploiting American POW's held in Vietnam.

For those of us who believe we have made far too many concessions in advance to Vietnam already, the time is long overdue for our analysts here to conduct the research necessary to fully understand the clandestine operations of the former Soviet Union, Cuba, and Vietnam vis-a-vis our POW's and MIA's, before upgrading or expanding the extant relationship.

However, unless we remain both objective and determined, we will not find the answers we need. It has become common practice for our Government officials to make excuses for the Vietnamese, while making exaggerated claims of full faith or superb cooperation.

In analyzing some of the evidence indicating that we have not been given the truth by Vietnam, our officials tell us that these reports probably pertain to nationals of other countries, that the information contained in the reports could have different meanings,

that 217 might be 210, or 210 might be 210B, that 44 might refer to the 44th Battalion, the 44th military station, or the 44th hospital.

What is important for this committee to understand, however, is that if the Vietnamese have failed to share with us the information and records necessary to resolve these reports, then who in their right mind can say that they are cooperating in full faith? I believe that this is one reason our Government has never requested Communist Party records from Vietnam, because the request would be refused and the lack of full faith cooperation would be obvious to all.

We must remember that the mission of the proselytizing element in Vietnam is to gain the active support of a small segment of our population in order to achieve the passive acceptance of the majority of our population. The proselytizing element is very adept at exploiting character defects in order to gain this active support, and greed certainly falls into this category.

We must be cautious of claims of handsome profits to be made, fast-growing economies, and potential for investments. With every step forward in the normalization process, we come closer to the point of no return regarding an honest accounting for our men. If we allow ourselves to become passive, the small, active segment of our population will begin to establish front groups for trade and friendship. Our collective memory can tell us the outcome from such front groups because we have seen them operate in the past under the guise of peace and solidarity.

Ultimately, the POW/MIA issue has become one of national character. We have rationalized as to why we have maintained an embassy and an ambassador in China for over 18 years and now have more than a \$50 billion trade deficit with China, even though there is no democracy or human rights in that country. We have rationalized as to why we have maintained an embassy and ambassador in Moscow for over 50 years, even though we still do not have full cooperation in achieving an accounting for our men missing from the Korean and cold wars.

After reflecting on this situation, and considering the fact that an American serviceman captured in Vietnam in 1972 at the age of 18 would be only 42 years old today, how can we allow ourselves to once again rationalize in the same manner regarding Vietnam.

This brings to mind just how angry respected CBS News correspondent Dan Rather was when he went to Vietnam just prior to the lifting of the trade embargo by President Clinton. Upon his return here to the United States, Mr. Rather described how a Communist party official in Hanoi said to him, point blank, "We know your President will lift the trade embargo, because Americans will do anything for money." It saddens me that this comment was ignored by those who did not see this comment made by a Vietnamese government official as an affront to our national character.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, we veterans of the Vietnam war beseech you to view this tragic issue as a matter of national character. We are so tired of hearing exaggerated reports and promises which are never fulfilled. Please remind American officials going to Vietnam that they are there to represent the best national interests of the United States, and that re-

ardless of how they feel personally, they owe honest answers to the families of the POW's and MIA's.

Our analysts must be objective and thorough in conducting the research necessary to uncover the truth. If American businessmen want to invest in Vietnam, let them do so, but at their own risk. If they expect the families to trust the Vietnamese with accounting for our Nation's heroes, then surely they can trust the Vietnamese with their money, and there is no need for OPIC or Export-Import Bank financing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Bell, I was impressed that you had the courtesy to sit all through Colonel Corso's testimony. He is extending you that courtesy and he is still with us.

You took note that he talked about commercial interests driving our policy in the fifties. Here we go again. Even beyond whatever commercial policy, through what some people in the conspiracies like to call the establishment, in a study of the British Empire you will always see that, in their case, commerce followed the flag. In our case, we pulled the flag down and let commerce come in before the flag has been fully honored.

Mr. Veith, Mr. Bell referred to you as George. Is Jay a nickname?

Mr. VEITH. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. What is your full name?

Mr. VEITH. George J. Veith.

Mr. DORNAN. Please proceed with your statement, and then we'll get into questions.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE J. VEITH, POW/MIA RESEARCHER AND ANALYST

Mr. VEITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Dornan, committee members, and other distinguished guests, thank you once again for asking me to appear before your committee to discuss the POW/MIA issue.

I wish today to concentrate on two areas. First, the use of special intelligence, often called SIGINT, in resolving the fates of many Americans still missing in action from the conflict in Southeast Asia, and second, from my perspective as a private researcher, whether the accounting process is flawed.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, in terms of special intelligence, Mr. Jerry Mooney, a long time NSA analyst responsible during the war for monitoring PAVN air defense communications, has often discussed how he developed a large list of Americans who were captured by the PAVN forces and who subsequently never returned home.

Mr. DORNAN. I apologize, Mr. Veith, but I have to tell the country, through television—there's still half the cameras with us, three, and I thank them—and the family members in the room, I was going to have Jerry Mooney sitting on your panel, or on a panel all by himself.

Lo and behold, when the word went out that I was going to bring him here as a witness, two DPMO office people—that's Defense Missing in Action POW, and action is not in their acronym, but I

noticed it today—they show up in Montana to interview him, just a couple of weeks ago. And they stayed several days.

This comes dangerously close to tampering with witnesses, dangerously close, to any people from DPMO in the room, dangerously close. So I canceled him, because I want to go up to NSA with him and see the lady director of Ops, who has about 34 years with NSA, I want to test his memory against them. I want a closed session up there. I want out of them whether or not the documents and records he is speaking about, that you referred to, Mr. Veith, exist. Then I'll bring him in for testimony all by himself.

Because what I'm told from NSA, the man has an unparalleled memory, an awfully good memory—

Mr. VEITH. That's right.

Mr. DORNAN. So I just wanted to put everybody on notice. I guess I'm enlisting my army, the only army I have—and that's the POW families from Korea, recently energized, and the tough fighters that are left from the Vietnam families—that's why Jerry Mooney is not here. I will take that slowly, and probably will not be able to do it until a hearing after the election. It looks like my race is tightening up, so I want to have him here for a few days, at committee expense, and go up to NSA with him, with my senior staff, personal and committee staff. I just wanted everybody to know I have not forgotten about Jerry Mooney.

Proceed.

Mr. VEITH. Unfortunately, Mr. Mooney was unable to appear before this committee, but since I have worked closely with Mr. Mooney on an almost daily basis for the past 10 months, he has asked me to speak for him and to share with you the results of both my research into this aspect of the issue, and just as importantly, the knowledge of NSA systems and procedures he has so carefully taught me.

To provide you with some background, I have reviewed every single SIGINT message and NSA memorandum released by the Senate Select Committee to the Library of Congress, which comprises thousands of wartime intercepts, along with all the various internal NSA messages dealing with many facets of the issue.

Additionally, I have gone through all the files of the investigators from the Senate Select Committee who worked with SIGINT material, and I have interviewed both Mr. Bob Taylor and Mr. Tom Lang, both of whom worked with Mr. Mooney and other NSA officials.

Lastly, I have read every deposition and/or interview—

Mr. DORNAN. One more interruption, Jay.

Would you recommend that, when I have Mooney here, that I request or subpoena other people who worked with him contemporaneously to appear here?

Mr. VEITH. Yes, sir; definitely. I can give you their names and phone numbers.

Mr. DORNAN. In other words, it might be a whole NSA team. How many people do you think were on his team listening to all of the electronic traffic out of Indochina?

Mr. VEITH. There are three people I can tell you, off the bat, who I would recommend. You might have to ask him who he would recommend beyond that.

Mr. DORNAN. Right. So we could have a panel. I could ask Mr. Pickett to plead with my members to show up, so that we could go into closed session and have a good, old time here. Because, unlike the CIA, which is involved with so much HUMINT analysis, personal perspective, NSA intelligence is raw data, when it first comes in, of the enemy's voices talking about our prisoners.

Proceed.

Mr. VEITH. That's correct.

Lastly, I have read every deposition and/or interview of NSA employees by the Select Committee. Consequently, I have shared everything I found with Mr. Mooney, and we discussed this material and other items at great length over the last 10 months. Therefore, I would like to provide your committee with several very important results of that research that Jerry and I have been doing for the last 10 months.

The first thing I want to discuss is the Government's portrayal of Mr. Mooney, only in an attempt to rectify some of the things that have been said about him in the past. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on December 4, 1992, by the DIA's Lt. Paul Maguire, Lieutenant Maguire attempted to paint Mr. Mooney as making analytical mistakes in two separate areas in his assessment of whether Americans were captured.

According to Lieutenant Maguire, Mr. Mooney only had access to a single source of intelligence, namely SIGINT, and second, because he only had access to this source, and not the all-source intelligence that DIA has, he therefore made errors in his correlations because he was unable to distinguish between multiple loss incidents.

Mr. Chairman, both of these statements are so patently false that they appear to be crafted so as to damage limit Mr. Mooney's claims. Let me deal with the first point, that he only had access to a single intelligence source.

Mr. Chairman, NSA collected during the war and analyzed an enormous amount of information about the PAVN into a tremendously effective technical and product data base which included not only SIGINT, but HUMINT, ELINT, RADINT, and PHOTINT, along with additional information collected by other non-U.S. intelligence agencies under third party agreements. The data base was so effective that NSA could predict PAVN responses and, just as importantly, NSA could follow their reporting on events down to the gun crew level, which provided NSA the ability to discern what was the truth and what was not.

This data base enabled NSA—

Mr. DORNAN. Could you slow down for absorption purposes? We could listen down to the gun crew level?

Mr. VEITH. Correct.

Mr. DORNAN. So we could have even heard Jane Fonda giggling in her gun pit, saying "Oh, it's one of ours," when an aircraft flew over, meaning a MiG. That's interesting.

Go ahead.

Mr. VEITH. This data base enabled NSA to easily discriminate between the different message categories of what Jerry calls emulation, Hot B, and control-dummy traffic, versus information NSA initially judged to be reliable and which was then later confirmed.

This data base was called the Central Reference files, or C-REF, and it had a sister computer data base called COINS, which has now been superseded by something called SOLIS.

For example, in May 1970, U.S. forces captured a large cache of COSVN radio messages. From this, NSA created a study of the PAVN B-3 Front Rear Services Department. Additionally, if you look closely at any CDEC address list, it clearly states as one of the addresses DIRNSA—Director, NSA—for B-6, which was the section Mr. Mooney worked in.

Lastly, also in 1970, ARVN forces captured some of the personnel who worked in the signal battalion for PAVN MR-5. Based on these interrogation reports, NSA published a study on the communication procedures in this area. Therefore, we can clearly see that even the lowest levels of intelligence from the field reached both NSA and Mr. Mooney's shop. All of these NSA reports are currently located in the Library of Congress.

As for the second point, Mr. Mooney wants you to understand the difference between people who just read SIGINT and those who understand SIGINT and work with it on a daily basis. Mr. Mooney calls this understanding both the art and the science of SIGINT. And let me provide you with an example.

Let's say today that three F-4's are shot down, one in Hanoi, one in the DMZ, one in the Dien Bien Phu area. The one in Hanoi is shot down at 4 o'clock; the ones in Dien Bien Phu and the DMZ, shot down at 12 o'clock. In the middle of that, let's say at 2 o'clock, NSA intercepts a message, "we shot down one F-4 and captured the pilot." So you can immediately knock out the 4 o'clock aircraft because the message came before.

But let's say the F-4 in Dien Bien Phu, the guys came back, and the guys at the DMZ didn't come back. DPMO has a tendency to take that message and automatically correlate it to the guys who came back.

Mr. Mooney, in terms of the science of SIGINT, will look at where the collection element came from, discovered in our example here that it came from Phou Bie, and that the collection intercept could not reach Dien Bien Phu and, therefore, he would make that analysis to the F4 that's MIA.

Mr. DORNAN. Since you're giving an example extemporaneously, let me analyze it. Because there's only two analyses that I can apply to that method, either it's criminal, or either stupidity, negligence, or deliberately trying to debunk—and by the way, the reason I have reworked that word "debunk," my dad used to say to me, when I would give an excuse why I couldn't go to school, "that's a lot of bunk." Then there's bunco artists. "Bunk" means baloney, lie. So when you debunk something, you're uncovering that it's bunk.

That's why I'm changing the term to a predisposition—because mindset is too cute—a predisposition to disrespect, discredit, then dismiss.

Now, the other thing could be—it still would be arrogant, but it wouldn't be criminal or negligent—to say, "oh, there must be something wrong with NSA. This is probably a human error. They recorded picking up this message traffic before the second F-4 was

shot down, but it's contemporaneous and it's within an hour, so they probably meant this one. This is human error."

I hope that would be the case. It's arrogant, but it's still a lot better than the other conclusions.

Mr. VEITH. I can't comment on how DPMO does their analysis, but Mr. Mooney took a look at the NSA correlation study that was produced for the Senate Select Committee and released by Senator Smith's office, and he was of the opinion that it seems DPMO was disregarding most of the NSA analysis correlations to particular shootdowns, and seemed to be matching them to a particular returnee who came back.

Mr. DORNAN. Did you study what Jerry Mooney's testimony was like in closed and open session before the Senate?

Mr. VEITH. In open, I have thoroughly, sir, but obviously not in closed session.

Mr. DORNAN. I have the closed and I'll be reading it tonight.

Do you think he was treated the same way Colonel Corso and General Sejna were treated, over the objections of my friend, the heroic Bob Smith of New Hampshire? Did Mooney feel he was given short shrift?

Mr. VEITH. Well, personally, when he first went out there, he had great hopes. Mr. Tom Lang, from the Senate Select Committee, brought him back out several times and went out to interview NSA people.

What appears to me happened, in reviewing the record, is that the Senate Select Committee viewed Mr. Mooney's testimony as credible until about April or May of that year, and all of a sudden it just kind of fell off the whole Earth.

Mr. DORNAN. Of 1992?

Mr. VEITH. Of 1992.

I haven't been able to put my finger on why it just kind of disappeared. I have asked this question of several people who were there, and they really can't answer it, either, other than there was just so many other things going on that it kind of fell through the cracks.

Mr. DORNAN. I spoke to Senator Smith over the weekend, home to home. I asked him if he would come back and testify again, which he did a year and a half ago to kick off this series of hearings.

It's too bad we didn't have joint House/Senate hearings. It's too bad that Senator Smith wasn't in the majority, as he is now. But I'm going to bring him back over to testify again. Maybe I'll have him come over and introduce the panel with Jerry Mooney and other NSA people, in closed and open session, to see if we can get to why this fell off the face of the Earth, as you said, in the spring of 1992, because Clinton was elected on November 3 of that year and everything started to change.

Go ahead, proceed.

Mr. VEITH. Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I want to discuss with you one of the most shocking items I uncovered in my research. Mr. Mooney has talked for years about an incident that occurred in the summer of 1972 in which the NSA intercepted a PAVN communication that stated they were about to execute 10 Americans. I found that message in the Library of Congress files, and it was exactly as Mr.

Mooney described it. But, as usual, DPMO states that the incident described by this intercept never occurred. Why? Because NSA, according to them, is just a passive collector of information, they have no way of knowing if information passed in PAVN comm channels is valid, and, well, it seems that DPMO just knows better.

Let me provide three reasons why NSA thought this was a valid message—and if you have it there, you can look at it at the same time. First, the priority attached to the message is represented by the Z in the upper left corner. This represents flash priority, the highest level priority. It must go out right now. Second, this execution message appears in the NSA Daily Summary, which I have also attached to my testimony, contains only the most important material and is sent to the highest consumers in the Government. Third, NSA requirements state that if they believe a message that they've put out is in error, they must issue a cancel message. No cancel message on this execution message exists in the Library of Congress files, nor, according to Mr. Mooney, was one ever issued. By the way, Mr. Mooney was the drafter of this message.

Mr. Chairman, the contents of this message beg for a deeper examination beyond the casual brushoff by DPMO. If accurate, they go to the very heart of whether Vietnam is cooperating and whether the process is working.

Special intelligence is very different from the more familiar world of human intelligence. It is more complex, often highly technical in nature. Because special intelligence is so unfamiliar to most people, the ability to penetrate through attempts at governmental deception is made much more difficult. As a concerned citizen, I am asking you and your committee to press DPMO and other governmental agencies to thoroughly examine this message and its ramifications.

Mr. DORNAN. Hold it right there, please, for one second, Jay.

It's almost like there's a predisposition to discount anything that would put the Vietnamese in a bad light in their conduct of the war. But last night, in rereading—I start to spot read, but I find myself reading everything again—the 1976 book, POW, there was a young man held in one of those hell holes in the south, named "Weatherman". An interesting name, given what some of the radicals were doing in this country under the name "Weathermen", like breaking the back of a 6-foot-5 district attorney in Chicago in the days of rage.

When Earl Weatherman escaped, he had crossed over, but he said not as a defector, but he had just opted out of the war. He was in the brig for some offense. But when they tried to use him and brainwash him, they had Garwood sometimes guard him in this camp, they lectured him that the struggle of the Vietnamese people has lasted 4,000 years and now the United States imperialists have come in and must be thrown out.

Young Private First Class Weatherman says, The Vietnamese have been fighting all their lives. It's a civil war, and now the Communists are coming down, trying to take over the south, and the United States is going to kick their ass back up into North Vietnam.

So the bristling Mr. Hahm, the Viet Cong in charge of the Americans political development, would urge, "Look at Garwood, look at Bobby. He's a good example. You ought to be like him."

"Weatherman became increasingly rebellious and disrespectful." And this is his real name, so his parents can read this. "His liberties were withdrawn. He was treated more like a prisoner. He began making the daylong hikes with the other Americans to gather maniok. He was on such a trip on April 1 when he overpowered a guard, took his rifle, and disappeared into the jungle with another American, hoping to make it to Cambodia.

"Within 15 minutes, the guards had tracked down the two. Weatherman threw out his rifle and he and his companion emerged from the cover with their hands over their heads. The guard walked up to Pfc. Earl Weatherman, placed the barrel of his rifle between his eyes, and blew the young man's head away.

"The other American, realizing that he, too, would be murdered, began running. The guard fired, the round went low, struck him in the leg. He went down, he writhed on the ground, the guard approached him, lifting his rifle to complete a double execution. The other guard stopped it. The prisoner was beaten savagely and returned to the camp, tried before a kangaroo court and sentenced to 90 days in stocks. I do not think that other soldier survived; he later died."

Now, the VFW Post in Hermosa Beach, CA, a district I used to represent, is named the Rocky Versace Post. I was there when his dad, a World War II veteran, a colonel, came. Rocky was a West Pointer. It was named VFW Post 2828, VFW Post Hermosa Beach, the Rocky Versace Post. We know Rocky Versace was executed, Kenneth Rhorabacher was executed. There were all sorts of executions.

I consider it first degree murder to allow Glen Cobeil and James J. Connell and Ken Cameron to die and not return them, so there are plenty of examples of executions all the way throughout the war.

I remember Charlton Heston narrating a film called "The Year of the Dragon," about the year 1967 when 10,000 village chieftains were executed, many of them decapitated and their heads put up on a stake, as though it were a priest with his head on a stake on London Bridge. I remember we showed it at the Writers Guild of America West, in West Hollywood, and the liberal writers all booed the Charlton Heston narration because their hearts had already been given to the communists in Hanoi. So just a little history.

Go ahead.

Mr. VEITH. In summation of my remarks concerning special intelligence, I would like to provide you a quote from the book about the NSA called the Puzzle Palace by Mr. James Bamford.

One of the people Mr. Bamford interviewed was a former NSA director, Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter. When asked about the ability of SIGINT versus other types of intelligence, Lieutenant General Carter remarked, "HUMINT is subject to all the mental aberrations of the source, as well as the interpreter of the source. SIGINT isn't. SIGINT has technical aberrations which give it away almost immediately if it does not have bona fides, if it is not legitimate. A good analyst can tell very, very quickly whether this is an at-

tempt at disinformation, at confusion, from SIGINT. It is better than HUMINT, it is more rapid than HUMINT as SIGINT is right now, its bona fides are there the minute you get it.

Mr. DORNAN. Everybody at NSA is military personnel?

Mr. VEITH. No, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. At the top? At the beginning, maybe it was.

Mr. VEITH. Well, there is a level there of military officers.

Mr. DORNAN. Jerry Mooney was what, an Air Force sergeant?

Mr. VEITH. He was Air Force.

Mr. DORNAN. But the commander has always been a military three star?

Mr. VEITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. And, therefore, supposedly less politicized than Hollywood's concept of the CIA choice, always a confidant of whatever President was in office?

Mr. VEITH. Bear in mind that DOD controls NSA.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. VEITH. As a matter of fact, I have an e-mail from the legislative assistant for NSA, Mr. Dan Klein, telling—I think it was Chief Gudein at the time—that they would no longer be allowed to communicate directly with the Senate Select Committee because DOD was rather upset about the close cooperation between the Senate Select Committee and NSA.

Mr. DORNAN. I'm sorry, but this is the apropos time to—and I can't think of a better one—to read the memo from General Clapper, who was a three-star Air Force general in command of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1991 through 1995. Here is what he said at the end of a memo about intelligence reports on United States prisoners of war during the Korean war and his reaction to Czech defector General Sejna, who just testified.

In paragraph one he discusses the drug experimentation on U.S. prisoners. In two he says the source was well placed and that he personally saw progress reports on the work in North Korea that were forwarded to the top leadership in the Czech Central Committee and Ministry of Defense. Of course, this is now leaked out, and it was General Sejna.

This is a three-star Air Force general, who I know to be an honorable man, that was very disgusted with some of the lack of followthrough by analysts at what was then a CIA predecessor group preceding DPMO.

Just think of the people's right to know, through Senators and Congressmen, at least, in closed session. This is Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., U.S. Air Force.

"I have furnished the attached report to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for their information. Normally, intelligence reports concerning American prisoners of war—" this would be Cheney he's sending this to "—are distributed within the Government to military departments, the intelligence agencies, the Department of State, the temporary Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, and the House POW/MIA Task Force—" of which I have been a member all the years I've been here. It doesn't exist now because of this committee, because of myself, as chairman, taking the portfolio here, where it never should have left 40 years ago.

General Clapper continues,

However, as the attached intelligence report could seriously impact ongoing foreign policy activities of the U.S. Government, I await instructions on any further dissemination of the subject report.

I have another comment where he says, if this were to be given to Congress, it could have foreign policy implications. So I'm going to ask Jim Clapper, who is retired from a great career, if he would come forward and tell us why he felt he had the right to do that, and why he thought it was necessary to do that, after people had dismissed General Sejna for all these years.

Please proceed.

Mr. VEITH. In the other area of whether the process is working, as a private researcher who has spent vast amounts of time reviewing United States wartime POW/MIA material, I was appalled to learn that the United States Government had provided to the Vietnamese two sets of documentation that I believe have seriously eroded our ability to conduct impartial investigations.

First, in late 1993, we gave the Vietnamese a complete copy of the 954 microfilm rolls from the wartime Combined Document Exploitation Center, known as CDEC. This microfilm set contains captured Vietnamese documents and their English translations and was given to the Vietnamese under the guise of helping them locate their own MIA's from the war.

What is so distressing about this decision is that the microfilm also contains most of the wartime HUMINT interrogation reports from the war in completely unredacted format. We are constantly reminded by the intelligence community of the need to protect sources, yet here we provided to the Vietnamese the names and background on almost all the individuals who gave information to us during the war.

To clarify this, any potential Brightlight report from the war that we are now using to determine the fate of any individual is now also being read and studied by the Vietnamese.

For instance, in April of this year, an alternate Politburo member was put under house arrest for "actions detrimental to the Revolution during the anti-American war." This individual had been captured during the war, and Mr. Bell and I suspect the Vietnamese Security Forces ran across his interrogation report in the CDEC collection.

To further muddy the waters of an honest accounting effort, the United States Government has also provided to the Vietnamese a streamlined version of what is known as the Brightlight data base. This is a computer data base of all the missing in action from the war and contains all the casualty records on it. The data base was streamlined in the sense that most of the wartime intelligence was taken out. Since that initial turnover, the JTF-FA has updated the data base twice and also has provided a Vietnamese language version of this computer data base to each of the Vietnamese province leaders.

Mr. Chairman, I ask you how our Government can conduct an honest accounting effort for our missing soldiers and civilians if the Vietnamese already have a great deal of the intelligence that our own Government possesses. I am not familiar with any style of investigation where one provides to the suspect the evidence against

him beforehand, unless, of course, one believes the Vietnamese are, indeed, cooperating superbly and are hiding nothing from us.

Mr. DORNAN. That, again, is one of the principal complaints of the families, that the Communist government in Hanoi was given deeper briefing information than the families themselves were given on their sons, husbands, brothers, and dads. It just seems unconscionable. It's been a mystery to me for 20 years.

Mr. VEITH. Even in the best environment, given the long record of Vietnamese intransigence on this issue, if I was a family member, I would find this difficult to accept. Perhaps you can request from DPMO whether the Vietnamese having much of our wartime HUMINT has any impact on the accounting effort.

Last, Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind you of the statement I made to you in June, that many of the answers are at the NSA. In that vein, Mr. Mooney has asked me to privately provide you and this committee something he believes you will find of great importance. This is not a smoking gun, per se, but it is an excellent starting point to begin researching whether American POW's were transferred to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Mooney has authorized me to tell you the code systems, frequencies, and aircraft tail numbers and call signs for the movement of all POW's from all wars by Soviet missile range head aircraft to the Soviet missile test sites as reflected in NSA product reports.

In addition, Mr. Mooney has provided to me the NSA electronic systems where this material is located, the process by which it was transferred to NSA, and the intercept sites involved, so that your office can easily retrieve this material.

Mr. DORNAN. I'm going to look forward to getting that. I am also going to look forward to getting from DPMO their interrogation—interrogation is too strong a word, I hope, and I haven't talked to Mr. Mooney—their interviews over several days a few weeks ago, which I repeat came dangerously close to tampering with a witness before a congressional subcommittee.

Mr. VEITH. Let me address that in the last seconds here, sir.

I forewarn you, however, that this is a very large body of material that will require much analytical time and effort. Again, it is an excellent starting point, and I do not wish to overhype it, but there are the code systems involved for your office.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Veith follows:]

Testimony by George J. Veith before the House Military Personnel Subcommittee on September 17th, 1996.

Chairman Dornan, Committee members and other distinguished guests, thank you once again for asking me to appear before your Committee to discuss the POW/MIA issue. I wish today to concentrate on two areas. First, the use of Special Intelligence, often called SIGINT, in resolving the fates of many Americans still Missing in Action from the conflict in Southeast Asia, and second, from my perspective as a private researcher, whether the accounting process is flawed.

As you know Mr. Chairman, in terms of Special Intelligence, Mr. Jerry Mooney, a long time NSA analyst responsible during the war for monitoring PAVN Air Defense communications, has often discussed how he developed a large list of Americans who were captured by the PAVN forces, and who subsequently never returned home. Unfortunately, Mr. Mooney was unable to appear before this Committee, but since I have worked closely with Mr. Mooney on an almost daily basis for the past ten months, he has asked me to speak for him, and to share with you the results of both my research into this aspect of the issue and, just as importantly, the knowledge of NSA systems and procedures he has so carefully taught me.

To provide you with some background, I have reviewed every single SIGINT message and NSA memorandum released to the Library of Congress (LOC), which comprises thousands of wartime intercepts, along with various internal NSA messages dealing with many facets of the issue. Additionally, I have gone through all the files of the investigators from the Senate Select Committee who worked with SIGINT material, and I have interviewed both Mr. Bob Taylor and Mr. Tom Lang, both of whom worked with Mr. Mooney and other NSA individuals. Lastly, I have read every deposition and/or interview of NSA employees by the Select Committee. Consequently, I have shared everything I found with Mr. Mooney, and we discussed this material and other items at great length over the last ten months. Therefore, I would like to provide your Committee with several very important results of that research.

The first thing I want to discuss is the government's portrayal of Mr. Mooney. In testimony before the Select Committee on Dec 4th, 1992, by the DIA's Lt. Paul Maguire, Lt. Maguire attempted to paint Mr. Mooney as making analytical mistakes in two separate areas in his assessment of whether Americans were captured. According to DIA, Mr. Mooney only had access to a single source of intelligence, namely SIGINT, and second, because he only had access to this source, and not the all-source that DIA has, he made errors in correlations because he was unable to distinguish between multiple loss incidents. Mr. Chairman, both of these statements are so patently false that they appear to be crafted so as to damage limit Mr. Mooney's claims. Let us deal with the first point, that he only had access to a single intelligence source.

Mr. Chairman, NSA collected and analyzed an enormous amount of information about the PAVN into a tremendously effective technical and product database, which included not only SIGINT, but HUMINT, ELINT, RADINT, and PHOTINT, along with additional information collected by other non-U.S. intelligence agencies under Third Party Agreements. This database was so effective that NSA could predict PAVN responses, and just as importantly, NSA could follow their reporting on events down to the gun crew level, which provided NSA the ability to discern

what was the truth, and what was not. This database enabled NSA to easily discriminate between the different message categories of Emulation, "Hot B," and Control/Dummy Traffic, versus information NSA initially judged to be reliable, and which was then later confirmed. This database was called the Central Reference files, or C/REF, and it had a sister computer database called COINS. For example, in May 1970, US forces captured a large cache of COSVN radio messages. From this, NSA created a study of the PAVN B-3 Front Rear Services Department. Additionally, if you look closely at any CDEC address list, it clearly states as one of the addresses, "DIRNSA for B-6," which was the section Mr. Mooney worked in. Lastly, also in 1970, ARVN forces captured some of the personnel who worked in the Signal Battalion for PAVN MR-5. Based on the interrogation reports, NSA published a study on the communication procedures in this area. Therefore, we can clearly see that even the lowest levels of intelligence reached both NSA and Mr. Mooney's shop. All of these NSA reports are currently located in the LOC.

As for the second point, Mr. Mooney wants you to understand the difference between people who just read SIGINT, and those who understand SIGINT and work with it on a daily basis. Mr. Mooney calls this understanding both the Art and the Science of SIGINT. Let me give you another example. (Example)

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I want to discuss with you one of the most shocking items I uncovered in my research. Mr. Mooney has talked for years about an incident that occurred in the summer of 1972 in which the NSA intercepted a PAVN communication that stated they were about to execute ten Americans. I found that message in the LOC files, and it was exactly as Mr. Mooney described it. But, as usual, DPMO states that the incident described by this intercept never occurred. Why, because, NSA is just a passive collector of information, they have no way of knowing if information passed in PAVN comm channels is valid, and well, DPMO just knows better.

Let me provide three reasons why NSA thought this was a valid message. First, the priority attached to the message as represented by the "Z" in the upper left corner. This represents "Flash" priority, the highest level. Second, this execution message appears in the NSA Daily Summary, which contains only the most important material and is sent to the highest consumers in the government. Third, NSA requirements are that if they believe the message is in error, they issue a "Cancel" message. No "Cancel" message exists in the LOC files, nor according to Mr. Mooney, was one ever issued. By the way, Mr. Mooney was the drafter of this message.

Mr. Chairman, the contents of this message beg for a deeper examination beyond the casual brush-off by DPMO. If accurate, they go to the very heart of whether Vietnam is cooperating and whether the process is working. Special Intelligence is very different from the more familiar world of Human Intelligence. It is more complex, often highly technical in nature. Because Special Intelligence is so unfamiliar to most people, the ability to penetrate through attempts at Governmental deception is made much more difficult. As a concerned citizen, I am asking you and your Committee to press DPMO and other Governmental agencies to thoroughly examine this message and its ramifications.

In summation of my remarks concerning Special Intelligence, I would like to provide you a quote

from the book about the NSA called the "Puzzle Palace" by Mr. James Bamford. One of the people Mr. Bamford interviewed was a former NSA director, LTG Marshall Carter. When asked about the ability of SIGINT vs. other types of intelligence, LTG Carter remarked, "HUMINT is subject to all the mental aberrations of the source as well as the interpreter of the source. SIGINT isn't. SIGINT has technical aberrations which give it away almost immediately if it does not have bona fides, if it is not legitimate. A good analyst can tell very, very quickly whether this is an attempt at disinformation, at confusion, from SIGINT. It is better than HUMINT, it is more rapid than HUMINT (but) SIGINT is right now; its bona fides are there the minute you get it."

In the other area of whether the process is working, as a private researcher who has spent vast amounts of time reviewing U.S. wartime POW/MIA material, I was appalled to learn that the U.S. government had provided to the Vietnamese two sets of documentation that I believe have seriously eroded our ability to conduct impartial investigations. First, in late 1993 we gave the Vietnamese a complete copy of the 954 microfilm rolls from the wartime Combined Document Exploitation Center, known as CDEC. This microfilm set contains captured Vietnamese documents and their English translations and was given to the Vietnamese under the guise of helping them locate their own MIA's from the war. What is so distressing about this decision is that the microfilm also contains most of the wartime HUMINT interrogation reports from the war in completely unredacted format. We are constantly reminded by the intelligence community of the need to protect sources, yet here we provided to the Vietnamese the names and background on almost all of the individuals who gave information to us during the war. To clarify this, any "Brightlight" report from the war that we are using to determine the fate of any individual is now also being read and studied by the Vietnamese. For instance, in April of this year, an alternate Politburo member was put under house arrest for "actions detrimental to the Revolution during the anti-American war." This individual had been captured during the war, and Mr. Bell and I suspect that the Vietnamese Security Services ran across his interrogation report in the CDEC collection.

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Lastly Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind you of the statement I made to you in June, that

many of the answers are at the NSA. In that vein, Mr. Mooney has asked me to privately provide you and this Committee something he believes you will find of great importance. This is not a "Smoking gun" per se, but is an excellent starting point to begin researching whether American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. Mr. Mooney has authorized me to tell you the code systems, frequencies, and aircraft tail numbers and call signs for the movement of all POWs from all wars by Soviet Missile Range head aircraft to the Soviet missile test sites as reflected in NSA product reports. In addition, Mr. Mooney has provided to me the NSA electronic systems where this material is located, the process by which it was transferred to NSA, and the intercept sites involved so that your office can easily retrieve this material. I forewarn you, however, that this is a very large body of material that will require much analytical time and effort. Again, it is an excellent starting point and I do not wish to overhype it.

I welcome any questions you have at this time.

1891548

Z 071545Z JUL 72
FM
TO

NVN 37TH AIR DEFENSE

PLANS TO EXECUTE 10 AMERICANS

ON 6 JULY, THE NVN 37TH AIR DEFENSE DIVISION (UNLOCATED, LOWER QUANG BINH PROVINCE) THE 284TH AAA REGIMENT AND DIRECTED THE EXECUTION OF 10 AMERICANS.
SON R. III V.

CADRE

SHALL BE LEFT BEHIND TO KILL THE 10 AMERICANS.
COMPLETE THE TASK AND RETURN

THE 284TH AAA REGIMENT DEPARTED QUANG TRI CITY ON 5 JULY AND IS PRESENTLY LOCATING IN THE AREAS OF CAM LO (16-49N 107-08E), DONG LON (16-47N 107-05E) AND TAN VINH (16-46N 107-06E)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

D

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1892288

P 072888Z JUL 72

FM [REDACTED]

TO [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] SECTION ONE

[REDACTED]

SOUTHEAST ASIA [REDACTED] SUMMARY

THIS REPORT SUMMARIZES DEVELOPMENTS NOTED THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA AVAILABLE
AS OF 1500Z, 7 JULY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

284TH REGIMENT HAD WITHDRAWN FROM QUANG TRI CITY. ON 6 JULY, THE DIVISION
[REDACTED] 284TH AAA REGIMENT TO EXECUTE TEN AMERICANS. ELEMENTS OF THE 274TH
SAM REGIMENT IN THE VINH LINH/DMZ AREA HAVE [REDACTED] TO PREPARE TO
RETREAT. [REDACTED]

1888339

R #62027ZJUL77

FM
TO

SECRET

FOLLOW UP TWO TO [REDACTED] #71949Z JUN 77 [REDACTED]

LAOS [REDACTED] REMAINS OF AMERICAN WAR DEAD

LAOTIAN OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SEARCHING FOR AMERICAN WAR DEAD SOMEWHAT EARLIER THAN ORIGINALLY THOUGHT, AS RECENTLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION REVEALS THE SEARCH IS ONGOING IN APRIL AND MAY RATHER THAN EARLY JUNE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE [REDACTED] ONE.

INDIVIDUAL TO SEARCH THE PROVINCE FOR GRAVES OF AMERICANS [REDACTED] PURSUANT TO AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) [REDACTED]

REMAINS OF SOME AMERICAN WAR DEAD HAD BEEN TAKEN TO OFFICE #88 [REDACTED] THE

[REDACTED] SOMEWHERE IN HOUA PHAM PROVINCE. [REDACTED] AUTHORITIES

IN VIENG SAI (ZB24N 1841YF VH1955) TO INVESTIGATE THE LOCATION OF THE REMAINS.

[REDACTED] FINDING THE REMAINS OF ONE AMERICAN AND

HAVING MOVED THE BODY [REDACTED] NEITHER THE NAME NOR LOCATION [REDACTED]

SEARCH HAD NOT UNCOVERED ANY ADDITIONAL REMAINS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AMERICANS KILLED IN THE AREA OF PHOU PHA THI, HOUA PHAM PROVINCE. (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LAOS AGREED TO ACCOUNT FOR AMERICAN SERVICEMEN MISSING IN THE INDOCHINA WAR AND HAD ESTABLISHED A "COMMITTEE" TO SEARCH FOR INFORMATION. (S) [REDACTED] #71949Z JUN 77, [REDACTED] #92128Z JUN 77. [REDACTED]

5700162

071949Z JUN 77

FM
TO

Handwritten notes:
Lao People's Liberation Army
Company 18

LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY TO
DISINTER REMAINS OF AMERICANS KILLED IN LAOS

ON 2 JUNE LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY COMPANY
18,

WAS
TO EXHUME THE REMAINS
OF AMERICANS INTERRED AT AN UNPAVED LOCATION. COMPANY
18 PERSONNEL WERE NOT TO LOSE OR COMPROMISE ANY
REMAINS. TO REMOVE, IF AT ALL
POSSIBLE, AN IDENTIFICATION NUMBER FROM THE AIRCRAFT IN
WHICH THE DECEASED WERE FOUND AND TO PLACE THE NUMBER WITH
THE REMAINS.

xq05 2

Mr. VEITH. Let me comment just briefly in terms of DPMO going out to see Mr. Mooney.

That was a process that I had been working on for several months. Whether or not DPMO had decided to all of a sudden go out and see him right now because of the hearing, I can't answer. You would have to ask them for that. But I can't sit here and say it was some kind of evil thing to circumvent the witness. I was involved with—

Mr. DORNAN. You were pressing them to go interview him?

Mr. VEITH. Yes, sir, in defense of DPMO.

Also understand that the meeting that was held in Billings was designed more as a get-together meeting, a rapport-building meeting, where Jerry would do an advise and consent. They listened, he would speak, tell them what he knew, in the hope that they would then go back and discuss what they had talked about, and agree to bring him to Washington for a more thorough debriefing.

Mr. DORNAN. That is excellent. I'm happy to hear that. By nature, I reject conspiracies, so I'm really pleased to hear that.

Let me start with Mr. Bell. You have a pad and pencil there, Jay, so take notes in case you want to comment on any of this.

Mr. Bell, in 1973, you participated in Operation Homecoming. It was a tear-jerking operation. Colonel Corso participated in it firsthand, interviewing men, and the big switch and then the little switch, from April to September, 1953. So here, 20 years later, we're doing it all over again in 1973.

At that time, was it your understanding that both sides had released all the prisoners taken throughout Vietnam, North and South, and throughout Laos?

Mr. BELL. The problem we had at that time, Mr. Chairman, was that we didn't know the fate of men who were still unaccounted for and believed to be alive, or last known to be alive. We knew the men that were on the list that they gave us in Paris that they were going to release. The only exception to that list that I recall was Capt. Robert White, who was released just after Homecoming, I think early April.

Actually, we came to the conclusion that the head of the Vietnamese delegation purposely withheld Robert White in order for him to get a C-130 aircraft to leave South Vietnam and go back to the North to begin planning on the attack that was to take place in 1975. In other words, that was his way out of the Communist delegation to the peace process. He used that as a ruse for him to go back and arrange the release of one more POW. So we provided him with an aircraft.

Subsequent to that, I found out that we had not released all the Vietnamese prisoners, the Communist prisoners, because approximately 200 Communist prisoners were still being held in South Vietnam, including some of their highest level security cadres and so forth. I know Mr. Frank Snapp mentioned some of these people, including the highest ranking prisoner that we ever captured in the South, in his book "Decent Interval." In that book he described where the individual was dumped into the sea or whatever, but I think he was trying to provide cover for the man because he did go back to North Vietnam and assume his duties. He was still in

the cell being held prisoner when Soviet tanks rolled into Saigon in April, 1975.

The situation in Laos was much the same as Vietnam. We had a large number of cases—I think the total number of cases throughout Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was over 300 men that we knew were alive the last we knew about them and had no real reason to think that they were dead.

Mr. DORNAN. After that period, 1973 and 1974, as a Defense Department investigator in Asia on our POW's and missing, when you came to Washington for briefings, what type of assessment did the Defense Department give you regarding Vietnam's level of cooperation in accounting for our men?

Mr. BELL. The assessment that we received was that the Vietnamese were not being very cooperative, because the general feeling was that they had extensive records—you know, some of this information came out of the debriefing of the defecting mortician, who described how he processed and stored remains, to be doled out at specific intervals.

Also, the DIA briefings that the specialist gave us indicated that most of the reports we were receiving on dog tags and remains and so forth, those were orchestrated by the Ministry of the Interior, the intelligence and security services of Vietnam. They, in fact, had extensive charts on the wall to show how one report of remains or a dog tag might be related to another report. They went so far as to take the photocopies of dog tags and remains, bone fragments and so forth, and compare them to see which machine in Saigon had actually been used to photocopy the documents and so forth. So it was pretty well determined at that time that the Vietnamese Ministry of the Interior was behind much of the reporting coming out of there.

Mr. DORNAN. When you first began the post-war field ops on the ground, what was the general attitude of the Vietnamese officials, the Communist officials?

Mr. BELL. The general attitude was, you tell us everything you know about this case, and we won't tell you anything. We'll give you the information back and we'll return remains, as long as you keep paying to do these field activities.

It went from that—when we showed some determination, the investigations at one point began to get real, but there were still signs that the Vietnamese were not cooperating, because we had indications of manipulation.

Mr. DORNAN. To whom did the Vietnamese make the comment "Your country will do anything for money"?

Mr. BELL. Dan Rather, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Did you have access to reports or studies encompassing intelligence from all the U.S. agencies, so that you could be prepared and the other investigators would be prepared for any investigation involving Americans last known alive, the discrepancy cases?

Mr. BELL. In many cases we would not know where the information came from. The information came to us in the field through the headquarters in Hawaii. That's where it was consolidated. Most of the reports that weren't in the initial case file would be called

subsequent information reports. Later on, we began to get some information from NSA.

I think the biggest shortcoming we had in the field doing field investigations was the fact that the Central Identification Laboratory did not give us the forensic analysis of the remains to use in the course of our investigations. Nor did we have much information on Soviet and Cuban activities during the war, and I think that could have been very important.

Mr. DORNAN. It's interesting that that right now is public law, that someone trained in forensic science has to make a determination of remains. If Clinton signs the authorization bill that comes out—we had a hearing last week putting it back in—at the moment it comes out, H.R. 4000, sponsored by about 275 Members, we're going to find out.

Mr. Pickett, let me ask two more questions and then I'll turn it over to you, and then I have a few more here.

When you traveled to Vietnam to do the investigations, did you provide the Vietnamese with any information on cases?

Mr. BELL. What we used, during the time I was in charge of the investigations, we gave the Vietnamese just a brief narrative, just a general outline of where the case occurred. We used the small Federal Government issue pocket notebooks, the green ones, that you can put inside your pocket, and we reduced the cases down to that size, inserted them in each one of those pages, and we had one of those notebooks for each case. That way, we could keep it on our person at all times and the Vietnamese would never be able to get access to it.

Mr. DORNAN. It was 1991 when you were assigned as chief of that office, right?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Were you satisfied that the office building was the proper place to conduct important official U.S. Government business? And what is the Boss Hotel?

Mr. BELL. Initially we started off in what was called the government guest house. We had reports there—as a matter of fact, some of the trips that I was on, where we had a security specialist go along, he found numerous hot spots all throughout the hotel. We knew from defectors that the rooms were bugged, and we knew where the wires led to, who was monitoring the wires back to the area of the American/Vietnam Friendship Association.

The Boss Hotel, after we were moved in—

Mr. DORNAN. That's where their best English language speakers were.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

We had to rent a storage closet upstairs in the hotel to put our drinking water in, and the keys to our rooms were different from this one storage cabinet key, or closet key, which was an older key. Some of the paint was missing from the key, and we scraped a little of that paint off and beneath the paint, instead of Boss Hotel, it said Public Security Guest House.

Then we began to inquire around, and some of our allies, I think the British and Australians, they were amazed that we would position our office in the Public Security Guest House, belonging to the Ministry of the Interior. But we didn't realize that until it was too

late. That's where the Vietnamese guided us into. The employees inside the hotel were all intelligence and security services—I mean, the ones that dumped our files every night, the ones that came in and cleaned our computers and our databases and so forth. So it was a given from the very outset that we had been deceived in that regard. I did complain to the Vietnamese about that.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Garnett Bell, in all my dealings with you—you appear to be a man of high honor, so I ask you this question only because of my difficult position here.

When you returned to Washington to testify before the Senate Select Committee, in November 1991, were you coached by the Department of Defense on how to answer congressional questions?

Mr. BELL. Back at that time they had what was called “murder boards”, where people would go and discuss the questions. I think that's pretty well the general practice everywhere. But in this particular case, when—

Mr. DORNAN. At DPMO they call it the “corporate board”, who conducts the “murder board.”

Mr. BELL. In this case, I think they went a little too far, because myself and others were taken into a room and given a list of the questions—which we appreciated—that would perhaps prepare us. But what we really were dismayed about in this instance is that we were given answers to each question.

No one came right out and said “you must use these answers”, but when you have a superior and your chain of command, the day prior to a hearing, say “here is the questions we anticipate, and here are the answers to those questions”, it's a safe assumption that that individual desires that you use those answers.

I think this happened to quite a number of people who testified at that time.

Mr. DORNAN. I want to ask just one more question right now and then turn it over to Mr. Pickett.

At that session, did you testify that, in your opinion, some Americans remained in Vietnam after 1973's Operation Homecoming?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today.

Mr. Bell, you were here several months ago and gave us some information, and my recollection is that at that time you maybe expressed the view that the United States had done about all it could do with the information that we had in our files, and if much progress was going to be made, then the data was going to have to come from the Vietnamese.

Did I get the right impression from your thoughts on that?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. But I can caveat that with one more comment. I've never really been confident that we have all the information from the U.S. Government files, because what we hear is virtually all the information that's been declassified. It would virtually depend upon your interpretation. It could be 51 percent or it could be 99 percent. Certainly it's not all. You could say virtually all.

The important thing to me is the analysts who analyze the overall process, as well as the field investigators on the ground, those are the people who need the information. If we have exhausted all of our information, then only the information in the hands of communist countries could now help us.

At the same time, though, I believe there are large volumes of uncorrelated reports—and I mentioned this before—in our files, where they're not correlated to any specific individual. Many of those reports have a great deal of information, and with just a little more work, they could be correlated to an individual and provide us with the answers we need.

In the case of Vietnam, where we had a source of information back in 1968 and he gave us an inadequate amount of information, if we could just meet with him another 30 minutes, it might lead to a correlation on the case. I can't see any reason why we cannot do that. If peace is really at hand and the Vietnamese are fully cooperating and so forth, we should be able to go back and revisit with those people who gave us information, but not quite enough information, to correlate.

Mr. PICKETT. I'm not trying to put words in your mouth, but it's probably quicker to get to the issue.

Is it still your view that the Vietnamese have data available that they can turn over to us that they are withholding, and if they would turn that data over, we could speed up the process and close a lot of the cases that are presently pending?

Mr. BELL. I think the Vietnamese have a great deal of information. They're fanatical about record keeping. I know our Government has made claims about 30 to 40,000 documents—I can't recall what the exact number is now, but I know that just over or only 1 percent of all those documents have anything to do with POW's and MIA's. Most of them are propaganda and so forth.

But we've been into the museums and archives. We see how organized they are. We followed that very closely during the war. The documents we have from the Captured Document Exploitation Center that we brought here to the United States for research are just a good representative sample of what we didn't capture.

If the Vietnamese would only make the political decision to begin cooperating fully, I think we could get some more information from them. In the meantime, we've made a grave error by falling into the same rut left by the French MIA recovery teams, in that we began to pay these large amounts of cash into a bank account in Hanoi, and the same problem there is like we had in Panama with Manuel Noriega or whatever country we've done this with in the past. Whenever we work the Vietnamese in the field all day, digging in a crater to recover an aircraft and pay them \$1.75, and we're paying the Communist party \$30 a day, by putting those millions of dollars every year in cash into the pockets of only a few generals or Communist party elite, that—

Mr. DORNAN. The \$1.75 is for our personnel?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. That takes their incentive away from them to really move forward. The people out in the country, the farmers, the construction workers, these are the people that continue to suffer while this goes on, while only just a small few political elites

in Hanoi derive the benefit from our national Treasury. I think this was a big error.

Mr. DORNAN. Are you aware that—if I could, Mr. Pickett, for just a second—that at the request of this subcommittee chairman, and Chairman Ben Gilman of the International Relations Committee, the Defense Department IG has a team over there right now investigating this allocation of money.

Go ahead, Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Just to follow up with Mr. Veith, you've been doing a lot of research in this area. How do you feel about this same set of circumstances that I asked Mr. Bell about? Do you think that we've exhausted the data that we can get from United States records and we must look largely to the Vietnamese records to proceed much further?

Mr. VEITH. I don't think we've exhausted U.S. records in one area, and that's the National Security Agency.

Mr. PICKETT. And you gave us some data on that today.

Mr. VEITH. Yes, sir.

In terms of what the Vietnamese can turn over to us, I pulled literally dozens of captured documents that we captured during the war that talk about their policy. They are almost unanimous in talking about carefully recording the circumstances of prisoners captured, their death, their locations, and a host of other issues.

As an example as to why I believe we can get more from the Vietnamese, during the last National League of Families meeting, analysts from DPMO briefed the National League and said the only documents they had gotten out of South Vietnam were essentially the Died in Captivity list, which we received in 1973, and something else that I can't remember off the top of my head.

Then with all the oral history done with the Vietnamese since that time, they continually remark about how they couldn't keep documents in the general environment, that the war was very fierce, that whatever they had they burned or was destroyed in B-52 strikes.

I submit, if that was true, then why are there 954 rolls of captured documents that we captured from them sitting down in our National Archives, which bear in mind only represents 10 percent of what we consider to actually have intelligence value. We captured literally millions of documents out of South Vietnam, which is where our combat forces were the majority of the time. Yet now we're told they have nothing there, that they couldn't keep records in a jungle environment, et cetera, et cetera. So I think those two facts speak for themselves.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett.

The last question I asked you, Mr. Bell, was did you testify that, in your opinion, American prisoners remain, and your answer was "yes, sir, I did."

Well, after the closed session part of your testimony, then, in November 1991, what was the response of DOD and the Pacific Command to your testimony?

Mr. BELL. After that testimony, after that hearing, I was asked to write a response in more detail, as to the information that I had provided, even though there was a representative from DOD sitting

in on the closed session, which I did accomplish. That is prior to the time when I was replaced in my job.

Mr. DORNAN. That cost you your job, testifying frankly to a closed Senate Committee hearing?

Mr. BELL. I think—the Vietnamese went to my superiors just before I testified, in my presence, and what they said to my superiors was that we are very concerned about what Mr. Bell will say—

Mr. DORNAN. This is in Hanoi?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. This was during one of the technical meetings that we had.

Mr. DORNAN. That's outrageous.

Mr. BELL. They went to my superior, who now works in the DPMO, and they said we're concerned about what Bell will say at the congressional hearing. This was in my presence.

This was one way that I felt they were trying to intimidate me. This was not uncommon. They did this quite often, and I'm sure they've done similar things with other people.

Mr. DORNAN. What was their reaction after you testified?

Mr. BELL. After I testified, they—first of all, they denied me a visa to reenter Vietnam and assume my duties.

Mr. DORNAN. Now it's coming back to me. I did know that.

Mr. BELL. Finally, they did, but by that time I think they had reached an agreement with my employer, that I would not be there long.

Mr. DORNAN. Who were your superiors in Hanoi, may I ask? How many were there?

Mr. BELL. At that time it was the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, which belonged to CINCPAC.

Mr. DORNAN. So the office had opened up with one person, you. Did you have a secretary?

Mr. BELL. Actually, we had several people there, actually two in the beginning.

Mr. DORNAN. And it built up?

Mr. BELL. It built from two to I think seven or eight, at the time this new task force was formed.

Mr. DORNAN. Was Joe Harvey one of your joint—

Mr. BELL. He was the commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center at that time, but he was superseded by General Needham.

Mr. DORNAN. I didn't ask him to testify today, but I sure want to hear from Mr. Havey on this.

Who else was there besides Joe Harvey?

Mr. BELL. Mr. Destatte was in Hanoi at that time. Mr. Destatte and I were the first two individuals up there. That was May 1991.

Mr. DORNAN. Did you go in together initially?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. We stayed behind after one of the technical meetings and remained there to open an office.

Mr. DORNAN. And you're both Vietnamese language specialists.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. When was the POW/MIA office relocated to a more permanent site? And I just wonder, this Boss name, was that their foolish translation for VIP, or was Boss an acronym, the placard they put over the guest house?

Mr. BELL. We never were able to figure that out. It had something to do with oil and gas exploration services.

Mr. DORNAN. So it probably was some kind of an acronym. When was it moved to a more permanent site in Hanoi?

Mr. BELL. I believe August 1993 is when the office was moved.

Mr. DORNAN. Who did the construction?

Mr. BELL. The Vietnamese did the construction.

Mr. DORNAN. Keep in mind that scene on the U.N. floor, of the big eagle gift behind the Ambassador—

Mr. BELL. I had asked for an American to come over, what I called a site support specialist, to come in and do the repairs, someone who had worked previously for the Department of Interior in restoring old buildings and so forth, because that's what we ended up with, old French buildings.

Mr. DORNAN. Having walked through, in Moscow, for several hours, the wiring, wiring doesn't even do justice to how they set up the listening devices in the new United States Embassy that is still vacant, I guess, to this day, eight stories high or something. They would take a whole metal doorway and turn it into a listening device, so there would be no bug you could look for. Incredible. And that was contemporaneous in time, what was going on in Moscow, to this period here.

So do you think it affected security? A dumb question, I think.

Mr. BELL. Well, I think the attitude at the time was that we're not taking any classified information into Vietnam; we're only working on POW/MIA matters. But I think what many in the policy aspect forgot was that when you deal with live sighting investigations, you do have to have some sort of strategy. If you're going out to visit a prison, the Vietnamese are going to want to know in advance—I mean, we have never visited a prison without notifying them in advance. But the amount of time that you do give them is important.

It also is important that you are able to plan your investigation strategy, where you will have one person who can speak the language well enough to pick up the innuendoes, who will be standing by when the witnesses are coached or rehearsed or whatever. When a cadre comes over and tells a witness, for example, "You tell the American that the parachute came out and opened, and you saw the parachute go down, but don't tell him anything else after that", it's important to hear that type of comment. This is all a part of your strategy. But you can't have a strategy when you're monitored 24 hours around the clock. It's impossible.

Mr. DORNAN. Right. So you can't even talk—

Mr. BELL. They know everything you're going to do before you can do it yourself, you know.

Mr. DORNAN. For example, there was a yachtsman, remember, when Senator Kerry was taken to the cleaners over there, down in the IV Corps area, they moved him briefly—I think he just sat in a car. Kerry came in, examined the prison, Kerry left, and they moved the prisoner right back into the prison.

Mr. BELL. They moved that—he was an American citizen who was arrested in a boat. We were checking the access to see if the Vietnamese were being sincere, if they were fully cooperating. Senator Kerry asked the Vietnamese, "Do you have any Americans de-

tained in this prison now, or have you ever had any Americans", and the Vietnamese said, "No, we don't have any Americans in here now, and we never have had." You know, we took that at face value, or at least the Senator did. He came back and said the Vietnamese are cooperating, very candid, straightforward, et cetera, et cetera. But 8 months later, this American was released and he just happened to be held in that same prison. He said he was moved out of that prison the day before Senator Kerry arrived there to inspect, and they moved him back into that same prison 2 days after Senator Kerry left.

Mr. DORNAN. The godfather of communism—

Mr. BELL. So, they weren't being as straightforward as we thought. I mean, I really didn't think they were anyway.

Mr. DORNAN. The godfather of communism, Lenin, said that when you're lying to further the cause, it's not a lie. So nobody should be surprised.

How about your telephone and your facsimile communications? Who installed all of that?

Mr. BELL. The Vietnamese technical department. [Laughter.]

Mr. DORNAN. Sad laughter again. I guess I wasn't surprised at that answer.

As a result of that, did you feel that you and Mr. Destatte had a proper facility in which to plan investigations, for the most important discrepancy cases, or to discuss strategy, things of that nature?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. The discrepancy cases, we got mired down in terminology as to whether or not a case would be a discrepancy case, a priority discrepancy case, or last known live sighting case. But any of those—

Mr. DORNAN. Who got bogged down, you and Destatte?

Mr. BELL. No; the whole apparatus, the accounting effort, just with the terminology. So whenever I'm asked a question now, I'm not sure exactly to which cases you might be referring because of that mixup in terminology.

But I think you can describe all the important cases, whether we had proof that the Vietnamese knew about it—for example, if we saw a photograph of the man dead on the ground, that should be a discrepancy case. If we had a picture in a magazine in the Soviet Union with a man with a bandaged head and still alive, then that would be a discrepancy case, or if the man was last known alive. But all of those cases required some degree of strategy.

I think the idea was that it's not important about the communications because now we're no longer going to have a strategy. What we're going to do is we're going to send infantry people in to do these cases, and they're not going to ask any questions anyway, and they're not going to have any strategy, so what does it matter?

Mr. DORNAN. Did they have language school training?

Mr. BELL. Some of the younger people. You know, like I mentioned before, I don't think a senior Vietnamese cadre, 70, 80 years old, is going to be very straightforward and forthcoming with a 22-year-old kid right out of language school.

Mr. DORNAN. A technical and personal question.

When did you start to dream in Vietnamese? How many years had you studied the language and used it where you found yourself thinking in Vietnamese grammar and sentence structure?

Mr. BELL. Thirty-one years, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. You were 31 years of age?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; I was 21 years old when I first learned Vietnamese.

Mr. DORNAN. But it took you 31 years before you could stand there and pick up whispered dialog with nuances?

Mr. BELL. Maybe not that long to pick up innuendoes. I would say 20 years, maybe.

Mr. DORNAN. Yell this out, Mr. Bengé. I see Michael Bengé out in the audience.

When you were captured, you spoke Vietnamese, right?

Mr. BENGÉ. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. And how long did it take you in the camp structure, listening to them, before you could think in Vietnamese and pick up whispered nuanced conversation?

Mr. BENGÉ. I would say right before I was released.

Mr. DORNAN. And then you made a mistake at one of your sessions, where they had you before, they spoke in Vietnamese and you answered in Vietnamese, and you realized then that you had blown your cover.

Mr. BENGÉ. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. And you paid the price for it.

By the way, when you were here the other day, it should have been brought out that when you were captured in your jeep, there was a little 14-year-old boy with you, and he ran for the underbrush and they shot him in the leg, and then went over and summarily executed him with a shot right in his face. That would have gotten your attention within the first few minutes of you being captured.

Mr. BENGÉ. It sure did.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

Again, here's one of these tough questions, where I almost want to call you "Bill", but I don't need to do that, Mr. Bell, to get a tough and straight answer. I did not realize you were eased out of this process because you had spoken to a House committee. I have discussed this with my staff. There will be no threatening of people. There will be no threatening of people.

How many DPMO people do we have in the audience right now? Raise your hand. I count nine. I'm telling you, gentlemen, I'm putting you on notice. There will be no threatening or easing off active duty, anybody, for talking to staff or any member of the U.S. Congress or Senate.

My staff brought it up to me, and Mr. Chapla told me he informed people at the Defense Department. We will not tolerate for a minute people being eased out on some charge of disloyalty because they were loyal to elected U.S. Congressmen, loyal to the process of truth, loyal to the families. That will not happen on my watch, or you'd better pray I get defeated on November 5. You know where to send the donations. Her name is Loretta Sanchez.

Now, here's this tough question, Mr. Bell. And it's not going to happen, what happened to Bill Bell. This man should still be on

active duty, working this problem. The families think so, Ann Griffiths thinks so.

Mr. Bell, most of the so-called live sighting reports were eliminated during 1992—and the Senate committee shut down that month—and in 1993. Were these investigations conducted, in your opinion, in a professional manner during those 2 years, 1992 and 1993?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; I don't think so. The reason I say that is because the investigator, the person who investigated those cases, was not someone who was there on the ground, who had any POW/MIA background, who was familiar with the cases or anything else. This was someone that they brought in for a 1-year tour, completely cold, didn't have any idea about the layout, didn't have any idea—very little language skills.

I think, to do almost a hundred cases, and in 1 year, very quickly like that, with a cold investigator who doesn't know anything about it, I don't think that's a sincere effort.

Mr. DORNAN. This next question is very peculiar and upsetting. But let me ask a followup to that first before I ask this strange question.

Was document shredding in Bangkok, in the Embassy there, significant, in your opinion? It was to me. Was it significant?

Mr. BELL. It was significant to my job especially, but significant to the overall effort, I'm not really sure because I don't think anyone really knows what was shredded.

Mr. DORNAN. The admiral who gave the command to do that left the service under a cloud, did he not? Oh, it was Admiral Larson who ordered that. He's commander now at Annapolis?

Let me ask you about two people who went to work for Caterpillar, U.S. Caterpillar, Peoria, IL. Were there two people on the payroll investigating some of these discrepancy cases, that as soon as the Senate committee shut down, they went over to work for Caterpillar and they're in Vietnam now?

Mr. BELL. I think two people went to work. The team chief of the discrepancy case team, and the senior DPMO representative on the team—I think the DPMO guy is the one that went to work for Caterpillar.

Mr. DORNAN. What happened to the other guy?

Mr. BELL. The other one went to work for Nation Books. This was at about the time they crossed off the cases and the embargo was lifted.

Mr. DORNAN. Who did he go to work for, the second one?

Mr. BELL. Nation Books.

Mr. DORNAN. What's that?

Mr. BELL. It's a publishing company that sells books in Indochina.

Mr. DORNAN. Meaning Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. So they both stayed in the area and they're making money there?

Mr. BELL. I think more than one. I think maybe at least three. One was Caterpillar and two with Nation Books.

Mr. DORNAN. Isn't it amazing that Colin Powell, a four-star general, cannot become the Secretary of Defense. If Clinton wanted

him to, if he gets reelected, or if Bob Dole closes the gap and gets elected, they can't appoint him Secretary of Defense. State, yes, but not Defense. He can't work in anything until he's been separated 10 years from the Defense Department.

But people who are clearing quickly a hundred discrepancy cases, stay in Hanoi and start drawing money from a U.S. corporation?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. I personally find that disgusting, offensive. If my kid brother was missing in action, I'd raise holy hell over that.

Mr. BELL. I think most of the places that are hiring these people are represented by the United States/Vietnam Trade Council, which is a front organization headed by former Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan.

Mr. DORNAN. Sullivan?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Whose code name was "Cowboy"?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Who was both in Tehran, the first time our Embassy was hit, and then back to Laos, and preceded G. McMurtry Godley?

Mr. BELL. That's correct, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. He is the head of this friendship organization?

Mr. BELL. The United States/Vietnam Trade Council, of which Caterpillar is a member, and these other companies, where the joint task force people are working.

Mr. DORNAN. I find Frances Lynig, and I say this publicly, I find her in that position utterly loathsome, disgusting, a foul conflict of interest that's an affront to every family member who still suffers with their missing in action. I see some family members and some former POW's heads nodding in affirmation.

Did you have any comment on anything that Mr. Bell said, Mr. Veith, or anything you want to add?

Mr. VEITH. I want to clarify one thing Mr. Bell was talking about, in terms of what's called the oral history program, which was a program that both he and, I believe, Mr. Destatte helped initiate in 1993.

Mr. DORNAN. Oral history program involving Vietnam, their oral history of the Vietnam war?

Mr. VEITH. What it refers to, sir, is our JTF-FA investigators going over to Vietnam and interviewing their cadre about their knowledge of United States losses in a particular area, or overall policy toward American POW/MIA's. I believe General Vialli testified last year there was about 175. I've gotten most of those and have read most of those.

If you take a look at those oral histories, from the ones that Mr. Bell did initially, and then when he left in about March or April 1993, the quality of those interviews drops off dramatically. What you find happening is that, in terms of what Mr. Bell said about the senior PAVN cadre, you will find our enlisted men or our NCO's interviewing lieutenant generals, major generals, senior Communist cadre.

Anybody with any sense of the Asians and their concepts of rank and face must realize that they're not going to get anything out of those people of substance, simply because of the rank and position

aspect, from that aspect alone. But even if that didn't happen, the quality of questioning and the quality of the interviews done, in 1993 especially, after Mr. Bell left, is a serious drop off.

Although I will say the quality improved in 1994 and 1995, essentially speaking, if Mr. Bell or Mr. Destatte didn't do the interview, it was worthless.

Mr. DORNAN. Jay, let me go down a line of questions here, and answer them as quickly as you can, and then you can comment at the end and Mr. Bell can have a closing comment.

When was the first comprehensive poll of NSA materials after the Vietnam war? How significant is that?

Mr. VEITH. Well, it wasn't done until 1992—

Mr. DORNAN. What?

Mr. VEITH [continuing]. And it was done because Mr. Mooney, when they took him back to NSA, he gave them the computer codes to access the database.

Mr. DORNAN. By the way, this document you gave me, I wrote "Secret" at the top and put it in my pocket, and I'm going to deposit it, in my other chairman position, up in the dome with the Intelligence Committee, to see if there's anything classified on there. But I appreciate him giving it to me. I'm allowed to receive classified information from former honorable people who served our Government and have information about American heroes.

Mr. VEITH. Right. I don't want an FBI agent at my doorstep tomorrow. My wife doesn't look favorably upon that sort of stuff.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, the media and the committees are so busy tracking the disreputable Dick Morris, and finding out how he got secret information from the reported Commander in Chief, that people are busy on other things right now.

How significant is it, in your analysis, that we didn't do a survey of NSA materials until 3 years ago?

Mr. VEITH. Well, what happened was, as various dust-ups occurred in the POW/MIA issue over the last 20 or 30 years, DIA at that time would go to NSA and say give us what you have. NSA would comply. They would give them a little bit. Three or four years later, another dust-up and they would go back to NSA, give us what you have. They would find a little bit more. Each time they would do this, they would find a little bit more, until the Senate select committee was in session and Mr. Mooney went down there, and Mr. Lang called him up and said NSA has egg all over its face because this stuff is just pouring out of the computer.

Now, if you read the Senate select committee's final report, it clearly states that there are hundreds of boxes that remain unreviewed at NSA on NSA wartime material, along with a lot of tapes. Most of the material was kept on magnetic tape, at least it was back then.

Mr. DORNAN. After the November 5th election, I promise you I'm going up there to try and—hopefully, I'll have Mr. Mooney flying on my wing.

To what extent did the NSA penetrate the People's Army of Vietnam air defense command and control—I'm asking you to repeat something you already said—down to the gun-pit level?

Mr. VEITH. Absolutely and totally. They had almost complete electronic coverage, an electronic spectrum, and the reason why

they could penetrate it so deeply was because the PAVN were using old-style Soviet codes, called ferrier codes, to communicate. They used Soviet tactics to fight. They had Soviet advisers. They basically were a mockup of the Soviet system.

Because they were using old-style Soviet codes to communicate, the NSA could break them in a heartbeat. Most of the stuff that they passed was not in code groups, and what's important about this execution message is that this was based on the unit's particular code. That's how they knew, one of the reasons why they knew this was a good message.

Most of the reporting that was done was called postfire reports, they're columns, ammunition being column A, number of rounds expended would be column B, and so forth. These would be passed in the clear. So they could monitor these. This is where they would come up and there would be one section of how many pilots they captured or killed or whatever, and you would often get reports, 1 of 1, 2 of 2, 3 of 3. This is when you begin taking and matching up where the intercept site was located, the time, what you call the art and science of SIGINT.

He would then take this SIGINT report and he would then go over to what is called collateral into the C/REF and COINS files and he would match it up with U.S. intelligence, other U.S. intelligence. Because he was trying to be as absolutely precise as possible, because his bosses made him do this, because everyone at NSA expected, in 1973, for Henry Kissinger to come to them and say give us what you have on POW/MIA's—and it never happened.

So Mooney would have these lists, ready to go, and it never happened.

Mr. DORNAN. The recovery of this in-the-clear data goes all the way back to McNamara's 7 years, all the way back to 1965, 1966, 1967—

Mr. VEITH. Back to 1962, sir. I have just recently uncovered a document from what was called a declassified documents project. It was called a NSAM, a National Security Action Memorandum, from November 1963, which instructs the NSA to upgrade dramatically its abilities to penetrate and record Viet Cong communications.

I will tell you that one of Mr. Mooney's bosses sent him in 1962 to the Philippines to prepare the NSA to begin copying and transmitting—copying and intercepting NVA communications, because this man, Col. John Kennedy, believed a war was going to happen.

Mr. DORNAN. It's no surprise that I hold McNamara in utter disrespect. I've called him a war criminal on the House floor, and now I'll do it in open committee. But finally, after midnight last night, I watched Charlie Rose interview an author, Paul Hendrickson, who has written a book with a compelling title, "The Living and the Dead". It appears that somebody is finally tearing down the wall of ego built around McNamara, protected by the elite inside the beltway.

McNamara would have been fascinated with this numbers crunching, because we had no battle plan, as Colonel Corso pointed out, in both Korea and Vietnam, to win the war. So, of course, this was something they obsessed over, since they had nothing else to do, like drawing up battle plans on how to achieve victory.

Let me finish these questions. Did the NSA collect reports that indicated direct, direct Soviet involvement with captured Americans in North Vietnam?

Mr. VEITH. Yes, sir. What happened with Mr. Mooney's—I don't know the exact timeframe, but just by sheer happenstance, they had overheard a couple of guards talking in the clear, talking about moving American POW's and the Soviet involvement.

The NSA section that Mr. Mooney ran used old French battle maps, which is not unknown—and Mr. Bell can also talk about the old French battle maps. They looked on the maps to see the location that these PAVN guards were talking about, and they happened to notice a village nearby called Sohn Tae. This was a location that American prisoners, according to Mr. Mooney, were taken, if they agreed to cooperate. They were taken to this location, interrogated by the Soviets, and then moved onward.

Now, what I did was I had Mr. Bell send Mr. Mooney a 1:50,000 map. I said, "Jerry, put an X on the map where this was at." He said fine, he did it. He sends it back to Mr. Bell, and lo and behold, it happens to be right next to the PAVN MR-4 hospital where the Cubans were also involved—and Mr. Bell can elaborate on that in a little more detail.

So what you had here was SIGINT picking up a location, where the Soviets were involved in interrogating American POW's, that happened to be right next to a major PAVN military hospital complex.

Mr. DORNAN. Comment, Mr. Bell?

Mr. BELL. The Cubans were actually all the way down to just above the DMZ at Doung Hai, just above the DMZ, which was the forward location of the field hospital. But the actual location of the field hospital, like Mr. Veith just mentioned, was back up in Vinh Province.

Mr. DORNAN. So an analyst who would say that the Cubans were involved with our prisoners for a period of less than a year, you would find that an incredible statement to make, since they had journalists over there in 1965, or earlier? Just yell it out, please, Mr. Michael Bengé.

What was the month you were interviewed by—interrogated by the Cubans?

Mr. BENGE. I was interrogated in—

Mr. DORNAN. They were supposed to have left in August 1968.

Mr. BENGE. Right. I arrived in Hanoi in 1969, so it would be very shortly after.

Mr. DORNAN. Already this former POW discredits the fact that the Cubans left with their tail between their legs, as Jim Cassler, a jet ace from Korea, horribly tortured, they left with great parties at the auditorium, at the zoo, with everybody speaking English.

Is there still a substantial amount of NSA intercepts—I think you answered this, and I want to hear it again—and reports that were collected during the Vietnam war, and in the post-war years, that is yet to be shared with other Government agencies responsible for accounting for our POW's?

Translation: could DPMO still go over there, if NSA made it available, and these 89 people that are on the payroll—well, three

are assigned to search for the future—but the 86 people on the payroll, there would be a lot for them to do just at NSA alone, correct?

Mr. VEITH. That's correct.

Let me give you two answers to that, sir. Mr. Mooney himself, during the war, was trying to transfer what was then a manual system, part paper, into their electronic database. Over a period of about 6 months, he transferred 250,000 NSA intercepts into their hard copy, into their electronic database. He told me that he had barely scratched the surface.

Now, the second thing I want to bring up is in terms of what NSA is doing now. This is kind of where we're dancing around some of the things that may or may not be classified.

It is my personal opinion that we still have very good penetration of North Vietnamese communications. I base that upon two things. One is, I found an intercept dated September 1992, in the Library of Congress that talks about the Minister of Interior from Quang Binh Province to not let the American team going down into that area to take photographs, not let them do anything other than what they're supposed to be doing.

Then there was a question asked of one of the DPMO analysts, again at the National League of Families meeting last June, where they asked him specifically does NSA currently have evidence that Vietnam is continuing to manipulate the issue, and the answer was "Yes."

Mr. DORNAN. Which DPMO analyst said that?

Mr. VEITH. I believe it was Dr. Gary Seido, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. I'll ask Gary.

What recommendations can you make about SIGINT reports that may correlate to the infamous Baron 52 incident?

Mr. VEITH. What I recommend, sir, is that we stop running a deal with these one-liners or two-liners of text. Especially with you, as head of the technical Intelligence Committee, you can request the full, unredacted version. What I would look for, especially in that—

Mr. DORNAN. When I ask for them, they keep sending me the redacted versions. I have a top secret clearance. I sit on the Intelligence Committee. I'm chairman of one of its only two subcommittees. I'm one of only two double chairmen in the entire Congress, out of 435.

You keep sending me redacted materials from DPMO. It's just a waste of time. It's paralysis, and it ends up in deception.

Go ahead.

Mr. VEITH. This is one of the problems I see, especially with the post-war material. Much of the discussion revolves around where the actual intercept came from. I believe DPMO says they actually intercepted four bandit pilots out of Phou Bie.

Now, there's a very simple way to find that out. Ask for the "from-to" line. If it doesn't say USM-808 on it, it's not from Phou Bie.

Now, Mr. Mooney believes that the actual intercept did not come from Phou Bie, for two reasons. One, he believes that Phou Bie can't reach that particular area, and two, there is a very highly technical atmospheric condition, which I won't go into, that prevents intercepts—that prevents them from going to that area. It's

an atmospheric condition that occurs in certain areas of the world, and the NSA has intercept capabilities at those locations, and that's where he believes the four bandit pilot intercepts came from, and not from Phou Bie.

It's very simple to find out. Just ask for the "from-to" line, and it says what I told you it says, it's from Phou Bie; if it doesn't say that, then it's not from Phou Bie. It's a very simple process.

Mr. DORNAN. The material that you found in the open, in the Library of Congress, what section?

Mr. VEITH. It's the POW/MIA microfilm rolls over there. They're right across the street, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Paul Cole, who was also trashed by some people at DPMO, a good analyst, a good archivist, he gave me a list of things to look at at the extension of the National Archives up at the University of Maryland. It is a tough, arduous process.

Mr. VEITH. Don't I know, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. My cousin is an expert producer and film editor, and he asked me once, do you want to edit some film. He put me on a—I couldn't stand it. I'm a fighter pilot.

Mr. VEITH. There are 13 total rolls in one set of the microfilm collection that deals with SIGINT NSA materials—I'm sorry, 13 total rolls in both sets. I have been through every single frame and all 13 rolls twice.

Mr. DORNAN. Good for you.

What significance is the "from-to" line?

Mr. VEITH. It will tell you who the interceptor is. It will tell you the unit or the station that actually intercepted the communication.

Mr. DORNAN. You mean the NSA—

Mr. VEITH. Correct, the NSA unit—or actually, the Army security agency.

Mr. DORNAN. I'll keep that in mind.

What is the significance of all the NSA intercepts related to the battle up on the plateau, the mesa of Lima Site 85? What is the significance of all the NSA intercepts related to the battle up on the plateau, the mesa of Lima Site 85? I was at the Intercontinental Siam Hotel during the war, looking for targets of opportunity as a journalist, but also a loyal Reserve Air Force officer. I found some Iraqi pilots. They clammed up after a while when their wives came over, because they thought I was some left wing journalist touching on sensitive material. But they were trying to unwind and had a few drinks, and they told me about Site Lima 85. They said this was one of the most incredible stories of the war, being bombed by Antonov 2 colt aircraft and this cliff-scaling operation by the Soviets. I do not like the DPMO analysis of it, I'll tell you quite frankly.

But what is the significance of all the NSA intercepts related to the battle up on the plateau, the mesa of Lima Site 85?

Mr. VEITH. Well, in terms of the actual battle, there's not much. There are some intercepts after the war. There is a message I found that refers to 27 or 30 total messages from the actual war-time period.

What I believe is more important is the post-war intercepts from June 1977, that I found in the Library of Congress, that clearly state the Lao sent what they called Company 18, which is actually a unit stationed in the area, a dissident Mong battalion, sent them up to Lima Site 85 to recover the remains of Americans up there.

Now, this was known to the U.S. intelligence community as soon as it happened. I have the documents that show it. But Ann Holland never saw it until I happened to show it to her, when I faxed it to her several days before it all came out.

Mr. DORNAN. She testified in June?

Mr. VEITH. Yes, sir. So we have known, since 1977, that the Lao sent the unit stationed in the area up on top of Phou Pha Thi, or at least in that general area, to begin recovering remains in that area, and to send them to what they call Office 208 in that province.

Now, I guess the obvious question to ask is, has our Government gone to the Lao and said we know that you were up there, for whatever technical intelligence reasons. Give us the remains back if you happen to—

Mr. DORNAN. Probably not. I may come back to that for a second.

In July, 1972, was NSA convinced—and again, this has already been discussed—that the 10 Americans executed in Quang Tri Province was a real event that was about to happen? Did NSA think it was a real event?

Mr. VEITH. NSA, according to Mr. Mooney, was absolutely convinced that this was an authentic message, based upon one of the reasons I gave you, in terms of the Z priority in the upper left hand corner. That's a flash priority. There is no cancellation message in the Library of Congress files, nor, according to Mr. Mooney, was there ever one issued. It also appeared the next day in the NSA daily southeast Asian summary, which only gets the top materials.

Now, this is very easy for us to figure out whether this actually happened or not. Release the whole contents of the message. Do a search of the NSA database for the Vietnamese officer who signed the message.

I made some recommendations to DPMO a while back. I don't know if they've ever acted on them or not.

Mr. DORNAN. If that execution actually took place, what significance would that have today, in terms of evaluating current—

Mr. VEITH. The significance is that the people at DIA at the time and Mr. Mooney thought that it pertained to, actually happened to be a AC-130 that had gone down several months before—and I believe the crew member that Mr. Mooney specifically remembers was a guy named Mark Danielson, whose family lives in Colorado, and whose remains were excavated out of the site in one of those handful of bone fragment type things and we mass bury everybody.

Mr. DORNAN. So there is still information we can extract.

Here is something I wanted to add to the Lima Site 85 at Phou Pha Thi Mountain in Laos. The Vietnamese and the Laotian Communists claim there were no records of this attack, one of the more brilliant tactical moves of the war, and are therefore unable to provide us with any information about 11 American servicemen assigned to this top secret Loran facility, sending in F-105's. We have already found a presumptive finding of death.

Do you believe DPMO should just accept the assessment, that they kept no records of a glorious attack like this?

Mr. VEITH. Personally, no. I think it is really strange credibility to accept that PAVN forces sent an entire sapper team all the way

into Laos to destroy a very important American base, have those guys come back—

Mr. DORNAN. They had tried to destroy it for 2 or 3 years.

Mr. VEITH. Yes, 2 or 3 months. And then have the guy come back and say, "Hey, I did it. Job well done. Thanks a lot, Lieutenant."

Mr. DORNAN. This guy is now a lieutenant colonel, Truong Muc.

Mr. BELL. I think another point, too, Mr. Chairman, regarding Mr. Truong Muc, who turned out to be the only available witness, this had to be a very unique or special attack during his career.

Mr. DORNAN. The peak of his career.

Mr. BELL. With AN Soviet aircraft involved, across an international boundary, with PAVN sappers involved and so forth. And not only did he claim there were never any records made, he also claimed that he could not remember even one name of an individual who participated in the attack with him. I think that's preposterous.

Mr. DORNAN. It is preposterous, but the "30 pieces of silver" continue to flow to Hanoi.

Mr. VEITH. If I could just add one more piece to that, his team left a month before the attack. That means he had to go from his location, travel down to the Phou Pha Thi area. He had to be fed, at least kept somewhere. They had to move supplies to his unit at a relatively constant rate.

Who did that? Who were the people behind it and why haven't they been identified? Why has no one tried to interview those people? I mean, somebody has to do a logistics trail of this operation.

Mr. DORNAN. As Mr. Bell said, it's preposterous.

Here is a final general question and then I will turn it back over to Mr. Pickett. This is to both of you. This is kind of the bottomline question.

Do you believe that the Vietnamese Politburo and the Central Committee, which is a separate entity as far as keeping fanatically detailed records, as you put it, Mr. Bell, do you believe the Politburo and the Central Committee documents that they have not given us contain information relevant to our American POW's?

Mr. VEITH. I believe that's a good question to ask for the next panel, why we have not asked for any Communist Party documents, which is what those represent.

Mr. BELL. I just wanted to say one thing, Congressman. The reason, as Mr. Veith pointed out, that our Government hasn't asked for any Communist Party document is we've had documents before where they say kill this man, shoot him—hang him but don't shoot him, so they won't be able to find the bullet in the body and so forth.

But the main thing is, our Government has not asked for any records from the Communist Party. The Military Affairs Committee, the Central Committee, any time you're involved with clandestine or sensitive operations, that's where these records would be, and especially in cases where Americans were executed.

The reason our Government has not asked for these records is because they know in advance that the Vietnamese are going to say no. That would give cause for everyone to say they're not cooperating fully, which we know they're not anyway.

Mr. DORNAN. Here is a document—and I'll end on this—from June 19, 1996. It was submitted to Kent Weideman, on our Subcommittee on Military Personnel. It has questions and then it has answers. And here's one of the questions.

"Have you personally asked the Vietnamese Government, or the Central Committee or Politburo, for records from the war? If you have, what is their response?"

And here's the answer that he is supposed to give, kind of this rehearsed thing you talked about that ended up costing you your job.

"We have asked the Vietnamese for all records and documents. I have made this request personally as a member of Presidential delegations. We have also mentioned our special interest in Central Committee or Politburo documents. While Vietnam has provided no Central Committee or Politburo documents to date, we have no evidence, from Russia or any other quarter, that the kind of case-specific information that would help us resolve POW/MIA cases was discussed at the Central Committee or the Politburo level."

It is the nature of bureaucratic hierarchies that specificity decreases as one ascends the chain of command. Not with POW's. Not with the KGB, not in Pyongyang, and not in Hanoi.

"The kind of detail we need * * *", this is the bureaucratic response, "is much more likely to be found in unit records." What crap. What a terrible analysis. "* * * and in documents prepared at lower echelons. These are among the types of records we have begun to receive from the Vietnamese document search teams. The Vietnamese have also located and made available a number of witnesses, some of them quite senior, enabling us to interview them directly regarding any relevant knowledge they might have."

This is to write the history, we're going to hear from the victorious lieutenant colonels who never won a battle, while we had air supremacy and sea supremacy, certainly superiority.

"As to how the Vietnamese respond to requests for Central Committee or Politburo documents, they reply by saying no information relevant to unaccounted for Americans is contained in these records."

Do you believe that that answer from the Vietnamese is an absolute lie, Jay?

Mr. VEITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you, Mr. Bell?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. We need a whole new team at DPMO, gentlemen. It is confrontational now. I'm very sorry.

Thank you very much. Any questions, Mr. Pickett?

Mr. PICKETT. I have no questions.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, gentlemen.

Would the third panel please come forward. Mr. J. Alan Liotta, Deputy Director, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office—action is not in the acronym; Mr. Robert J. Destatte, senior analyst, Research and Analysis Directorate; Mr. Norm Kass, Director, Joint Commission Support Directorate, which handles Russia; and Comdr. William G. Beck, U.S. Navy Reserves, Special Research, also under the JCSD. Please come forward.

They are accompanied by Mr. Danz Blasser, analyst, also of the JCSD; Mr. John McCreary, analyst. Then, because Carol Hrdlicka asked me to, I asked for the two interviewers of a former Soviet journalist, Ivan Loboda, regarding my friend, Col. David Hrdlicka. I see that would be Mr. Norm Kass, who is already coming forward, and in the row behind him will be Mr. Tony Litvinas, who is from a different branch of DPMO. He's an analyst with the Research and Analysis Directorate that Mr. Destatte heads.

Gentlemen, please take your seats.

[Panel sworn.]

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Liotta, have you testified anywhere on the Hill since that first meeting when you testified for me?

Mr. LIOTTA. No, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. OK. You said that was your baptism of fire.

Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. You said it wasn't so bad. Brace yourself. It might not be as nice today.

Mr. Liotta, I'm going to start with you. I understand you have a written statement and Mr. Destatte has a written statement.

Mr. LIOTTA. Only I will be presenting a written statement today, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. I just mentioned that it has gotten very confrontational now, because I think what your whole senior team, what General Wald calls the corporate board, should have had their tails in this room during the testimony of a two-star Czech defector, General Sejna, and Philip Corso, who is not nearly the human being described by some analysts at the Defense Department, and Mr. Douglass, who accompanied them.

You should have been in here for the testimony of Bill Bell, who I didn't know until today was eased out of his job because he testified truthfully and openly to a closed Senate Committee. And you should have heard what Mr. George J. Veith had to say. I learn more from these people outside the system than I ever do inside. I'm learning now how people are prepared with the "murder board", how to give canned answers from DPMO to questions.

I was asked by General Wald, a decent man, to supply you with questions that we were going to ask and with cases we're going to discuss. This chairman will never do that again. As a ranking minority member or chairman, I am never going to supply any questions to DPMO. I want everything to be "cold turkey" here. No preparations, no rehearsed canned answers. Candidness.

In one case we're dealing with a personal friend of mine, David Hrdlicka, and I'm sick of the nonsense. That's why I wanted Tony Litvinas to come here, too, since he and Mr. Kass went over and interviewed the surviving journalist, Ivan Loboda. The other one has died.

Please start, Mr. Liotta, with your prepared statement.

Mr. LIOTTA. Before I begin, I would just say I'm a little confused, Mr. Chairman. I'm not sure to what you're referring in preparation of canned responses. That's not what we do at DPMO, and every person that comes to testify before you is sworn in and is prepared to speak the facts as they know them, and to provide truthful answers to your committees.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Liotta, you may be new to the system. When did you come on board?

Mr. LIOTTA. I came on board as Deputy Director 1 year ago.

Mr. DORNAN. Then you wouldn't have been there during the period that was discussed, during the Senate Committee hearings, when people were given questions they were going to be asked, sent them over not out of courtesy but what I charge was collusion, with this Frances Weinig, who is now making blood money in Hanoi, who was chief of staff of the committee. And then the written responses were given, and people were told, "You don't have to slavishly memorize this, but here's the answers you're supposed to give." And when Mr. Bell did not give those answers, his work was on a termination path after that.

Mr. LIOTTA. You're correct, Mr. Chairman, that was before I came on board and, in fact, before our office was even established. But that's not the way we do business today. We try very hard to answer accurately and faithfully all the questions which you put forward to us, either in written form or through phone calls, or through committee testimony.

Mr. DORNAN. I'm happy to hear it. Please proceed.

STATEMENTS OF J. ALAN LIOTTA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE POW/MIA OFFICE [DPMO]; ACCOMPANIED BY NORM KASS, DIRECTOR, JOINT COMMISSION SUPPORT DIRECTORATE; ROBERT J. DESTATTE, SENIOR ANALYST, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE; COMDR. WILLIAM G. BECK, USNR, SPECIAL RESEARCH, JOINT COMMISSION SUPPORT DIRECTORATE; AND ANTHONY LITVINAS, ANALYST, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

Mr. LIOTTA. Good afternoon. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of your committee for this opportunity to brief you on events that have transpired since I last testified here in June regarding our efforts to account for American servicemen lost in North Korea.

On November 1, 1950, near the North Korean village of Unsan, elements of the U.S. Army Eighth Cavalry Regiment were making their last stands against an onslaught which had surprised and initially thrown back the U.N. command along the entire Korean front. In a lone foxhole, one cavalry trooper, like his forebears under Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn almost 120 years ago, went down fighting. But neither his surviving comrades or family ever knew what happened to him. He was reported missing and presumptively declared dead on December 31, 1953.

On July 30, 1996, the team of 10 American Department of Defense remains recovery experts returned from the first ever joint United States-North Korean recovery operation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This unprecedented event was the result of long years of frustrating but ultimately successful negotiations with North Korea on the POW/MIA issue.

The team recovered remains which have been confirmed as those of the previously mentioned trooper who was killed in action in North Korea in November 1950. Those remains are now going through the final steps of the identification process and contact is being reestablished with his next of kin so that we can provide

them these remains for burial with honor. Our team for the second joint recovery operation is scheduled to deploy into North Korea later this month.

Since I last testified, our researchers have been to the Eisenhower Library archives, where much of the government-level information on the Korean war period and the period immediately after was located. They brought back approximately 1,800 pages of unclassified documents, copies of which have been forwarded to the Congress, and the classified documents, approximately 900 in number, are now being reviewed for declassification and are still being reviewed for their analytic use.

What we are learning from this research and our ongoing review of almost 30,000 pages of documents previously collected from the National Archives is helping us to resolve many of the apparent inaccuracies of the past and develop a much more accurate accounting effort.

The Defense POW/MIA Office is also working closely with the services and the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory to formally launch a Korean war family outreach program. The purpose of this program is to restore contact with most of the over 100 families concerned, obtain DNA samples from the appropriate family members, and create a DNA reference data base. This will provide us a base to which we can compare samples from recovered remains, offering a much greater chance at making successful identifications.

This program also looks to the future by securing samples now so that even if the maternal line of the serviceman has ceased, the identification tool can be used whenever the serviceman's remains are recovered.

Our investigation of unresolved reports of live Americans living in North Korea continues unabated. As I testified previously, one of the first initiatives launched by our Korea research analysis cell was to follow up on the series of reports, mostly hearsay, of alleged American POW's received prior to 1992. As a result of this effort, other reports surfaced, some new, others repeating earlier claims. We are currently using all available resources to help us substantiate these reports.

For example, the information originally obtained from North Korean defectors was due to our tasking of the intelligence system. Our office coordinates such taskings with all levels of the intelligence community. We also act through the State Department to contact foreign governments.

In addition, we continue to aggressively canvas the former POW community for information that will help us learn what happened to their comrades. In July, for example, we interviewed over 110 former POW's at the Korean War Ex-POW Association annual reunion in Chicago, gathering information on over 200 unaccounted for cases.

The Department of Defense is determined not to let the daunting challenges facing us deter our efforts to succeed. As American military experts prepare to deploy into North Korea this month to begin the second joint recovery operation, they do so in a concerted effort to remember and respect the brave servicemen for whom they are searching and working to bring home after so many years.

But as I hope this brief testimony illustrates, they represent only the most visible part of the most thorough effort since the end of the war to account for our missing American servicemen and, if possible, to bring them home. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Liotta.

Mr. Liotta, could I ask you one question. It is not pejorative. I understand you were hired as an administrator with a good reputation at the CIA. I just wanted to ask what your professional background qualifications are in the analyst field, if any.

Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir. I received an undergraduate degree from Wittenburg University in Springfield, OH. At that time, I was selected as 1 of 25 students selected nationally in a competition to go to the People's Republic of China and study at Beijing University in the first annual exchange program after normalization of relations with China.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you speak Mandarin Chinese?

Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Excellent.

Mr. LIOTTA. After I returned from that, I graduated from Wittenburg and I earned a master's degree from George Washington University in national security politics and Asian studies at the Sino-Soviet Institute in the School of Public and International Affairs.

After that, I came on board with the CIA in the Directorate of Intelligence. I was an analyst there for 12 years, an analyst and a manager, serving as the principal analyst on China and manager on China and also all of Asia except for Japan. I did all of South-east Asia and also Korea.

Mr. DORNAN. But a principal emphasis on China.

Mr. LIOTTA. Initially on China. I was hired for my China expertise, yes.

Mr. DORNAN. That is a great background. Can I just ask you a question about your birth, only because I am thinking of Dave Hrdlicka in 1965, May of 1965. When were you born?

Mr. LIOTTA. October 9, 1959.

Mr. DORNAN. Fifty-nine, so you were 6 years old when Dave was shot down.

Mr. Destatte, do you have a written statement, sir?

Mr. DESTATTE. No, sir, but I am prepared to answer questions.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you have a written statement, Mr. Kass?

Mr. KASS. No, sir. I am prepared to answer your questions.

Mr. DORNAN. And Commander Beck, do you have a written statement?

Mr. BECK. No, sir. I do not have a written statement but I am prepared to answer your questions.

Mr. DORNAN. Let us just dig right into the tough stuff here. Since I had you join the first panel—your colleagues may not know this, Mr. Beck, because I wanted your analysis of something we had seen here, I would like to turn that tape recorder sideways, if we have a jet pilot or a technician that can do it.

We have the tape from General Kalugin and the interview with a courageous young wife and mother, Deborah Robertson, who, when she got into her thirties, decided it was time to find out what happened to her dad and she was hurt badly by a disinformation

program, by cowardly thieves in the Phnom Penh area, go into the library and taking a book out of four Soviet farmers with the moustaches in the Caucasus and portraying them as American POW's, and she bought that, unfortunately, from alpha to omega.

Congressman David Drier was involved with the family because some of them live in his district and I warned him this would happen. It so burned him, he lost interest in this issue, even though he had been to Hanoi with me in 1985.

Tragically, Deborah was hit with the flu and died as a young mother in her 30's, and it is a tragedy, but you see her on her own, under her own initiative, interviewing Gen. Oleg Kalugin and it is a fascinating piece of tape. Is it ready to go?

Mr. BECK. Congressman?

Mr. DORNAN. Yes?

Mr. BECK. I would like to amend my last statement. I do not have a written statement to make, but after this is over, I would like to make a verbal statement, if I could.

Mr. DORNAN. Certainly. I have questions for all of you.

First of all, I want to ask a very tough one. Commander Beck, are you being eased out of DPMO? Are you being fired, cashiered, dumped, taken off active duty?

Mr. BECK. Mr. Kass, who is sitting here next to me, is—

Mr. DORNAN. He is your immediate supervisor?

Mr. BECK. He is my immediate supervisor. He asked me to come back for 2 years, if I would do it. I volunteered yes, and I am not coming back.

Mr. DORNAN. Wait a minute. Your supervisor, who is head of—

Mr. BECK. The Joint Commission Support Directorate.

Mr. DORNAN. The Joint Commission Support Directorate asked you if you would stay on active duty for two more years. You are a commercial artist. There are other things you could do—

Mr. BECK. Absolutely.

Mr. DORNAN. And more money to be made in the outside world. But you are not being picked up. Some reservists are, but you are not?

Mr. BECK. As far as I know, none of us that work for Mr. Kass are being brought back in his directorate here at the headquarters level. That is seven of us, about 40 percent of his staff.

Mr. DORNAN. Wow. Then let me start with Mr. Kass, and I will build up at the end to your interview in Israel, Mr. Kass. Please describe your professional background qualifications and your job position with DPMO and—I wonder why they did not use the acronym, DPMAO, to get that word "action" in there, which I saw for the first time today. Could you please give your background and your background, how long you have been head of the Joint Commission Support Directorate?

Mr. KASS. I would be glad to. I have been around since 1945, not 1959, so I am afraid my bio is a bit longer than Mr. Liotta's. I have experience in the Army. I served in Vietnam as a military intelligence officer. I served in Utrang, Vietnam, in 1970-71.

My background, I have two master's degrees in international affairs from Columbia University and a degree in Slavic linguistics from the University of Pennsylvania. I have been with the Department of Defense for the past 13 years. I worked issues related to

the transfer of sensitive dual use technology to the Soviet bloc for 8 years. I am sure you know the names, Richard Pearl. We were directly involved in representing DOD's concerns on dual use—

Mr. DORNAN. Do you speak Russian, Mr. Kass?

Mr. KASS. Yes, I do, sir. And for the past 4-plus years, I have been with the Defense POW/MIA Office and its predecessor group within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Commission Support Directorate has been in operation as that entity for the past 2 years and I have been its head during that period.

I am also—I wear a second hat as the executive secretary of the United States-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA's, which followed from the Senate Select Committee hearings, was established in March of 1992.

Mr. DORNAN. So you have worked with Ambassador Malcolm Toone and Congressmen Sam Johnson and Pete Peterson?

Mr. KASS. Yes, sir. That is correct, among others.

Mr. DORNAN. How many trips have you gone to the Soviet Union with them? Not all of your trips funded as Directorate, but how many with the two Congressmen?

Mr. KASS. I have been on at least a dozen trips with the Commission and I have been on a number of other trips in connection with specific investigations, apart from the Commission.

Mr. DORNAN. Another excellent background. I know Mr. Destatte's background, 20 years active duty and analyst for years after that, and also a Vietnamese language speaker. We will get to yours in a minute, Mr. Beck.

You and Mr. Beck were in the room, I believe, all day long, since 12 noon, right? So you saw the Kalugin tape?

Mr. BECK. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. So I do not have to run the tape for you, but I want to run it for Mr. Liotta and Mr. Destatte. What is your impression, as we are waiting for the tape to come back, what was your impression of the Kalugin tape? What was the first time you saw it? In other words, when did you first see it, because I have a feeling this tape was at DPMO for several years, maybe, a couple of years since the young Mrs. Robertson, Debbie Robertson conducted this civilian family member interview of a top KGB general, but yet it was never shown to you or anybody in the JCSD. What did you think of the tape?

Mr. BECK. I thought it was very interesting. As I mentioned earlier on, with my background in the clandestine service, I look at things a little differently than the usual analyst. I look at it from a covert operator. There are a lot of things that General Kalugin was saying in that brief tape that I found amazing. There are some nuances that I think were very interesting and there might have even been one statement there that was a defensive mechanism, that if you could talk to him in private sometime and ever get him to tell the truth—now, I know we have talked to him before, but I found that to be one of the most revealing comments I have ever heard him make.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Kass, could you give us your impression?

Mr. KASS. We spoke with Oleg Kalugin in Moscow—

Mr. DORNAN. You personally?

Mr. KASS. Not I personally. People from our office in Moscow—the group was then called Task Force Russia—spoke with Kalugin in Moscow, who provided us snippets of information on the POW question, none of which ever allowed us to follow lead through to conclusion. The information that he shares with you here on the tape is information that I personally was not aware of. The tape itself, I viewed for the first time perhaps 2 weeks ago and the references he makes to what the Vietnamese asked of the Soviets for advice or the transfer of Americans into the Soviet Union from Korea is not information I knew of from Kalugin until I saw that tape.

Mr. DORNAN. Did it shock you?

Mr. KASS. It did not shock me, no, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Why not?

Mr. KASS. Because I believe, as a number of us do, that the question of transfers from the Soviet Union or into the Soviet Union from their theaters of military operation is a very much unresolved one. None of us dealing with it directly, I think, would find it unusual to hear comments like that.

Mr. DORNAN. Other defectors say that Mr. Kalugin has about 100 times more information than what he has divulged so far but that he hopes to get back into the political system in his country, and certainly they need intelligent leaders and people who have mastered English as he has, but there are probably others like Ugenich Permikov who would just as soon he fell into circumstances terminating his life.

Describe, Mr. Kass, the kind of support that you get from the rest of DPMO in general for your particular JCSD. It is a tough question, but we are all under oath here.

Mr. KASS. We have found that within the work we do within JCSD, there are some distinctive features of our operation that are not reflected in some of the other activities of the office overall. Our program consists of people in Moscow who go out in an operational or an investigative environment, together with Russian counterparts, to try to get information from the people who have become known to us through ads that we placed, through word of mouth, et cetera. That makes this a bit different from what goes on elsewhere in the organization. I think it is fair to say we are the only ones with an operational or an investigative focus that involves field support within the organization.

Many of the people within DPMO have a background in the POW issue which focuses on Southeast Asia. Geographically, our focus is broader than that, because the areas that we look at in support of the United States-Russia Joint Commission encompass not only the war in Southeast Asia but the losses during the cold war period, during the Korean war and World War II. So both in terms of time and in terms of geography, we are broader. We have a wider mandate, let us say, than other functions in the office.

As far as actual support goes, I can tell you that I personally am not—I would not say that I was pleased with the speed at which it took to get the personnel that we need to do the job in place supporting our work. We have had to rely very heavily on reservists and what that has meant is a great deal of time lost in trying to

get the respective services to support our program with qualified people.

Mr. DORNAN. And you still have 11 slots unfilled? Maybe I should ask Mr. Liotta that. You are allocated 100 slots and you have 89 filled?

Mr. KASS. Right now, our directorate has a total of 17 or 18 authorized positions—

Mr. DORNAN. Within the 89 at DPMO?

Mr. KASS. Yes, sir, and that includes the number of people we have in the office in Moscow. At the moment, of those 17 or 18, we have all but three positions filled.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you have reservists in Moscow now?

Mr. KASS. We have two reservists in Moscow, someone from the Army Language School in Garmish and a civilian employee who directs the operation there, a total of four people.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you ever felt—this is a tough question—have you ever felt blindsided at DPMO, that you are not getting all the information or support you need when you have been trying to work initiatives?

Mr. KASS. I believe that the work within the office overall in terms of coordination can always be improved and I think that more, much more, in fact, should be done to make sure that what we are doing is consistent with what else is going on.

Mr. DORNAN. Did you know, and I do not know how you would know this, but did you know, over my 20-year career here, I have tried to always enlarge the size and the financial resources of whatever entity was doing what DPMO does now?

Mr. KASS. I am aware of your efforts.

Mr. DORNAN. I am going to give you the chance of a lifetime. What is wrong with DPMO, in your viewpoint? Why is there this hostility with the families and what do you think needs to be done to improve its effectiveness? I asked General Wald to read the Mike Peck resignation letter. I asked him to read the Clapper-initiated, three-star General Clapper-initiated studies. I asked him to analyze where this expression, the mindset to debunk came from, and since debunking is discrediting bunk or lives or bunko, I have changed it to a predisposition to discredit and dismiss. The more I get involved, the more confrontational it becomes between this chairman and what DPMO is doing.

So please, Mr. Kass, tell me, what could be done to improve DPMO besides more money and more slots? Let us say we have a budgetary freeze. You are not going to get any more dollars. You have travel money available. You are not going to get any more than the 89. Say we take away the 11 unfilled slots. What are your recommendations to make DPMO exercise more Sherlock Holmes imagination, less talk about, well, that is hearsay, forget it, and more aggressive investigating, considering that you sat through General Sejna, Joe Douglass, Phil Corso, and these men are not unreliable, senile people just blabbering on.

You heard Colonel Corso and Sejna say they would take sodium pentothal in addition to the polygraph test that General Sejna has already passed without deception, according to General Clapper. Please answer. What can we do to improve DPMO?

Mr. KASS. First of all, I do not think improvement is necessarily measured in terms of additional dollars. I think the approach that needs to be taken is one of insisting on an aggressive approach with maximum openness to the families and to the people we serve. Obviously, there are areas that we deal with, there are ongoing investigations that are sensitive. We cannot come out immediately and share everything with the public as we might like. But to the maximum extent that that can be done, we should endeavor to do it.

As far as approach, people we bring onboard, I think the approach of the directorate and the office needs to be one which emphasizes the fact that there are many open, unresolved issues that we do not have answers for and that the approach should be not that we know the outcomes or have written the final line but that we are looking in new ways. We are reexamining positions taken before to see if we could perhaps move things along and bring them to resolution.

Mr. DORNAN. Could you name a couple of issues?

Mr. KASS. From what I observed and heard the first part of the afternoon, a great deal of discussion, both by General Sejna and Colonel Corso concerned what they knew about the transfer of Americans into the Soviet Union. In the case of Corso, it was primarily Korea. In the case of General Sejna, it was both Korea and Vietnam.

We have grappled with the question of transfers during those conflicts for the entire period that I have been in this office. We had struggled with trying to get cooperation from the Russians and access to archives and written documentation over there, and frankly, it has not been a cakewalk to try to get documents on this side of the pond in terms of the holdings within the various archives of the United States Government.

Mr. DORNAN. For example, NSA?

Mr. KASS. NSA has been extremely useful and informative with regard to 10 cold-war-loss incidents that we have examined in the office and through the Joint Commission. We stumbled, literally stumbled upon that information and that basically became the backbone of our investigation.

With regard to other things that NSA may have, frankly, I do not have at this point an assessment of what is there. Much of that material has been untapped.

Mr. DORNAN. Please give me a vague answer to this, since we are in open session, but are unconventional means needed, do you think, to pursue some of these cases?

Mr. KASS. I think it is a mistake to put all of our faith and trust in what is going to come out of the work that we do in this partnership through the Joint Commission. I do believe that we need to complement what we are doing with the Russians with an aggressive program over here that goes after documentary evidence and that tries to locate individuals who could provide us additional clues. If that is called an unconventional program or not, I defer on that. I just believe it has to be implemented if we are going to make a good-faith effort to do our work.

Mr. DORNAN. Not being a trained analyst but having been an intelligence officer at the user level, at the squadron level in the Air

Force and having common sense and, from what tests showed me in my youth, a high IQ, I asked certain obvious questions of General Sejna and he said he would be willing to do them and they involved unconventional means to identify targets of opportunity to get to the bottom of this.

Congressman Ron Lewis of Kentucky said that it was earth-shaking, what he heard here today. You heard most of it. Did you find anything in today's testimony that, as a trained analyst, you were jolted by, that you just wanted to reject out of hand? Let us start with Colonel Corso on Korea, hundreds of wounded men or mentally disturbed men held behind within 10 miles of Panmunjom, never to see the light of freedom again. Anything that he said that you said, "Well, that cannot be," to yourself?

Mr. KASS. I had the pleasure of listening to the testimony back in 1991-92 and I am aware of some of the comments. I heard Colonel Corso at that time in open testimony. I do not know that anyone has a definitive answer on numbers, how many were held where or, from our particular vantage point, how many were taken into the Soviet Union. I do believe that I certainly have come to the conclusion that this is an area where there may very well have been a transfer of Americans.

Mr. DORNAN. I wish Mr. Liotta and Mr. Destatte were here. At your next corporate board meeting, please pass on to them—hopefully, you will read the testimony—it is stunning. It is mind blowing. He sat right here in front of me, where Mr. Kass is seated now, and said he personally saw dazed, confused young Americans being led around like sheep in Prague on their way to the Soviet Union, to break the trail from Vietnam to the Soviet Union. That was General Sejna.

Was there anything that General Sejna said, other than its shocking nature, that you had not learned from the temporary Senate committee that closed its doors in December 1992?

Mr. KASS. General Sejna, when he explained to you how the selection was made among the various groups for testing, presented remarks or insights that track very closely with information we obtained from other sources which talked, for example, about a program to differentiate enlisted from officer ranks, to separate out African-Americans from whites, educated from less so. These are practices that we have come across in other writings and I consider those sorts of observations for that reason to be very credible.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you, in your background reading, studied the infamous demonic Unit 731 in Harbin, Manchuria, how they separated by race?

Mr. KASS. No, sir, not that particular one.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Kass, will you do me a favor? There is a book over at the Library of Congress called Unit 731. I would recommend all of you get it and read it as we try to pursue the truth on this.

I would also recommend what I said in the past session, that any young officer, any young captain, major, or lieutenant colonel, lieutenant senior grade, anybody who comes to your unit, you should ask them to read this book, POW 1976. I do not know how anybody can work at DPMO without reading this book and using it as a bible.

I did some research on the list of the 591 returned and found that at least two people were known alive, and this would have been before the 1968 escape of Nikro in the South, but two people, Thompson and Alvarez, were in captivity in 1964. In 1965, 62 more were added plus Frederick, who died of cholera at Dogpatch on the Chinese border and Ron Storts, who was a particularly effective patriot in their face, resisting being used. So that would be 64, plus the two, 66, in 1965, and then 86 more were added on the returnee list that were shot down in 1966, including two more, Norm Schmidts, who disappeared in the system, and James J. Connell, who was a very effective resistor until the Cubans and others broke him.

So, as of New Year's Eve in 1966, when the aforementioned evil war criminal Robert McNamara was convinced that we could no longer win the war but was grinding up better men than he in that meat grinder. We had 154 that we knew of in captivity in the North and God knows how many in the South. After doing all that research, I find a notation in the book that says, by March 1967, when LBJ started his erratic and near-criminal bombing pauses, we had 178 POW's.

Now, I find one problem with General Sejna's testimony and it is the arithmetic, the numbers. If people were coming through Prague on their way to the Soviet Union at the numbers he says in the early 1960's, way before we had the two in 1964, the 62 in 1965, and the 86 added in 1966, plus the four, 154, the numbers are stunning unless they were drawing people from the secret war in Laos, and I have tried to read as many books as I could on the so-called secret war in Laos under run with the Commander in Chief, a civilian ambassador, first in the serious part of the fighting, Sullivan, Ambassador Sullivan, and then Gene McMurtry Godley, who I visited with in his home in 1971.

But even there, it seems to me that we would find the documents of how many people were captured in that effort, civilian and military, to try and reconcile it with the numbers that General Sejna gave us. So, I would hope that you would please look at that, since that is under your Russian field of study with your Joint Commission.

Could you describe—wait a minute. Let me just come back to this. So there is nothing in today's testimony that you take immediate exception to with Mr. Veith or Bill Bell or the first panel?

Mr. KASS. I cannot address Mr. Bell's testimony because I am frankly not familiar with the program that was run in Hanoi.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you heard folklore, though, about how we were in their government buildings, they were bugged, they installed our telephones, they installed our facsimile equipment, they listened in on everything, they manipulated us, manipulated the whole operation? Have you not heard folklore about that in Vietnam?

Mr. KASS. I have heard folklore about it and it tracks what goes on in the Soviet Union, as well.

Mr. DORNAN. Exactly. On the Hrdlicka Loboda interview—is Loboda still alive?

Mr. KASS. Yes. Loboda is alive.

Mr. DORNAN. The other journalist that was there with him has died, right?

Mr. KASS. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. But Carol Hrdlicka, his wife, the journalist who has died wrote to Carol Hrdlicka?

Mr. KASS. The widow wrote to Carol Hrdlicka. The gentleman's name is Schedwin, by the way, the one who passed away.

Mr. DORNAN. Schedwin, that is right. Tony Litvinas, would you raise your hand?

Mr. LITVINAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Tony. I just wanted to identify you. The two of you went over there. You do not have to come to the table yet, but you might, Tony, if you want to add anything. If you are burning to add something, maybe your boss can—or you, because you are from two different directorates there. You are from research and—

Mr. LITVINAS. The same mission, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. The same mission, though. Do you believe when Mr. Loboda told you, and I am getting this from Carol Hrdlicka, I used to tease then-Captain Hrdlicka about his high cheekbones that in his family tree were Mongol invaders. Probably were if you look at Slavic people, Polish people, and Dave was 100 percent Polish, I believe, Polish American. Was it Mr. Loboda or the deceased journalist who said he remembered thinking that Colonel Hrdlicka had Slavic features?

Mr. KASS. He told us in Jerusalem when we interviewed him that what stood out in his recollection of the person he saw in 1969 were the Slavic features of the face.

Mr. DORNAN. When you two gentlemen were coming back, long flights coming home, did you rehash some of this, of what you had heard, this testimony you had taken in the holy city of Jerusalem?

Mr. KASS. Yes. We did talk about it some.

Mr. DORNAN. DPMO at that point had decided, kind of corporately, I guess, that Hrdlicka was already dead, so these two Soviet journalists had seen someone else. Am I correct on that?

Mr. KASS. Do you want to answer that?

Mr. DORNAN. Tony, maybe you had better come up here, or just lean forward.

Mr. LITVINAS. I really cannot speak to that, but if I can just offer, by way of background—

Mr. DORNAN. Please.

Mr. LITVINAS. I have been in the organization for a year and the reason I went on the trip is, by way of history, I have spent, growing up in Southeast Asia—

Mr. DORNAN. Missionary parents or something?

Mr. LITVINAS. No, foreign aid, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Foreign aid?

Mr. LITVINAS. I spent 1964 and 1965 in Saigon—

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, you meant growing up professionally?

Mr. LITVINAS. No; with the family. I spent about 10 years on and off in Laos, from 1965 through 1975. One of the initial reports from Mr. Loboda was the description of Vihn Chen in 1969, and frankly, I know about every street in that city, and so from my own personal familiarity, I went along.

Professionally, I am a retired Army officer, foreign area officer in military—

Mr. DORNAN. I have been there four times and visited with Sotpetrosi in that little house in the middle of town. I have banged on the door there of the Soviet Embassy, the Chinese Embassy, which was off by itself by that little stream, and Mr. Sotpetrosi, in the presence of four POW wives, told me in January of 1970—Clinton was returning from his triumphant trip through Scandinavia, Leningrad, Moscow, and Prague—we were arrested at the airport, came through India, Vietnam, Cambodia, and went up to Vihn Chen and Mr. Sotpetrosi told me—told the wives, I was sitting there—that we have 10's of 10's of prisoners, and I stopped, because I was a journalist. I said, "Tens of tens is 100." "Yes. We have about 100," he said. That would jive with the 300 that were missing by that time, roughly.

So I know Vihn Chen, that people would have no concept in America today of the international flavor of this little dirt street town with its big triumphal Arch de Triumph, smaller scale, but the cosmopolitan atmosphere there, the Cuban cigars at the long-gone hotel. The whole scene there was something right out of "Terry and the Pirates". So I understand what you mean when you say you know every street.

Mr. LITVINAS. Back to your question, I have no preconceived notions about what happened to Colonel Hrdlicka and I think—

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Loboda said he interviewed Hrdlicka in Vihn Chen?

Mr. LITVINAS. The initial report was that that is where he saw him, yes, sir. Subsequent to that, in our interview, he retracted that statement and on the third occasion he said that the interview took place in the outskirts of the city to our drive from the caves of the liberated zone. But there is also a third journalist that was on that trip and we just recently—Mr. Kass' folks in Moscow finally located him and interviewed him in Kiev and we just recently received the report of that interview.

Mr. DORNAN. Within the last few days?

Mr. LITVINAS. September 11, is the date of the report, yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Obviously, since this is my closest friend in the military, I have an interest.

Mr. LITVINAS. Yes, sir. I just—

Mr. DORNAN. Does it confirm or throw a cloud over the Loboda interview?

Mr. LITVINAS. There is conflicting views of what happened, yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. By location of interview or what?

Mr. LITVINAS. What happened, whether there was a prisoner there or no prisoner.

Mr. DORNAN. All right. We will take that up later.

Mr. LITVINAS. The point is, we have not gone forward yet with a finished assessment because we are still in the information gathering stage. We located a third journalist, a guy who is—

Mr. DORNAN. Right. That would take care of my next question, because I was going to say, If it was not then-Captain Hrdlicka, who was it, and when you came back, you ran a test, I assume, to see if there was anybody else from that timeframe who went down

in Laos with or without Slavic features who would have been interviewed, correct?

Mr. LITVINAS. Yes, sir. We ran it before we went.

Mr. DORNAN. Before you went? And you got it down to how many names, a handful?

Mr. LITVINAS. Sir, I would have to—yes, sir. A handful. I would have to go back and check—

Mr. DORNAN. If I could, I would like to come over to DPMO and talk to you about this just personally, off the record, because of my interest in Hrdlicka. Thanks, Tony.

Mr. Kass—

Mr. KASS. Yes, sir?

Mr. DORNAN. Could you describe, and here is where it gets tense, Commander Beck's role in your directorate, JCSD, and your evaluation of his skills and particularly his value to the POW/MIA investigations? If you asked him, as Commander Beck said, to stay on for 2 years, you must have felt you needed his services as a special assistant. First, his skills, and then his value to resolving POW/MIA investigations.

Mr. KASS. First, I should say that DPMO reached a decision at a recent meeting of the corporate board as to which reservists to invite to come back for renewed assignment and which to tell with this current assignment their responsibilities to DPMO would be over. There were a number of individuals in our directorate, in fact, a total of six, who were not asked to return because of the current personnel trends toward bringing on active duty personnel to replace the reservists.

Frankly, there is merit to that approach because reservists serve for a 6-month stint. Then they have to come off Reserve duty for a week or two before they are brought back. It creates a number of problems, this continuity for us.

Mr. DORNAN. The 179-day Bosnian problem that we were running into in operations over there.

Mr. KASS. Yes. I was very interested in the possibility of having Commander Beck stay with us in the program because of what I believe to be—did then and do now believe to be, his unique skills and the experience that he brings, which, frankly, we do not have certainly within our directorate and I think it fair to say within DPMO overall.

My idea was that we would, and I was unsuccessful in presenting this view, obviously, because the decision went against it, to allow Commander Beck to come on board for more than simply 6 months, for an extended period of whatever it is the Navy would have permitted so that he would have been able to be one of the people involved in investigative work to try to add that second dimension to compliment what we are doing with the Joint Commission and to launch some initiatives of our own within DPMO to tap into and explore individuals who may have information, documentation that we may not have been able to put our hands on until now or up to now. This was the intent, to really begin an initiative of our own within DPMO and I saw Commander Beck's role as being central to that.

Mr. DORNAN. And you passed that on to General Wald, as the commander?

Mr. KASS. I passed it on to the corporate board at the time that the review is done of the people who were to be invited to return.

Mr. DORNAN. I said earlier in open session and I will say it again, I hate this title "corporate board", because in a corporate board situation, a board of directors, it is like blackballing. A cynic who has no Sherlock Holmes abilities and no feel for this issue can blackball somebody who does. Do you think Chip Beck has Sherlock Holmes qualities, as opposed to a lawyer that would see everything in terms of hearsay, preparing to be Johnny Cochran in court?

Mr. KASS. I think Sherlock Holmes precedes the cold war, so I do not know if I would use that analogy, but I think that Chip Beck has the investigative skills and the savvy that I think could have helped the program enormously.

Mr. DORNAN. I want to ask you one more question here and then I want to go to Commander Beck. If you were given all the resources to investigate the really tough POW mysteries, and we heard some, again to quote Congressman Lewis, earthshaking statements here today about mysteries, do you think, as presently constituted, your group, the Joint Commission group, JCSD, do you think you have the resources and the talent, the background talent, to make any progress? And if your answer is in the negative, what is standing in your way? Can you make progress as constituted today?

Mr. KASS. The answer is in the negative, and as far as making progress, I would tell you that if you want to be aggressive and you want to go out and explore areas, areas we have not looked into so far, that obviously would require bringing on board the people with the resolve to do that. We have some capable people. However, as you know, personalities vary. Talents vary. You could be a very fine analyst. You can read and speak Russian very well. You may, even with that, not have the requisite skills to be out there as an investigator drumming up new leads.

Mr. DORNAN. I have already asked you if there was anything in today's testimony that you disagreed with. Let me ask Commander Beck that. Anything today, General Sejna, Mr. Douglass, Joe Douglass, Col. Philip Corso, or Jay Veith or Bill Bell, was anything said today that gave you a tilt, that, well, this cannot be. This is too outrageous. This is too heartbreaking.

Mr. BECK. No; it certainly did not. In fact, most of what I heard falls into the pattern that I think is perfectly logical when you look at the POW problem from what I consider to be a clandestine operation directed against us since World War II. The patterns are there, the deception.

When we spend a lot of time looking for bones and being archaeologists to the exclusion of the strategic importance of what happened to our men and how it was carried out against us, we lose a lot of, I think, the substance and the importance of what we should be doing.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me go up the chain of command. Let me start with you as a reservist but with, as your ribbons indicate, years and years of experience, and you and I have talked about your experience working against the Cubans on several continents, par-

ticularly in a lot of African nations. Let me go right up the chain of command here.

Do you believe that we left live Americans behind in Korea, from what you have heard today or from your own analysis before?

Mr. BECK. From my analysis, and this is my opinion, perhaps, I do not know that it is accepted by everybody in DPMO, but it is beyond just Korea. I have found documents that indicate that maybe 6,000 or 7,000 Americans could have been transferred to the Soviet gulag in World War II, and I think that is important because that is where the operations began, the operations to deceive us.

I have interviewed Colonel Corso down in Florida. I find him to be very credible.

Mr. DORNAN. You were sent down there by DPMO?

Mr. BECK. Correct; by Mr. Kass. I believe that whatever the number is, whether there are 200, 400, 900, or more, I believe in my heart that American POW's were transferred to the Soviet Union in Korea.

Mr. DORNAN. How about Vietnam?

Mr. BECK. In between Vietnam, in the cold war. I mean, you have to remember that we were not acknowledging some of the things we were doing to the Soviet Union during the cold war in terms of our penetration of their airspace. Therefore, they were not obligated to let us know or even acknowledge that they had some of our men that may have been captured alive. I do not know the details on those things. Those are questions that need not only to be asked but to be pursued.

In Vietnam, yes; I think some Americans were transferred to the Soviet Union. This is not classified because it was given to me freely at my house. As you mentioned earlier, Victor Blenko, the MiG pilot, is a very good friend of mine. Not too long ago, about a year ago, he brought along a friend who has not been out of that environment anywhere near as long.

Mr. DORNAN. Twenty years for Blenko this month, 1976.

Mr. BECK. Twenty years for Blenko and much, much less for this other person.

Mr. DORNAN. The 200th birthday party for the United States, he brought us a MiG-25.

Mr. BECK. Yes. But this other person was sitting in my house and we were talking about prisoners of war in Southeast Asia and I said, did GRU, the Soviet military intelligence for the KGB, ever have a program to exploit our POW's in Vietnam? He looked at me like I was nuts. He said, "Chip, of course we had it and we were successful." He said, "We were successful."

Mr. DORNAN. So your answer—

Mr. BECK. Yes, and he talked to somebody. He gave us a name of someone who had witnessed the transfer of approximately five or six—

Mr. DORNAN. Let me come back to that. I want to go up the chain of command here. Mr. Kass, by seniority, because Mr. Destatte is senior to you in tenure with DPMO. By the way, I am not going to refer to it as "dipmo" ever again. I do not know where I got that name, but I do not like the sound of dip. If you call it DPMO, I am going to call it DPMO.

Do you believe, before or after today, that we left Americans behind, wounded or otherwise, in Korea and then Vietnam?

Mr. KASS. I believe from a number of reports that we have so far not been able to substantiate, but a steady flow of information that there is a very strong possibility that there were Americans taken into the Soviet Union during the entire period following World War II.

Mr. DORNAN. All the way up through Vietnam?

Mr. KASS. All the way up through Vietnam.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Destatte, do you believe—you did not hear the testimony today, but I am sure you have read the earlier General Sejna reports and the Corso reports came across your desk, right, from Commander Beck. Who went down there, by the way, with you?

Mr. BECK. Captain Kevin Smith, U.S. Air Force.

Mr. DORNAN. Is he here today?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. BECK. Yes; he is.

Mr. DORNAN. I may ask him if he believes Colonel Corso was credible. Do you have an intelligence background, Captain Smith? [Mr. Smith nodded yes.]

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Destatte, do you believe or have you ever had a gut feeling that we left wounded Americans or otherwise, technicians, behind in Korea?

Mr. DESTATTE. Sir, I have not studied the Korean war in enough depth to even have an opinion on that. Some of my colleagues have made persuasive arguments.

Mr. DORNAN. That is a fair answer. How about Vietnam, given your experience in Hanoi, or even a handful in Laos? Let me make it Indochina.

Mr. DESTATTE. Well, it is difficult to give a brief answer to that.

Mr. DORNAN. I know.

Mr. DESTATTE. Over the years, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and later the Joint Task Force full accounting and in the field and the Defense Intelligence Agency's POW/MIA office and now the DPMO here have studied this issue very, very carefully and, as you know, they have gone through a case-by-case review more than once, both from an analytical point of view and field investigations in Vietnam, and you are familiar with some of the lists. But the most important of those lists, of course, is the, variously called the last-known-alive list, the discrepancy list, et cetera.

I feel that the analysts collectively did a good job in selecting the cases where there was some reasonable question about the fate of the individual. I do not recall the number precisely. I think it was 196 men were named on that list and we set about investigating those cases and some of those cases have been investigated several times. Today, we feel confident that we know the fate of all but approximately 50 of those men, and I really should rephrase that.

Those judgments have been subjected to a rigorous review and those judgments have been confirmed or affirmed in that review process. There are approximately 50 cases remaining and many of those cases, we are waiting on one last interview, finding one last

source. But if we look at those cases individually, we will find it. In most of those cases, reasonable men and women looking at the evidence of the case will agree that the person died.

So as you mentioned earlier, somehow you have to make the arithmetic work and the arithmetic does not work. My belief is that the information that we have available to us today tells us that we did not leave anybody behind in Vietnam at the end of the war. Now—

Mr. DORNAN. Let me help you with a few caveats there, and the exception may prove what you are saying, but we left Tucker Guggleman to be tortured to death in a Saigon jail in June of 1976.

Mr. DESTATTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. You are talking about—

Mr. DESTATTE. I am talking about the Americans who became missing during the conflict, during the years of conflict. Now, actually, there were 70 Americans who were stranded there or chose to remain there at the end of April 1975. Tucker Guggleman was one of those who was stranded there, and yes, he died in Chehwah Prison and we have talked to quite a number of people who have—including some Korean diplomats who were in that prison at the same time—who have given us fair accounts of what happened to Tucker Guggleman.

Mr. DORNAN. I am going to ask Mr. Liotta to go to General Wald at the request of this committee—I will do it open, right now—and investigate the B-52 pilot or crewman who was shot down in December 1972 during the noncarpet bombing, non-Christmas Day bombing from December 11 to December 29, minus Christmas Day, who said he saw somebody in a photograph that he thought was Glen Cobeil sitting catatonic on a bench in the corner of Heartbreak, because if that is true, then Cobeil and Connell and Ken Cameron were still alive in 1973. We know they were taken away from the annex that is a zoo in the spring of 1970. But if they were alive, then we left those three behind.

Now, you are well aware, Mr. Destatte, because of your combat record in that area, that—so please do that for me, Mr. Liotta. Ask General Wald. You can take it on as a task, if you choose.

I got it from what you gentlemen sent me, the whole packet on Glen Cobeil, pictures of him with his family. When I went back and cross-referenced the book "POW," the Vietnamese, to try and bring him out of his catatonic state, gave him pictures of that beautiful family, Patty, his son, Jeffrey, and his daughter, and the POW's pinned the pictures up on his wall and they said never once did any of his roommates who were force feeding him and sometimes hand feeding him ever see him look up at the pictures of his beautiful family.

One of the men who was tortured by the Cubans to make one of the broadcasts about the immoral imperialistic war, a Navy radar intercept officer, Larry Spencer, certainly was courageous in the way he hand fed and, more than any other prisoner, personally took care of every bodily need of Earl Cobeil during his worst moments.

But you know from your own experience in Indochina that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger kept bombing Laos from January 27, when Harley Hall was the last man shot down, his reel came

back from his F-4, that all the way through February, March, April, May, June, July, and August, we kept bombing the hell out of Laos while Kissinger expected them to send any prisoners they had through Hanoi, through the Hanoi prison system.

When Nixon got the 10 back in 1973, I had just turned 40 years of age and I was tracking this carefully, 8 trips to Vietnam, many to the CIL in Hawaii, I could not believe that Nixon had the gall, or staffers had the gall to misadvise him that all the prisoners were home from Laos. All? Well, 9 out of 10, except for Ernie Brace, who had been held for 3 weeks at Dien Bien Phu, at the prison there. They all were handed over within 24 hours, if not immediately captured by North Vietnamese. They were North Vietnam, Hanoi, or the six satellite camps, they were North Vietnamese prisoners. Translation: Nobody came home from Laos. Nobody came home from Laos.

I see former POW Mike Bengé is already nodding in affirmation. So I knew Nixon was making a historically outrageous and tragic statement. When you say that the arithmetic does not add up, you are talking about Vietnam, right, not Laos?

Mr. DESTATTE. Primarily about Vietnam. I can speak with less confidence about Vietnam, but—or, pardon me, about Laos. I wanted to close my statement by pointing out that we do not have all the answers. Certainly, in some of the cases, we could be less positive than others. But it is very difficult to summarize this in a short statement without—and I would be happy to give you something in writing later.

But when we look at what happened in the case of the Americans who did come home from Laos, and there were several Americans who were picked up—several dozen Americans who were captured in South Vietnam who moved through Laos to Hanoi, when we look at the amount of information that we collected over the course of the war, I think it was somewhere in the order of a quarter of a million prisoners, ralliers, refugees from Communist-controlled areas. We had millions of captured documents. We had hundreds of thousands of signal intercepts. We had a massive collection effort.

Mr. DORNAN. Excuse me 1 second, Mr. Destatte. You were not in the room here when Mr. Veith and Mr.—well, mainly Mr. Veith testified. There are boxes and boxes and boxes, reams of NSA intercepts that are superior to human intelligence that you have not seen.

Mr. DESTATTE. Sir, I was 1 of the 98 people who opened the signal intelligence collection effort in Vietnam. In 1961, I and two other gentlemen, a Vietnamese and an American, were sneaking around War Zone D, and I am sure you are familiar with War Zone D, looking for General Hwong's headquarters so we could do something so that our folks could introduce ourselves to him. This was in 1961. Yes, I am familiar with the signal collection effort in Vietnam. I was a part of it. I helped start it.

Mr. DORNAN. Then you know that there is a lot of that material that still sits up there at NSA, and we are going to try and crack that and get it down here. We will come back to you.

Let me ask Mr. Liotta, your background is principally China and one of the big revelations that just hit me recently as to why the

arithmetic did not add up on Parks, Cameron, Fisher, and Heller—Heller, I got to know as a commander at Williams Air Force Base—why these 4, 1 F-84 pilot and 3 Sabre jet pilots, why they were returned in June 1955 and why Maj. Jack Arnold's B-29 crew was returned in August of 1955, why they would return 11 of his 13 crew members, keeping back the radar enlisted men who knew they were over North Korea dropping leaflets and could prove it, so that cost them their lives, that they could make the Chinese out to be liars, but why would those 11 come home and the 4 fighter pilots, and then it hit me, because they were held in China, your area of expertise, Mr. Liotta. They were held in China.

But all of the testimony earlier today is of Soviet transfers, or Vietnamese and Korean transfers, Hanoi and Pyongyang transfers, to the Soviet Union, bypassing China. So China could come up with what they had. They could return F-104 pilot Bob Flynn and three or four of the seven that were missing over China, lost aircraft, generally, from the Vietnam conflict or the South China Sea, because they were not involved directly. There was great antipathy during all this period between China and the Soviet Union, both helping Vietnam, North Vietnam for different reasons.

But given that you then moved over from the China desk at CIA to the Indochina desk, let me ask you directly, Mr. Alan Liotta. Do you feel that there are any live American POW's in Vietnam at this time or in Laos or anywhere in Indochina or in Korea?

Mr. LIOTTA. Live American POW's?

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. LIOTTA. We have no evidence that there are live American prisoners of war still being detained in either Vietnam or Laos, and that is a judgment which is based on 20 years of investigating each and every report which we received and applying all the resources of the United States Government against those investigations.

Mr. DORNAN. You realize that people have left the DPMO or its prior predecessor organizations, like Col. Mike Peck, who left the office in anger with a totally different opinion, and that even analysts at the middle or lowest level have different opinions? You understand that?

Mr. LIOTTA. I understand that, yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Now let me ask you about Korea, because remember, you and I had a little dust-up a few months ago when you said that some of the reports were contradictory. Some of the people said Caucasians and other people said white people were seen by the Romanians. Now a third Romanian has turned up. I said that in any man's commonsense evaluation, a Caucasian and a white person are one in the same.

You know that the New York Times has a headline story today—my name is not in it, but the committee is identified, and you know there was a story last week in the New York Times. The Korean thing is starting to heat up. That is why there were six cameras here earlier. The reason I did not accede to General Wald's request that you people go first and then my other two panels is I wanted to reverse this for a change. When the cameras were here earlier in the day, I wanted them to hear the utterly stunning testimony of General Sejna and Lieutenant Colonel Corso. Everything they

have been telling me, I am finding in records in the Eisenhower Library and other classified documents.

But you are under scrutiny right now as the deputy in this office under General Wald. Do you believe that we left Americans behind in Korea?

Mr. LIOTTA. I think as a result of our efforts and the documents which we are uncovering, we are becoming closer to the truth of finding out exactly what happened at the end of that conflict. Colonel Corso's testimony has contributed to that, and as you know, we have interviewed Colonel Corso on more than one occasion and we have been searching for the documents that he said existed so that we could help substantiate that story.

We have had investigators into the archives, and I was pleased to see that you had some documents associated with the hearing today, and I think it should be noted that those documents are documents, many of them which our investigators found in the archives, uncovered, and turned over. We are actively going after all of these documents so that we can get a true story as to what happened in the Korean war.

Mr. DORNAN. So you are saying it is possible. Commander Beck and Norm Kass have said it is possible, probably so. You are saying possible.

Mr. LIOTTA. And as I testified before you last time, if we did not think it was possible, we would have debunked the reports and ignored them, but that is not what we did. We began an honest and an earnest and an aggressive investigation into these reports. That investigation continues. I could not sit here before you today and tell you definitely one way or another how that investigation will turn out. That would be premature.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Destatte, have you read this book, "POW"?

Mr. DESTATTE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you read it?

Mr. LIOTTA. I have not, but I will on your advice.

Mr. DORNAN. Please do. Mr. Destatte, I would recommend respectfully that you become an expert on Korea and it will make you a 100-times-better analyst on Vietnam. You must follow the course of Communist lying—

Mr. DESTATTE. Sir, I have read several—

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. Campaign in 1919 right to today.

Mr. DESTATTE. Several years ago, I read several books related to the POW/MIA experience as part of an effort to put together a program with the 25th Division on how to survive in a Communist POW camp. But I am not familiar enough with it, I do not have a deep enough understanding of it to comment with confidence on the question you have asked. I do not want to convey the misunderstanding or misimpression that I have not done my homework.

Mr. DORNAN. When you got to Hanoi with Bill Bell, somebody told Bill Bell, the POW issue can be fun. He said that under oath. Were you told that, that the POW issue could be fun?

I have never found it fun. I have found it, over my entire adult life, particularly since Dave Hrdlicka went down, a gut-ripping, family-destroying, tragic, just ugly page in American history. I never found any fun in it. I found it as a career destroyer or a career compromiser. I have found people that I otherwise respected

at the Pentagon in other executive jobs right up to four stars who considered it a pain in the ass. Get rid of this damn problem. I never found anybody who thought it was fun, but Bill Bell said under oath that somebody told him it was fun. Have you ever heard that word "fun" applied to this issue?

Mr. DESTATTE. Not that I recall, no. This is a—

Mr. DORNAN. And you have never looked at it as fun?

Mr. DESTATTE. No, not for a moment. Sir, if I could, you have mentioned the office in Hanoi. Bill Bell and I have been close friends for nearly 30 years. Whenever I visited Bangkok, whenever he was in town, I stayed with him and his family. We helped open that office together in 1991.

Mr. DORNAN. He testified today that he was eased out because he testified frankly to a Senate committee in closed session.

Mr. DESTATTE. Yes, sir, and I would like to comment on that a little.

Mr. DORNAN. Sure.

Mr. DESTATTE. I was there. I was a part of that and I observed it firsthand. In the fall of 1991, late 1991—

Mr. DORNAN. One second, please. We have an unusual circumstance here. In the anteroom is the equivalent to Floyd Spence and Bob Stump, the chairman of the Veterans Committee of their Parliament, the Duma, and the chairman of their National Security/Armed Forces Committee. I thought, since these are elected people and since our Speaker at one point said there was more freedom in the Duma than there was in the U.S. Congress in the years 1993 and 1994, building up to my party's victory last November, let me recess just briefly and maybe I can cajole them into coming into this prestigious room with all those battle flags—I do not know if there is a battle flag and the Army flag for Murmansk and the 15-nation effort to strangle communism in the crib—that is Churchill's quote; a couple of you were in the room when I used that in my opening statement and two of you were not.

But let me just take a brief recess and I may talk them into coming into the room here. We will take a short break.

[Recess.]

Mr. DORNAN. Gentlemen, I do not know if you could pick up what has happened here. There was also the deputy chairman, so it would have been like Ron Dellums—unless they are from the same party. There were three-star and four-star generals there. We do not have many generals or admiral flag officers left after Admiral Denton, the 6½-year POW, went down September 20, 1965. When he left the Senate after one term, we do not have any full career admirals or generals, no flag officers that I know of that have ever served in my lifetime. It is interesting over there that their former flag officers will stand for office and serve in their congress.

I asked them if they wanted to sit in to see the world from the view of a U.S. Congressman and they quickly declined, maybe a protocol thing, but it was nice of Mr. Weldon to bring them by. And I told them in no uncertain terms that we were taking testimony today on American Sabre jet pilots who flew against MiG pilots, and I did not leave any room for discussion.

I said, "We know your officers flew against us in North Korea. I have seen your general officers in uniform telling us that they

called a lot of the shots in the air war." And I said, "Our young F-86 pilots were taken to Siberia to be interviewed by the KGB, some to Moscow itself, all the intelligence information that could be extracted from them," and I said, "There is a problem. They were never seen again." And there was a little tension. I guess that is why they did not sit in.

Let me tell you what is going to come out of this. It is going to be very tough. First of all, Mr. Liotta, does North Korea deny that there are any Americans in their country, even defectors? Do they weasel-word that the way people in Hanoi did to me in 1979 and 1985 when I was in Hanoi? And do you have a gut feeling that we are inching close to them saying, tracking the New York Times story, "Yes, you can come and interview these people who stayed behind willingly," these now-black, African-Americans and older Caucasian-Americans who live in this kind of retirement home, guarded retirement home environment not too far from Pyongyang? What is your feeling from your analysts?

Mr. LIOTTA. In response to your first question, sir, in response to my questions to them, General Wald's questions to them, and questions by other Congressmen and Senators who have asked in the past, they have repeatedly denied that they are holding Americans in North Korea.

Mr. DORNAN. Right. Do you press them about defectors or people who are there willingly?

Mr. LIOTTA. As we testified at the last hearing and as David Brown testified from the Department of State, the Department of State has made a formal request of the North Koreans to grant us access to the four American defectors that we know are still in North Korea. They have not yet acknowledged our request.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you looked at the propagand movie? You have seen that, as we discussed before, right, with some American language teachers. One of them, it appears, may want to come home now.

Mr. LIOTTA. You are referring to the film, "Nameless Heroes"?

Mr. DORNAN. The defectors, right, from the 1960's.

Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, the 1960's and the 1970's, yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. You have seen it, and you are still asking to see them?

Mr. LIOTTA. No. We have not seen all of the film. What we have seen—the film is a 20-segment film. We have seen one segment of the film and we are attempting to get all the rest of the segments of the film.

Mr. DORNAN. Now, this corporate board, the next time the corporate board meets, I would hope that you would discuss using the eyewitness accounts of Mr. Kass and Mr. Beck, what General Sejna told us, that there is a hospital—I am going to make a request through my Intelligence Committee of national imagery of where this hospital is supposed to be. General Sejna says, in recent months, or up to when he testified in 1992, it was confirmed by Czechs that the hospital exists but they denied any medical experiments went on on Americans.

What you missed this morning, what Mr. Kass and Mr. Beck heard, was right out of Dr. Mengele and Auschwitz, right out of the sick hellhole, Unit 731 at Harbin, Manchuria, medical experiments,

amputations of healthy men, of their limbs to train doctors, radioactivity training. He speculated partly on that because he has seen films of horses and human beings being subjected to radioactive blasts, all the things the Japanese did at Harbin, Japanese who went on to head medical schools, never faced a war crimes trial.

That is why I think that DPMO should be the most educated functioning government entity in the free world, blending together everything from Murmansk 1919—my dad was asked to volunteer for that, you missed that, and he had enough wound chevrons, Purple Hearts, three, and combat points to turn it down—right up through the Slavic names held behind in World War II and this persistent rumor—I used the word “lust” this morning.

The reason I used one of the seven deadly sins is any communist intelligence officer who does not believe in God, has no code of honor that he follows, is trained to lie by his god figure, Lenin, any intelligence officer who did not want to interview an F-86 pilot when we were shooting them down at 13-to-1 and then it leveled off at about 7 or 8-to-1, he would not be worthy of being a Communist, with no respect for human life.

Given the numbers of POW's, German or otherwise, that died in the gulag archipelago, which we first became aware of through the writings of Solzhenetyn, a real hero, any intelligence officer who did not want to talk to these people was not preparing properly for world war III. When you hear the testimony of the cheap ass way that General Sejna was interviewed by flaky people in your former agency, it is unbelievable, the stupid asinine questions they asked him when he was divulging material to them about live Americans that he physically saw that had been transferred from Vietnam through Prague. I asked him if he would take sodium pentothal and he said yes.

I want you to carry back to Jim Wald that if Commander Beck is released, there is going to be holy hell to pay. What I said earlier to the DPMO people who are in the room, you had better hope I get defeated November 5, and my opponent is running undercover with her maiden name as Loretta Sanchez. Her name is Loretta Bricksey, has a \$1 million ocean view home in Palace Verdes Estates, three districts away. But you had better send money to her and hope that she beats me if you do not expect to have holy hell break loose if Commander Beck is let go.

I want him to stay, I, personally. I have talked to Floyd Spence about this, our chairman, other people. If that causes tension in your office, I think he has a nice personality. I think he can withstand it. You do not have to talk to one another socially. That has not gone on for months anyway.

But I want to ask you about an initiative that people, not Commander Beck alone, have made me aware of, where the corporate board destroyed an initiative that I cannot speak about but it involves a European country and it was insisted it go through the CIA, your former agency, when the people in this European country specifically asked that it not go through the CIA, and this is way before I ever knew of the existence of Commander Beck. I am talking about timeframe February, March, April, May, and now he is leaving and it was his initiative.

Can you tell me, without mentioning the name of the country, what in holy hell is going on, Mr. Liotta, that this initiative, which looked very interesting, has been destroyed by the corporate board at DPMO? Can you elucidate any of the facts on that?

Mr. LIOTTA. I would like to respond to several of the points that you have made.

Mr. DORNAN. Sure.

Mr. LIOTTA. The first is a request of you, sir. I encourage you and look forward to your tasking that you are going to put forward on trying to, through your Intelligence Committee portfolio, to get some information on the Czech hospital, and what I would like to offer is that we work together on that. As you know, there have been several investigations into that Czech hospital, the report, and I think we could collaborate together quite effectively so that we can make sure we most efficiently target whatever systems we are going to use to get us the kinds of answers you are looking for and do that.

Mr. DORNAN. Done. Remember, I told you once before that your predecessor entities in Defense Intelligence Agency had to humbly beg and request that the KH-9 or -11 might be in the area of a certain camp called Pnomaret, which had been cut and burned out of the jungle with triple walls, creating two paths 10 feet high, French and Indian War style, so that people could go to and from the latrines without other prisoners seeing them, that they had to ask, and weeks went by before the imagery passing overhead might take a peek.

I think today, if this issue truly is top priority, second to none in our Government, that they could task as fast as possible, with the coordinants and the technical skills that have been developed in the last quarter century, to show me imagery. If they can show me Saddam Hussein's 3 palaces before Desert Storm and the 15 palaces that he has built since in our face while he is starving his people, if they can show me that imagery, then I can certainly ask to see this hospital, and you bet we will work together on this and I will get together with you and Mr. Destatte and Mr. Kass as the leaders over there.

Mr. LIOTTA. Second, I want to respond——

Mr. DORNAN. I want to let Mr. Pickett have a chance to question all four of you, too.

Mr. LIOTTA. Would you like to do that first, sir?

Mr. DORNAN. Please respond to that. Do you see any—you would put it highest priority if I brought you pictures of a Czech hospital that exists that was built in the middle 1960's, a 200-bed hospital that may have been used for experiments on unfortunate living American prisoners?

Mr. LIOTTA. What I understand from the meeting that you had last week with General Wald is that——

Mr. DORNAN. Let me correct that—the middle 1950's.

Mr. LIOTTA. Right. What I was offering is that there are some reports that have been done on the Czech hospital and I think it would be wise for us to be able to provide that information and work with you so that when the systems are targeted, we make sure that we are targeting, first, the right place, and second, we

are getting the most effective targeting sequence down so we can make the best use of the technology.

Mr. DORNAN. Of course, nobody would be in the hospital now. They have not run any experiments. See, what General Sejna testified to and why I wanted Mr. Destatte to be an expert on both periods is he said, everything that they learned during the Korean war with prisoner exchanges, if what he is saying is correct, and he passed the polygraph test, no deception, he is willing to take sodium pentothal—we might even learn more, since it has the ability to so incredibly heighten memory recall—he said that in 1961, there were meetings on his general staff, here we go again. The Vietnamese intend to fight a war as long as it takes without any hope of winning a single battle because they will break us because we are culturally so similar to the French, and since they broke the French, they will break us.

I went to a prison camp outside of Vihn Tenh, Laos, and a young NVA captain who spoke broken English, but through the translator told me that, and that was 1970. "We are going to break you just like we broke the French because we know how to whip you in Washington, DC, the way we whipped them in Paris."

So this pattern, starting in 1961-62, according to General Sejna, was, "Oh oh. Here comes a war. The Vietnamese are going to drag it out for a long time while they break us on our college campuses in world Western capitals and in Washington, DC. So that will be an opportunity to get more prisoners. We have not had a chance to experiment on prisoners for a long time. Let us see how we can get some." And then they started drawing some from Laos in the secret war when we only had a handful of prisoners captured in North Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. So I want to see if the arithmetic jives or the time period, and let us hope he will take the sodium pentothal.

You can finish your comment on that, Mr. Liotta.

Mr. LIOTTA. The second thing that I would like to respond to, Mr. Chairman, is your comments and concerns regarding the corporate board.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me show something else here. So many documents are starting to come into our possession. This is not whistle-blowing documents. This is from people at the Defense Department, not in DPMO, although this is DPMO stuff that we are getting.

Handling an indoctrination of foreign prisoners of war. Are you familiar with this, Mr. Destatte?

Mr. DESTATTE. Undoubtedly, I have read it. We get thousands of documents over there.

Mr. DORNAN. This one is particularly interesting because it is 1960. It comes right out of China, the liaison department of the Central Politburo, May 1960, to the Vietnamese on how you should handle prisoners, given their experience. It was captured in war zone D in Vietnam when you were there by the First Infantry Division, February 23, 1966. The handling and indoctrination of foreign prisoners of war.

Then there is another one captured from earlier in that period telling how to work these prisoners. Are you aware of these documents, Norm Kass and Commander Beck?

Mr. KASS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BECK. I am not.

Mr. DORNAN. But it makes sense, does it not, that they would already have it codified, down like a science, how to handle us? See, this is where I separate from DPMO. I think they lie to you in Hanoi. I think they rip your ass off. I think they make fools out of you, and I think they are going to do it in Pyongyang, Mr. Liotta. I think that DPMO has to look in a mirror and has to analyze your whole structure from top to bottom before you fill in the empty 11 slots and you have to decide whether you are professional intelligence analysts who can study communism for three-quarters of a century and not come to some of these naive assumptions.

Mr. Destatte, your analysis of the Cuban program was not an analysis. It was not an 11-month program. Read what they did.

Mr. Bengé, are you still in the room? Please come up and take a seat next to Destatte. Let me swear him in.

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give, Mr. Bengé, before this subcommittee in the matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. BENGE. I do.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Would you please tell Mr. Destatte that you were interviewed by Cubans in the spring of 1970? And tell us what camp it was at.

Mr. BENGE. I do not know the name of the camp. It was about 35 kilometers southwest of Hanoi. It was——

Mr. DORNAN. D-1, maybe, or the Rockpile, one of those——

Mr. BENGE. There was about three or four names to it. One of them I recall was the cheeses. There were a number of others. It was one of the camps that DOD at the time of my release had no knowledge of.

Mr. DORNAN. Why did you think they were Cubans?

Mr. BENGE. Because I—after being in Vietnam and working with the Vietnamese since 1963, I definitely identified them as not—as being non-Vietnamese, although they were wearing North Vietnamese uniforms, and they had a Spanish accent.

Mr. DORNAN. Then that would still come under this category of Latin Caucasians, but there are so many overlapping reports and I read so many first-generation intelligence debriefs in the Glen Cobeil file, and Mr. Liotta, would you please help me. As fast as you can, get me the entire similar file. We are still trying to get it from the family of Col. Brown Lee. But get me the file on Ken Cameron and on J.J. Connell.

Mr. BENGE. I would also like to add, I I.D.'d one of the Cubans.

Mr. DORNAN. You did? You I.D.'d him?

Mr. BENGE. Yes, sir. I did.

Mr. DORNAN. How? During your debrief?

Mr. BENGE. After my debriefing with a congressional committee, and the I.D. of that Cuban was in the NLF intel unit down in Cuba and that Bell here testified about. He was identified and told to me by the congressional committee that he——

Mr. DORNAN. That was a Viet Cong team in Havana?

Mr. BENGE. No, sir. That was not Viet Cong. That was the National Liberation Front——

Mr. DORNAN. That is what I always thought of as Viet Cong.

Mr. BENGE. No. OK. It was not the Viet Cong. That was the North Vietnamese front for the Viet Cong.

Mr. DORNAN. I stand corrected.

Mr. BENGE. So I would like to clarify that. I identified him. I was told that that man was responsible for funnelling KGB money to the American antiwar activists and he was directly involved, I believe, someone may want to correct me, it is the Bermelios brigades—

Mr. DORNAN. That is the Ramos brigades—

Mr. BENGE. Right.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Beck, what countries did you analyze Cuban operations in worldwide during your career? Just tick them off, just a bunch of them.

Mr. BECK. Well, it has to be over 17. I think I may miss a few, but Guatemala, Panama—

Mr. DORNAN. Africa?

Mr. BECK. African, in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Algeria, Somalia, Ethiopia. I followed Chez Guevera's exploits as a student in Bolivia when he was running around down there. I have talked to African revolutionaries who, interestingly enough, told me—who knew Chez Guevera personally, told me that he visited Vietnam during the war. When I was a paramilitary advisor out in Laos, it was very interesting that—this was in 1971. I mean, it was common folklore among the case officers out there that that attack on Pufatea included Cuban advisors flying the AN-21 Colts.

Mr. DORNAN. AN-2.

Mr. BECK. AN-2, excuse me, AN-2 Colts. But the important thing about the Cubans, what were they doing not only in Vietnam but elsewhere in the world—

Mr. DORNAN. Were they not sort of the intelligence shock troops?

Mr. BECK. They were the third world brigade. They were the internationalists that were the surrogates for the Soviets, so the—

Mr. DORNAN. And Castro loved it.

Mr. BECK. I mean, the Russians have a reputation of being condescending and a bit racist to the third worlders, so the Cubans were used to go in and fill that gap. They could relate directly to these people, and they did it in Vietnam.

I have just recently looked at the files that I was not able to get. What the Cubans were involved in in Vietnam was long term. It was intelligence related. By that, I mean it was part of a worldwide propaganda effort leading up to what was called the Second Symposium on U.S. Genocide—

Mr. DORNAN. In October 1968 in Havana?

Mr. BECK. Well, it started in actually 1967, and it was throughout the—

Mr. DORNAN. Bertrand Russell was involved?

Mr. BECK. The names of Bertrand Russell and Stokely Carmichael and Wilfred Bouchette, who was a big Communist name in Korea, by the way, and a cast of—

Mr. DORNAN. Col. Bud Mahuron, who shot down—excuse me for interrupting—who shot down five MiG's, Japanese aircraft, and was the first double, triple, and quadruple ace in World War II,

told me, and pardon my language, ladies, but our POW's called him well-fed bird shit because he would correct the torture-extracted confessions of men in Korea—Korea—and would then subject them to more torture so they would clean up their grammar and deliberate archaic terms that Americans do not use, like “dastardly air pirates”, and then he came down to Vietnam.

See the connection, Mr. Destatte, between Korea and Vietnam? And he did the very same thing in Vietnam, got men tortured as he corrected—thank God he has gone to his eternal punishment—he did the same thing to our prisoners in Vietnam. Korea and Vietnam are so interlocked that it is just beyond belief that the intelligence world still looks at them as two separate spheres of influence and does not understand that what our intelligence people did, their Communist ambassadors did, including the Cuban ambassador.

Mr. Cassor made me aware of a book that I am going to ask the Library of Congress to translate on an emergency basis by the ambassador—

Mr. BECK. “El Grande Credo Los Cubanos and El Camino de Ho Chih Minh”.

Mr. DORNAN. What does that mean?

Mr. BECK. “The Big Secret: Cubans on the Ho Chih Minh Trail”.

Mr. DORNAN. The Cubans on the Ho Chih Minh Trail. So, gentlemen, let me turn it over to Mr. Pickett, because this is to be continued, maybe even next week or the week after before we adjourn. If we do not go out by September 27 and we are in 1 more week, I want to have one more session. I want it to be friendly and constructive to see if we can end this us against them mentality and start working together, and I will call General Wald about it.

Mr. Pickett, we have about—well, the second bells have not gone off yet.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was just going to ask Mr. Liotta if he had had an opportunity to make a full response. You seemed to have a couple of items, several items that you wanted to speak on. Did you get them all in?

Mr. LIOTTA. No, sir. I would appreciate an opportunity just to finish responding to the chairman's question.

Mr. PICKETT. Why do you not finish that up? We are going to have to leave to go make votes and I expect it is going to take about 30 to 45 minutes to finish that, so you may want to kind of wrap this up.

Mr. LIOTTA. I understand, sir. Thank you.

I just wanted to respond first to the questions and concerns which the chairman has expressed about the corporate board and also about the true function of the corporate board, and perhaps we can save a bulk of that discussion for another time, for even in your office. I just wanted to say—

Mr. DORNAN. My opinion is, it saves General Wald from ever coming to a decision, that he can pass the buck. That is a tough word, but he can always pass the buck, be disengaged, listen to Norm Kass, tell him that he should keep Commander Beck on, and then defer to some blackballing operation at the corporate board. I know there is a lawyer mentality over there about things that are

hearsay, dismiss them. Mr. Destatte told me that the whole mindset to debunk—

Mr. LIOTTA. That is not the purpose of the corporate board, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. But that is not what other leaders have said there that have left.

Mr. LIOTTA. That is not the purpose of the corporate board, and since I brought the concept of the corporate board into DPMO, I believe I can answer your questions about its functions, its responsibilities, and what it does do and how it performs those, and I would be glad to discuss that with you.

And third—I know you have to go because the bells are going, but the third was in response to your questions about the Russian initiative and I think there that it would be better not to get into a brief discussion of that. I cannot discuss it or elaborate in terms of the details but I can tell you that it is not a dead initiative. It is not over with. I am not sure how you came up with the perception that it is, but it is an initiative which our office is pursuing.

Mr. DORNAN. Here is a final thought. If the Communist liars in Hanoi are telling us the truth, if everything they are saying now is gospel truth and they are really cooperating fully, effectively, totally, passionately, all the crap words we heard out of the Senate committee, if all of that is going on and there is nothing left but dust and the bones of a few heroes, then why do you exist? Why not shut down DPMO and let the joint resolution people out of Hawaii go on the bone search if there are not valuable pieces of intelligence here that can be put into a mosaic?

That is the problem DPMO has boxed itself into. If everything you say and that the corporate board puts out to the U.S. Congress, House and Senate, is true, then there is no reason for you to exist and you ought to go back to the CIA. General Wald ought to go back to North Dakota and the rest of you can either retire or look for analyst jobs somewhere else.

Mr. LIOTTA. If my office did not exist, we would not have returned an Eighth Cavalry Regiment soldier from the Korean war back to his family.

Mr. DORNAN. Hawaii could have done that.

Mr. LIOTTA. We would not be in North Korea—

Mr. DORNAN. You brought back bones. Hawaii could do that.

Mr. LIOTTA [continuing]. We did not have the documents which we have before us today on the Korean and what happened in the Korean war and be closer to learning the truth about that.

Mr. DORNAN. But—

Mr. LIOTTA. If my office did not exist, we would not have been able to conduct a comprehensive review of all the information, allowing us to question the analytic assumptions of the 1970's and 1980's that guided—

Mr. DORNAN. But all you have done is sign off on the analytic assumptions of the 1970's and 1980's that these Communists are telling the truth, that we are stupid in this country, that there was no coordination between the Kremlin, Pyongyang, and Hanoi, that they have been telling this truth right along. You were not in the room, Bob, when a couple of your people went to work for Caterpil-

lar. I think that is disgusting and disgraceful. I said it before you came in the room.

I think you need to look in a mirror over there at DPMO. Let us shake this whole thing up and start working together. This is a damn disgrace, if you want to know something. You cannot justify your pay, Mr. Liotta, because Hawaii can do that. We can send a joint resolution team to go look for our heroes' chips of bones and single teeth anytime we want. We do not need 89 highly paid people and millions of dollars to function with a predisposition to disregard, disrespect, discredit, and dismiss, because it is not bunk we are hearing, it is hardcore intelligence.

We have 7 minutes to vote. Do you have a final statement, Mr. Beck?

Mr. BECK. No, sir. I would not want to follow that. Thank you, though.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you, Mr. Kass, because I appreciated your constructive analysis of how DPMO can do better. Mr. Kass, do you have any final comments?

Mr. KASS. No. I would like to just say that I believe, as many of us do, that there are many ways that we could approach our work that would move things along. I think many of us are impatient with the progress we have made. It is difficult work, it is frustrating work, but—

Mr. DORNAN. Right. Mr. Kass, if I asked you right now as a U.S. congressional chairman to write me a paper on how you think DPMO could improve its work, would you be considered a whistleblower? Would General Wald and Mr. Liotta start to move you out?

Mr. KASS. I have no reason to assume that, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Then good. I ask you, please, Mr. Norm Kass, to write me a paper on how DPMO can improve itself.

You are new on the job, Mr. Liotta, so you and I, we are going to try and work together.

Mr. LIOTTA. I look forward to that.

Mr. DORNAN. I promised Mr. Destatte I would come to his section over there and look at it.

I will tell you this, and it has nothing to do with Mr. Beck or Mr. Kass. You do have whistleblowers below them. You know what they told me? They told me that your place functions like a retirement home. That is what I told Mr. Pickett and that is what I told Mr. Chapla, that it functions like a retirement home with a lot of people telling war stories about past careers, and it sounds an awful lot like what I heard today, that this issue can be fun as you wrap up your career, reminisce-at-will operation instead of getting at these hardcore truths.

Mr. DESTATTE. The people in our office, many of them routinely work 6 days a week. Most of them work overtime every day. They do not get a cent for it.

Just to tell one story on myself, while I was in Hanoi, people would call me from here—

Mr. DORNAN. Try to do it, Mr. Destatte, in about 30 seconds.

Mr. DESTATTE. People would call me at all times. One time, one of my colleagues called me at the office at 2 o'clock in the morning Hanoi time and actually expected that I would be there. He was not surprised. And never in the last 17-plus years that I have been

with this office, whether I have been working here in Washington or whether I worked in Hanoi, not once has anyone——

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Pickett and I have to get out of here. Let me just tell you this. You should become an expert on Korea. This is all tied together. I am going to stay on this like a bulldog.

Mr. PICKETT. Mr. Chairman, if I could, since we are ending this in such haste, if any of the witnesses wish to supplement——

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. PICKETT [continuing]. The statements you have made today, the record will be held open. You can make a written statement and it will become a part of the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett.

Thank you. The subcommittee is temporarily adjourned until we meet again next week or the week after.

[Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[The following information was submitted for the record:]

Testimony by
MR. J. ALAN LIOTTA
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE POW/MIA OFFICE

Before the
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

September 17, 1996

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the members of your committee for this opportunity to brief you on events that have transpired since I last testified here in June regarding our efforts to account for American servicemen lost in North Korea.

On November 1, 1950, near the North Korean village of Unsan, elements of the U.S. Army Eighth Cavalry Regiment were making their last stands against hordes of Communist Chinese soldiers who had surprised and initially thrown back United Nations Command along the entire Korean front. In a lone foxhole, one cavalry trooper, like his forebears under Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn almost 120 years ago, went down fighting. But neither his surviving comrades or family ever knew what happened to him. He was reported missing and presumptively declared dead on December 31, 1953.

On July 30, 1996, a team of ten American Department of Defense remains recovery experts returned from the first-ever joint US-North Korean recovery operation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This unprecedented event was the result of long years of frustrating, but ultimately successful, negotiations with North Korea on the POW/MIA issue. The team recovered remains which have been confirmed as those of the above trooper who was killed in

action in North Korea in November 1950. Our team for the second joint recovery operation is scheduled to deploy into North Korea this month.

Since I last testified, our researchers have been to the Eisenhower Library archives, where much of the government-level information of the Korean War period, and the period immediately after, was located. They brought back approximately 1,800 pages of unclassified documents, copies of which have been forwarded to the Congress. The classified documents, approximately 900 in number, received later by mail, are still being reviewed. What we are learning from this research and our ongoing review of the almost 30,000 pages of documents previously collected from the National Archives, is helping us to resolve many of the apparent inaccuracies of the past, and to develop a much more accurate accounting effort.

The Defense POW/MIA Office is also working closely with the Services and the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory to formally launch a Korean War family outreach program. The purpose of this program is to restore contact with most of the over 8,100 families concerned, secure DNA samples from appropriate family members, and create a DNA reference data base. This will provide us a base to which we can compare samples from recovered remains, offering a much greater chance at identifying remains. This program also looks to the future by securing samples now so that even if the maternal line of the serviceman has ceased, the identification tool can be used whenever the serviceman's remains are recovered.

Our investigation of unresolved reports of live Americans living in North Korea continues unabated. As I testified previously, one of the first initiatives launched by our Korea research and analysis cell was to follow up on the series of reports, mostly hearsay, of alleged American POWs received prior to 1992. As a result of this effort, other reports surfaced, some new, others repeating earlier claims. We are currently using all available resources to help us substantiate these reports. For example, the information originally obtained from North Korean defectors was due to our tasking of the intelligence system. Our office coordinates such taskings with all levels of the intelligence community. We also act through the State Department to contact foreign governments. In addition, we continue to aggressively canvas the former POW community for information that will help us learn what happened to their comrades. In July, for example, we interviewed over 110 former POWs at the Korean War Ex-POW Association Annual Reunion in Chicago, gathering information on over 200 unaccounted for cases..

The Department of Defense is determined not to let the daunting challenges facing us deter our efforts to succeed. As American military experts prepare to deploy into North Korea this month to begin the second joint recovery operation, they do so in a concerted effort to remember and respect the brave servicemen for whom they are searching and working to bring home after so many years. But as I hope my testimony illustrates, they represent only the most visible part of the most thorough effort since the end of the war to account for our missing American servicemen, and if possible, bring them home.

Thank You.

Opening statement by Mr. Robert J. Destatte
Senior Analyst, Research & Analysis Directorate,
Defense Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Office,
before the House Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
September 17, 1996

Congressman Dornan I welcome the opportunity to appear here today. I remember well the many constructive meetings I had with you and your colleagues on the House POW/MIA Task Force in the early and mid-1980s. The task force's dedication and support for our efforts to account for our servicemen and its courage and integrity in opposing all efforts to exploit the POW/MIA issue for narrow personal or partisan purposes profoundly influenced me and my colleagues who had the privilege of working with the Task Force. With your permission I will make a short verbal statement at this time and I ask that my full written statement be made a part of the record for this hearing.

In view of our past association, it saddens me that I appear here today to respond to charges you made against me in a speech on the floor of the House on 2 August 1996, as reported in the Congressional Record for that date.

In that speech you accused me of treachery. You accused me of willfully and knowingly lying to, manipulating, and psychologically torturing our families. You implied that I have become an accomplice of the Communist government in Hanoi. And, finally, you threatened to bring criminal charges against me.

As you know from our many earlier meetings, I have served this nation faithfully my entire adult life. I served in the United States Army for more than 20 years as an enlisted man and Warrant Officer. I voluntarily served five years in uniform in Vietnam during the war, including nearly two years with the 173rd Airborne Infantry Brigade and one year with the 1st Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division. I carry an artificial hip as a result of an injury I received from a mine while accompanying montagnard soldiers from the Mai Loc Special Force Camp on an operation near the Demilitarized Zone in 1970. Despite the injury, I continued forward with a small group of montagnards and received the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device for an action later that day.

I have an unblemished record of 17 years of dedicated and faithful service as an analyst in the Defense POW/MIA Office. I helped open the American POW/MIA Office in Hanoi in 1991. While seconded to that office from mid-1991 until August 1995, I and my colleagues in the United States Joint Task Force-Full Accounting worked hard to develop the spirit of genuine cooperation that now characterizes our joint search efforts in Vietnam.

I have been on the front line of our battles in war and peace in Vietnam. Your charges as reported in the Congressional record have done me a grave injustice. Friends have called and expressed wonderment and concern. Even my 12 year old granddaughter in southern California learned about them. I explained to my friends and family they need not be concerned because the facts are clear and they are on my side. The facts are outlined in the written statement I submitted for the record of this hearing. I told my granddaughter she can be confident that if history remembers my efforts on behalf of our unaccounted-for servicemen, it will remember me for my dedication to discovering the facts and my courage in defending the truth about this issue. I am ready to answer your questions.

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Testimony of Mr. Robert J. Destatte,
Senior Analyst, Research & Analysis Directorate,
Defense Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Office,
before the House Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
September 17, 1996

This unclassified statement for the record responds to charges Congressman Dornan made against me and other current and former members of the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Office (DPMO) in a speech in the House of Representatives on 2 August 1996, as published in the Congressional Record, and in a letter to the Secretary of Defense on 26 August 1996. This statement for the record extends my opening remarks before a hearing by the House Subcommittee on Military Personnel chaired by Congressman Dornan on 17 September 1996.

Congressman Dornan, in a speech in the House of Representatives on August 2, 1996, you made several serious charges against me and my colleagues in the DPMO. You accused me of treachery. You accused me of willfully and knowingly lying to, manipulating, and psychologically torturing our families. You implied that I have become an accomplice of the Communist government in Hanoi. And, finally, you threatened to bring criminal charges against me. In your speech and in a letter to the Secretary of Defense dated August 26, 1996, you implied in strong language that I and other analysts in the Department of Defense POW/MIA office had lied about and misrepresented a program in which three Caucasian interrogators who appear to have been Cubans brutally mistreated 19 American POWs at a POW camp nicknamed "The Zoo" in Hanoi, between about August 1967 and July 1968. As you know, the POWs coined the term "Cuban Program" to describe the actions of those interrogators. The records of the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Office (DPMO) concerning the "Cuban Program" show that your charges are unfounded and based on misrepresentations of information contained in documents DPMO sent to you in March 1987 and August 1996. I'm sure you agree that the strong language and serious nature of your charges demand the following detailed response.

In your August 2 speech you charged that I ". . . had the gall, the effrontery, the treachery to put in writing recently that [the Cubans who tortured our POWs] were interpreters only. . ." You also stated you intended to ". . . bring [Mr. Destatte] up on charges for willfully and knowingly lying to our families, and I understand he owns property in Hanoi, that he is marrying in to that system over there, and that he has been allowed for years to disgracefully manipulate and psychologically torture the families of these men that were tortured by [the Cubans]."

DPMO recently furnished your office everything I had ever written about the "Cuban Program" as of August 13, 1996. Those writings consisted of two informal notes I sent via our internal office e-mail system to another member of the DPMO staff on the 3rd and 9th of July 1996, respectively, and two memoranda for record dated July 12 and August 13, 1996. I have copies of those documents with me today and request that they be made part of the record of this hearing. As these documents clearly show, I portrayed the "Cuban Program" with full and complete accuracy; including the repeated brutal beatings and torture by the "Cubans" that caused the death of one of the brave victims of

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the program. Your charge that "for years" I caused difficulties for the families of the American victims of the "Cuban Program" is wholly untrue. I wish to emphasize that I was never responsible for any investigations or analysis related to the "Cuban Program," nor had I ever written anything about the program before writing the informal e-mail note to a co-worker on July 3, 1996.

Your attacks on my character also are totally untrue. For example, as you undoubtedly know from your own research, one of the major impediments to foreign investment in Vietnam is the fact that foreigners can not purchase or own property there. I could not have purchased property in Hanoi, even if I wanted to.

Your implication that I am disloyal to the United States is especially unjust. I have dedicated my entire adult life to faithful service to this country. As I explained in my opening remarks today, I served in the United States Army for more than 20 years, including five years of voluntary service in Vietnam during the war, including nearly two years with the 173rd Airborne Infantry Brigade and one year with the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Infantry Division. I carry an artificial hip as a result of an injury suffered in combat and was decorated for valor in combat. I have dedicated the last 17 years of my life to the search for an accounting for my fellow servicemen who are still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. I have served on the front lines of our battles in Vietnam in war and peace. If history remembers my service with the Defense POW/MIA Office, history will remember me for my dedication to discovering the facts and my courage in defending the truth about the fate of our unaccounted-for countrymen.

In your August 26 letter you wrote in reference to unnamed analysts that you found ". . . it shocking that in some of the documents you sent me . . . non-combat analysts kept referring to torture as 'punishment,' . . . [and that] there is more than a hint by some analysts that an uncooperative attitude [by the POWs] brought about the sadistic brutality of the Cuban and Vietnamese torturers. And in one disgustingly memorable phrase, an analyst wrote that the young Captain Cobeil seemed to 'relish' his punishment." These criticisms are misrepresentations of information contained in documents DPMO provided to your office and, in one instance, a classified report of a debriefing of a returned POW.

The word "punishment" appears in only two documents in our files on the "Cuban Program." One of the two documents is an extract from a Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated April 5, 1973. The other is a fact sheet based on the earlier document. The Defense Intelligence Agency's POW/MIA Office sent the fact sheet to you on March 25, 1987. The letter of transmittal described the fact sheet as ". . . a summary of the information known on the interrogation and torture of American PWs by 'Cubans' . . ." The relevant passage in the 1987 fact sheet stated: ". . . When the soft sell was found to be ineffective, brutal measures were applied. Extreme physical torture was used in an attempt to gain total submission to 'Fidel's' will. Besides physical punishment, the PWs were under constant mental strain and duress. 'Fidel' was always nearby, looking in the cells or asking questions, and the PWs were aware that they could be tortured or quizzed at any time. . ." The 1973 memorandum contained nearly identical wording, and explained that "physical torture included beatings with fists and rubber strips (known to the PWs as the 'fan belt') and the 'ropes'." I brought a copy of the fact sheet with me today and request that it be entered in full into the record of this hearing.

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As the full text of the documents show, the analysts who prepared the documents pointed out the fact that the "Cuban" and Vietnamese interrogators resorted to brutal torture in frustration over their inability to bend American POWs to their will. I am puzzled that anyone could find in those words any suggestion that our analysts disapproved of the bravery of those Americans or their inspirational resistance to their interrogators. I cannot identify any document in DPMO files that contains the "disgustingly memorable phrase" you referred to, namely that the POW who eventually died, USAF Major Earl G. Cobeil, seemed to "relish" his torture.

I did, however, find in the debriefing reports similar statements by two former POWs who were victims of the "Cuban" interrogators. Those two POWs helped protect Major Cobeil and helped try to nurse him back to health. The two returned POWs made the comments in the context of reporting that the chief "Cuban" interrogator, nicknamed "Fidel," had beaten Major Cobeil so severely that he became almost completely disabled physically and mentally, and that "Fidel" had convinced the Vietnamese guards that Major Cobeil was faking. Each of these returned POWs then explained how Major Cobeil's roommates tried to protect him from more punishment when he refused to bow to the Vietnamese guards when they entered their room. One of the returned POWs recalled that "... In order to save [Major Cobeil] from further beatings, the other POWs grabbed him and forced him to bow. This satisfied the Vietnamese. He seemed to be looking for torture at this point; he had to take it. . ." The other returned POW recalled that Major Cobeil's "... roommates tried to protect him from the guards and the harassment he was getting, however, he liked to be hit. . ." The second quote appears in a debriefing report prepared by three Navy officers, including two specialists from the US Navy Neuropsychiatric Unit in San Diego. The returned POW requested that medical experts participate in this debriefing to help insure there would be an expert record of the full consequences of "Fidel's" extreme cruelty to Major Cobeil.

The statement you described as a "disgustingly memorable phrase" written by a "non-combat analyst" is in fact a misrepresentation of a statement a returned POW made as he tried to illustrate the extent of "Fidel's" cruelty to Major Cobeil. I can not understand how or why anyone would misrepresent the source or the intent of the former POW's statement.

The Department of Defense has steadfastly protected the reports of debriefings of returned POWs from unauthorized disclosure outside of the Department of Defense precisely to protect the reputations of the POWs from unjust attacks by unscrupulous persons who would misrepresent their statements and their conduct. I want to reaffirm my statement to you on 11 September 1996, that information from one or more classified reports of debriefings was released without proper authority to someone on your staff by a member of the DPMO staff who placed his or her personal opinions above our sacred responsibility to protect the reputations of our former POWs from unjust attacks. Again, I ask for your assurance that your office will protect that information from further disclosure and that you will return to DPMO immediately all copies of all documents any member of your staff received that contain information recorded in any report of debriefing of any former POW. Of course, DPMO will continue to provide you with all information and documents relevant to our efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for the Americans lost during the Vietnam war; however, I'm sure you will agree that the brave

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Americans who served with exemplary courage under extremely trying conditions in the POW camps in Southeast Asia deserve our gratitude, our profound respect, and our protection from unjust attacks.

Finally, I want to address your implication that my predecessors dismissed the "Cuban Program." I must point out that by 19 March 1973, nearly two weeks before the last POW was released, Mr. Trowbridge, a retired former member of the DPMO staff and a former US Navy pilot and Vietnam veteran, had helped establish a coordinated effort within the United States Government to learn the identity of the "Cubans" who were responsible for the torture of the 19 POWs in the "Cuban Program" and the death of Major Cobell. That effort included the DIA POW/MIA Office, each of the Armed Services, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the Chief Investigator of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. That effort led to the tentative identification of two of the "Cubans" in 1976; however, the returned POWs who were victims of the "Cubans" were never able to confirm that the two men who were tentatively identified were indeed the men who tortured them in the Hanoi prison camp. Mr. Trowbridge also helped insure that the DIA POW/MIA Office gave prompt and full support to the FBI's investigation of a 1987 report that a Cuban employee of the United Nations might be one of the Cuban interrogators that tortured our men in Hanoi. The FBI worked closely with returned POWs in that investigation; however, the POWs could not positively identify the Cuban at the United Nations as one of the men who tortured them in Hanoi.

In summary, the record demonstrates that your charges against me and my colleagues in your August 2, 1996 speech and subsequent correspondence are unfounded and based on misrepresentations of documents DPMO furnished to you in March 1987 and August 1996 and a report of a debriefing of a former POW. I'm sure you will agree that if left uncorrected those charges are grave injustices to men who have devoted their entire adult lives to the service of this country. With all respect due your position, Congressman Dornan, I believe you owe me and my colleagues a public apology.

5 Enclosures:

1. E-mail note dated July 3, 1996.
2. E-mail note dated July 9, 1996.
3. Memo for Record dated July 12, 1996.
4. Memo for Record dated August 13, 1996.
5. DIA Letter dated March 25, 1987.

From: Destatte, Robert
To: Baughman, Daniel M. LTC, USA; Beck, William G.
Cc: Litvinas, Anthony J.; Sydow, Clyde G.; Gray, Daniel W.; Caswell, James R; Harvey,
Joe B.; Travis, Jo Anne B.; Cooke, Melinda; Vivian, Paul
Subject: RE: Cuban Vietnam operations
Date: Wednesday, July 03, 1996 12:10PM

Chip,

We explored this issue with the Vietnamese a few years ago. According to the Vietnamese, the Cubans were not interrogators, nor were they part of any officially sponsored interrogation program. The Cubans sent a team of three English language instructors to Vietnam to provide instruction in basic English to PAVN personnel working with American prisoners. At the working level, the three Cubans persuaded their Vietnamese colleagues to allow them (the Cubans) to demonstrate the effectiveness of Cuban interrogation techniques. The resulting mistreatment of some of our POWs by the Cubans is well documented in returnee debriefings and books written by some of our POWs (for example Alvarez). Information about the mistreatment eventually filtered up to Vietnamese decision makers and they terminated the Cuban's English language training program about one year after it began.

The Vietnamese explanation is plausible and fully consistent with what we know about the conduct of the Cubans in question and Vietnamese practices granting outsiders access to American POWs. I don't know what you have in mind when you refer to a "Soviet POW program during the Vietnam War era." I do know that we can state with complete confidence that the Vietnamese did not permit Soviet persons to interrogate American POWs, nor did they send any American POWs to the Soviet Union.

If you feel it is necessary to learn the names of the three Cubans in question and, perhaps, try to question them about their activities in Vietnam, I suggest we try to persuade Vietnamese and Cuban authorities to identify them and permit us to interview them. We should not, however, attempt to justify (either explicitly or implicitly) pursuit of further information about the three Cubans on the false notion that they can lead us to information about a presumed secret Soviet POW program.

We have more than 30 years of accumulated knowledge and experience regarding POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia. While there are still some unanswered questions about specific cases, or general issues such as the quality and quantity of records the Vietnamese and Lao might still have, there is no mystery about Soviet or other Communist bloc access to American POWs.

In short, we answered the questions about Cuban and Russian access to American POWs years ago--there is no reason to reinvent the wheel. Let's focus our time, energy, and resources on actions that can produce useful casualty resolution data.

Regards, RJ Destatte

From: Destatte, Robert
 To: Baughman, Daniel M. LTC, USA; Beck, William G.
 Cc: Graham, Albert E.; Litvinas, Anthony J.; Sydow, Clyde G.; Gray, Daniel W.; Caswell, James R; Harvey, Joe B.; Liotta, Jay A.; MacDougall, James; Travis, Jo Anne B.; Wold, James W.; Chester, Mark, LCDR, USN; Cooke, Melinda; Kass, Norman D.; Vivian, Paul; Schumacher, Roger
 Subject: RE: Cuban Vietnam operations
 Date: Tuesday, July 09, 1996 4:03PM

Chip,

This note responds to your 08 July and 09 July notes.

The records of debriefings of the returned POWs will show that the so-called "Cuban Program" lasted from about August 1967 to August 1968, involved three interrogators who might have been Cubans and 19 American POWs, and took place at the Cu Loc prison camp in Hanoi. The program did not attempt to acquire significant intelligence or to indoctrinate the POWs involved. The USAF studied the program and published a report of its findings (Report No. A10-2, Series 700/JF-1, dated June 1974, Subject: Special Exploitation Program for SEASIA PWs, 1967-1968). As the USAF report noted, "While the 'Cuban Program' was undoubtedly sanctioned by the North Vietnamese, it apparently lost favor in the summer of 1968 and was permanently terminated." You did not note who showed you the more than 100 newspaper articles, personal documents, etc. that you mentioned in your 9 July note; however, my experience is that most returnees acknowledge that when they were debriefed in 1973, their recollection of events in the POW camps was much clearer and more precise than in recent years.

Some points have never been in dispute. Communism is by nature an amoral ideology. Communist officials frequently are secretive and duplicitous. Nevertheless, they do not always lie skillfully, nor do they always successfully keep secrets and deceive their adversaries. Although they shared some similar goals and methods, the Soviet and Cuban governments did not successfully dictate policies or actions to the North Vietnamese government.

The intelligence community has been collecting and evaluating information about Americans who became unaccounted-for in Southeast Asia for more than 30 years. Thousands of professionally competent Americans contributed to this effort. I doubt that any one of them was so naive as to place any confidence in uncorroborated statements by Communist officials. In fact, in the early years, suspicions about covert programs drove much of the collection effort. As the evidence accumulated, the answer_χ emerged.

As this 30-year effort proves, it is seldom proper to assume on the strength of faith alone that we know in advance the answer to a question and then proceed to try to prove we were correct. The proper way to proceed is to begin with a question and then collect evidence to answer the question, recognizing that at some point the evidence will yield an answer. The intelligence community has striven over the years to insure that answers follow the evidence, and that analysts recognize answers when they see them. ☹

The fundamental question is not, as you suggested, whether the Soviet or Cuban Communists had a successful covert operation with regard to American POWs. We answered that question years ago. They did not. The fundamental question is whether we should continue to base our judgments and policy on rational, logical, and objective analysis of facts, or turn to speculation based on exaggerated notions of Communist actions and capabilities, and uncorroborated second and third hand claims by sources whose access and reliability are questionable.

I remain firmly convinced we should not spend our time, energy, and resources, and taxpayers' money, trying to reinvent the wheel. We should focus our efforts on activities that can produce useful casualty resolution data.

Robert J. Destatte, Senior Analyst, Research and Analysis Directorate

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

DATE: 12 July 1996

PREPARED BY: Robert J. Destatte, Senior Analyst, Research & Analysis Directorate, DPMO

SUBJECT: Comments by Vietnamese Officers Regarding the "Cuban Program"

1. Summary:

- a. The purpose of this memorandum is threefold;

1) To record comments by two officers of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) in conversations with me in May and June 1992 concerning the so-called "Cuban Program."

2) To summarize efforts by the intelligence community and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to identify the "Cuban" interrogators.

3) To summarize the descriptions of the "Cuban Program" the victims made during their post-homecoming debriefings.

b. The "Cuban Program" is a term that returned American POWs coined to describe a program in which a team of Caucasian interrogators subjected 19 American POWs to brutal torture over a period of nearly one year, from August 1967 to July 1968, at a POW camp in Hanoi, Vietnam. Many of the returned POWs believed the Caucasian interrogators were Cuban.

2. Background.

a. The POWs nicknamed the chief "Cuban" interrogator "Fidel." They nicknamed his two colleagues "Chico" and "Pancho." "Pancho" (one or two POWs called him "Garcia") first appeared shortly before the "Cuban Program" ended, and had direct contact with only two POWs. "Fidel" brutally beat and tortured most of the 19 POWs, destroying the physical and mental health of one of them. This POW eventually died in captivity, apparently as a result of the beatings. For a brief period during the closing months of the "Cuban Program," the POWs observed a fourth man who appeared to be a Cuban working as an electrical technician in the POW camp. Also for a brief period late in the program, the POWs heard on the camp radio the voice of a woman they believed was Cuban. As of the date of this memorandum, our records indicate that the American intelligence community and federal law enforcement agencies never positively identified the "Cuban" interrogators in the "Cuban program."

b. "Fidel." In 1976 American intelligence officials tentatively identified "Fidel" as a Captain in the Cuban Ministry of Interior. This Captain had a background of interrogating foreigners and was in Hanoi during the "Cuban program." The one available photograph of this Captain was taken in 1959 when he was wearing a full beard and an Army field hat. Seven victims of the "Cuban program" viewed the photograph, but none could positively identify the man in the photo. This Captain was in the United States during 1956-1957 buying and shipping arms to Cuba. In 1987 the FBI investigated a report that a Cuban working at the United Nations might be "Fidel." The absence of any follow up note in

DPMO files suggests that this tip did not produce definitive results. I will contact the FBI agents who investigated the claim and confirm the results of their investigation.

c. "Chico." Also in 1976, American intelligence officials felt that "Chico" *might* be a Cuban employee of the Cuban Department of State Security who studied at Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, during 1958-59. Apparently, however, intelligence officers did not have a photograph of this man.

3. PAVN Officers Comment on the "Cuban Program":

a. PAVN Colonel Pham Teo. Colonel Pham Teo is an experienced member of the staff of the Ministry of Defense component of the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Persons. On 31 May 1992, Colonel Teo and I accompanied a team of American specialists that visited several sites in Hanoi, including one former POW camp. During one of our several informal discussions that day I mentioned the "Cuban Program" to Colonel Teo. I asked if he knew the names of the Cubans involved in the program. Colonel Teo stated that he was an enlisted soldier serving with an infantry unit engaged in the fighting around the US Marine combat base at Khe Sanh during late 1967 and early 1968 and, therefore, did not know the names of the Cubans or have any direct knowledge about the "Cuban Program." He said he had heard, however, that in the mid or late 1960s a team of Cubans taught English to Vietnamese turnkeys who worked in one of the POW camps. He heard that the Vietnamese officers in charge of the camp allowed the Cubans more freedom of action than they should have, and that the Cubans abused the freedom. He heard that when higher authorities learned about the abuses in the camp they terminated the program.

b. PAVN Colonel Nguyen Minh Y (aka: "The Rabbit"). Colonel Nguyen Minh Y served as an interpreter and interrogator in the POW camps for American prisoners in Hanoi from 1964 until 1973. At that time he was a PAVN Lieutenant. American POWs nicknamed him "The Rabbit." I interviewed Colonel Y in Hanoi on 3 and 10 June 1992. During the interview I asked Colonel Y to identify the Cubans who interrogated American POWs in the POW camp at the Tu So Intersection (American POWs nicknamed the camp "The Zoo") in Hanoi. Colonel Y said he did not know the names of the Cubans and was not directly involved in the program. He was, however, aware of it. He stated that the intent of the program was to help the Vietnamese improve management of the POW camps. He noted that one problem in operating the American POW camps was the fact that most of the guards and other lower ranking personnel who had frequent daily contact with the American POWs could not communicate effectively with the POWs. He explained that one of the objectives of the program was for the Cubans to teach American English to Vietnamese who worked with American POWs. Colonel Y said he understood that the Vietnamese officers in charge of the camp where the Cubans worked permitted the Cubans too much freedom of action, that the program went out of control, and ultimately resulted in unacceptable treatment of some of the American POWs by the Cubans. Colonel Y recalled that when higher authorities learned of the abuses in the camp they terminated the program.

4. Comments. The above comments were consistent with information I had seen in the reports of the post-homecoming debriefings of the American POWs who were victims of the "Cuban Program," and the comments contained no new information about the "Cubans" or the "Cuban Program." Therefore, there was no need to make a formal record

of them in 1992. Recent discussions about the "Cuban Program," however, suggest that the comments of these two PAVN officers could have some historical value. For that reason, I prepared this memorandum. I drew the following summary of the "Cuban Program" from records of the post-homecoming debriefings of the POWs who survived the program. This summary should help analysts assess the comments these two PAVN officers made about the program.

a. In their post-homecoming debriefings the returned POWs drew a portrait of the "Cuban Program" as having begun as a Cuban assistance project intended to help the Vietnamese improve POW camp management and to teach American English and probably interrogation techniques to the Vietnamese prison staff. They depicted a project that went awry because of the ineptitude of the Vietnamese officers in charge of the "The Zoo" and the mindless brutality of the senior Cuban officer on the Cuban assistance team.

b. Several returned POWs noted that "Fidel" appeared to be in charge of a number of projects apparently intended to improve the quality and quantity of food fed to the POWs. The projects included constructing a bakery to make bread for the POWs and ponds to raise fish and ducks. The bakery eventually provided increased amounts of bread; however, the ponds failed. The pond construction project, however, did allow some of the POWs to spend more time outdoors.

c. Many survivors also noted that "Fidel" taught English to the Vietnamese staff at the camp and to young Vietnamese trainees who later became turnkeys in the camp. The POWs dubbed this the "Kiddies Project" because of the youthful appearance of the trainees.

d. One of the POWs who survived the program recalled "Fidel's" description of the "Cuban Program." "Fidel" told this POW, "I don't want anything from you." "Fidel" went on to explain that there were many problems in the camp and that he suspected the problems were due to a communications problem between the Vietnamese and the POWs. His purpose was to solve those problems. Fidel also indicated that the Vietnamese lack of proficiency in the English language was the main reason for the communication problem. Fidel explained he was there to use his proficiency in English to help overcome this communication problem. Another survivor recalled that "Fidel" exhibited no interest in obtaining intelligence data. In the opinion of this survivor, "Fidel" appeared interested primarily in having access to Americans with whom the Vietnamese camp personnel and trainees could practice speaking English.

e. Judging from the post-homecoming debriefs, "Fidel" also used the POWs to demonstrate interrogation techniques to the Vietnamese trainees, and might have been teaching interrogation techniques to the trainees. Initially, "Fidel" tried to gain the cooperation of the POWs without using physical force. As the program continued, however, he became increasingly brutal. Former POWs recalled that "Fidel" had a quick and violent temper, a large and fragile ego, and possibly a drinking problem--a deadly combination that probably contributed to his increasingly violent treatment of the POWs when they did not readily submit to his will.

f. "Fidel's" violence culminated in a savage beating he gave to USAF Major Earl G. Cobeil on 21 May 1968. This beating, combined with the numerous previous beatings

Cobeil endured, turned Major Cobeil into a vegetable-like state from which he never recovered. Survivors recalled that this incident caused the Vietnamese to lose respect for the Cubans and led to the downfall of the "Cuban program." On about 12 June 1968 the other POWs persuaded the Vietnamese to bring a doctor in to examine Major Cobeil. On the doctor's orders, Vietnamese prison officials sent Major Cobeil to a hospital.

g. Sometime between 22 and 30 June 1968, the Vietnamese ended all interrogations by Cubans and appeared to have terminated the "Cuban program." As one survivor recalled, it appeared that "Fidel" lost his power in the camp as a result of the Cobeil incident. For example, this survivor noted that the POWs no longer saw "Fidel" chatting or strolling with the political commissar of the camp as he commonly did in the past. The POWs noted that "Fidel's" authority had visibly diminished. After the incident with Major Cobeil, the Vietnamese restricted "Fidel" to contact with one POW, USAF Colonel James H. Kasler; and they limited that contact. Despite the limitations, however, "Fidel" managed to administer a final savage beating to Colonel Kasler on about 10 July 1968. A short time later, one of the POWs observed the Vietnamese host a farewell party for "Fidel." This was the last time any of the "Cubans" appeared in the POW camps.

h. Major Cobeil's condition did not improve after the Cubans disappeared. During the last half of October 1968 the Vietnamese took him to a hospital several times to receive shock therapy treatments. One survivor noted that this "... started a chain of events in the camp command. Someone higher up had heard of the Cobeil thing and wanted some answers." At the end of October 1968, the Vietnamese placed Major Cobeil in a hospital for about two weeks. When he returned to the camp he was better physically, was clean, and would feed himself, but he was still in bad shape mentally. He remained that way until mid-December 1968, when his condition started to decline again.

i. Then, on the morning of 16 February 1969, the camp commander and political commissar tried to coerce two POWs into signing a statement that Major Cobeil was receiving adequate care. The two POWs refused to sign any statement unless it contained the full details of the savage beatings that destroyed Major Cobeil's health. The camp commander and political officer refused to include any details about the beatings. Events later that day suggest that the camp commander and political officer were trying to cover up their role in allowing the beatings to occur.

j. That afternoon a Vietnamese Major from a higher headquarters and the doctor who had been treating Major Cobeil visited the camp. They quizzed the two POWs the camp commander had tried to coerce and a third POW about "Fidel's" beating of Major Cobeil. They then apparently began an investigation of the incident. Initially, the camp commander and political officer interrupted the POWs several times during the interviews and tried to describe to the Major the care Major Cobeil was currently receiving. Eventually, the Major told the commander and political officer to shut up. The POWs spoke for more than four hours, telling the Major every detail of "Fidel's" abuse of Major Cobeil. Within 15 minutes after the POWs finished telling the Major about the incident an ambulance arrived to take Major Cobeil to the hospital. This time, he remained in the hospital for about three months. Unfortunately, he never recovered his health. Major Cobeil died before the Vietnamese released the POWs in 1973.

5. Conclusions: None of the POWs knew for certain why the Vietnamese allowed the "Cubans" in the camp or why the "Cubans" left the camp so suddenly. Some POWs thought "Fidel" might simply have finished a one-year tour. Other POWs thought the Vietnamese ended the program because of what "Fidel" did to Major Cobeil. Their post-homecoming debriefings, however, drew a clear portrait of a program that began as a Cuban assistance project intended to help the Vietnamese improve POW camp management and to teach American English and probably interrogation techniques to the Vietnamese prison staff. The project went awry, however, because of the ineptitude of the Vietnamese officers in charge of the camp and the mindless brutality of the senior Cuban officer on the Cuban assistance team.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: 13 August 1996

PREPARED BY: Robert J. Destatte, Senior Analyst, Research & Analysis
Directorate, DPMOSUBJECT: FBI Efforts to Identify Cuban Interrogator American POWs Nicknamed
"Fidel"Reference my 12 July 1996 memorandum, Subject: Comments by Vietnamese
Officers Regarding the "Cuban Program."1. Summary:

a. The referenced memorandum noted that in 1987 the FBI investigated a report that a man working at the United Nations might be an interrogator who savagely beat several American POWs in a POW camp in Hanoi in 1967-68. Many of the POWs believed this interrogator, who they nicknamed "Fidel," was a Cuban.

b. Prior to the date of this memorandum DPMO files contained no record of the results of the FBI efforts to confirm whether the man working at the United Nations was in fact "Fidel."

c. The purpose of this memorandum is to record for DPMO files the results of the FBI's efforts in 1987 to confirm whether the Cuban working at the United Nations was "Fidel." As of the date of this memorandum, our records indicate that the American intelligence community and federal law enforcement agencies never positively identified "Fidel" or the other "Cubans" in the "Cuban program."

2. Background:

a. Returned American POWs coined the term "Cuban Program" to describe a program in which a team of Caucasian interrogators subjected 19 American POWs to brutal torture over a period of nearly one year, from August 1967 to July 1968, at a POW camp in Hanoi, Vietnam. Many of the returned POWs believed the Caucasian interrogators were Cuban. The POWs nicknamed the chief "Cuban" interrogator "Fidel."

b. A handwritten unsigned note, dated 4 May 1987, in one of DPMO files notes that an unspecified member of the DPMO staff gave an FBI agent in the FBI's Washington, DC field office a couple of composite sketches of the "Cuban program" interrogators. The note goes on to say that a friend of the FBI agent in New York viewed the sketches and "made a make" on "Fidel" as a man working at the United Nations.

c. In early 1987 the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs sent a fact sheet about the "Cuban Program" to Congressman Dornan, at his request. DPMO records do not indicate whether Congressman Dornan's request was linked to the FBI's efforts to identify "Fidel;" however, in a speech on 2 August 1996 Congressman Dornan implied that "Fidel" is a Cuban Brigadier General named "Fernandez" who worked at the United Nations in 1977 and 1978 (sic).

3. Details:

a. On 13 August 1996 I spoke by telephone with the second of two FBI agents who handled this action in 1987. He recalled that in 1987 he showed photographs of a Cuban who was working at the United Nations to former POWs who resided in the Washington, DC area and who had been victims of "Fidel". He also showed them photographs of several other Cuban officials to see if they recognized one of them. He recalled that the former POWs confirmed that the Cuban who worked at the United Nations was not the "Cuban Program" interrogator that the POWs nicknamed "Fidel." The POWs also did not recognize any of the Cubans in the other photographs as "Fidel." The FBI agent emphasized that the FBI, in cooperation with returned POWs, made an intense effort in 1987 to determine whether any Cuban official in the United States was "Fidel." The POWs could not, however, positively identify any of those Cuban officials as "Fidel."

b. On 14 August 1996 I spoke with FBI Special Agent David A. Beisner. Agent Beisner was the first of the two FBI agents who handled this action in 1987. He confirmed that he and the other FBI agent showed photographs of a number of Cuban officials who had entered the United States after the Vietnam war to survivors of the "Cuban Program" who resided in the Washington, DC area. He recalled that the POWs could not positively identify any of the Cubans in the photographs as "Fidel." Like the other agent, he emphasized that the FBI, in cooperation with returned POWs, made a concerted effort in 1987 to determine whether any Cuban official in the United States was "Fidel." Also as stated by the first agent, the POWs could not positively identify any of the Cuban officials as "Fidel."

4. Conclusion: As of the date of this memorandum, DPMO records indicate that the American intelligence community and federal law enforcement agencies never positively identified "Fidel" or the other "Cubans" in the "Cuban program."

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340



U-0375/VO-PW

25 MAR 1987

Honorable Robert Dornan
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Dornan:

This is in response to your recent request for information pertaining to the "Cuban" program involving American prisoners from the Vietnam war.

A summary of the information known on the interrogation and torture of American PWs by "Cubans" is enclosed. However, it is important to remember that the nationality of the interrogators was never conclusively established and it was mere speculation that they were Cubans.

Since the 1973 return of the American prisoners involved in this program, hundreds of man-hours have been spent in an attempt to ascertain the identity of these interrogators. All attempts to identify any of the alleged Cubans, to include photo identification by the returnees, proved unsuccessful.

If you possess any recent information as to the identity of the foreign interrogators, request that it be provided to DIA to aid in the identification procedure.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH V. HELLER, JR.

SIGNED FOR

JAMES W. SHUFELT
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for Operations,
Plans and Training

1 Enclosure a/s

"CUBAN" PROGRAM

During the period August 1967 through July 1968 two Caucasian interrogators conducted an extensive interrogation/indoctrination program at a prisoner of war camp, located on the southwest outskirts of Hanoi. A group of 10 U.S. PWs was initially selected for the program after a screening process. The prisoners speculated that the group was a cross section of PWs at the camp with different backgrounds and personalities. Another group of nine prisoners was added to the program in January 1968.

The Caucasian interrogators were believed by the PWs to have been Cuban because of an apparent Spanish accent; however, their nationality was never definitely established by the prisoners. The interrogators were careful not to identify themselves to the PWs. The principal interrogator, nicknamed "Fidel," was usually driven into the camp in a chauffeured automobile and was saluted by the North Vietnamese. After a short period in the camp, he was given complete control of his group of PWs. "Fidel's" assistant was nicknamed "Chico." He played the "good guy" role and never administered torture to the PWs. Others possibly associated with the program included a radio technician and a woman whose voice was heard for a two-week period over the camp radio.

The "Cuban" program appears to have been a training exercise in which "Fidel" attempted to learn the most effective methods and techniques for gaining information from the PWs, to test their reactions to his program, and to gain complete submission of the group to his will. All types of interrogation/indoctrination methods were tested. The soft sell approach was initially used by "Fidel" in an attempt to extract propaganda from the PWs. The group was given extra cigarettes and better food, and received more letters than the others in the camp. Outdoor projects, such as building duck ponds and gardens, were initiated by "Fidel," thus allowing these PWs more time out of their cells. When the soft sell was found to be ineffective, brutal measures were applied. Extreme physical torture was used in an attempt to gain total submission to "Fidel's" will.

Besides physical punishment, the PWs were under constant mental strain and duress. "Fidel" was always nearby, looking in the cells or asking questions, and the PWs were aware that they could be tortured or quizzed at any time. "Fidel" had complete domination over the PWs involved, and he succeeded in forcing everyone to "surrender" with the exception of one USAF officer.

It was the considered opinion of the prisoners that this Air Force officer was beaten to a point that he was insensitive to pain and became completely withdrawn and unresponsive. He deteriorated both physically and mentally during the "Cuban" program and was believed to have died as a result of his beatings.

In July 1968 a new "Cuban" arrived, possibly as a replacement for "Fidel," but the program ended abruptly before this new "Cuban" became involved with the PWs. The prisoners speculated that the program was terminated due to the disenchantment of the North Vietnamese with "Fidel's" methods and the extremely deteriorated mental and physical condition of the Air Force officer. The program ended in late July 1968 when the "Cubans" left the camp.

UNCLASSIFIED

Statement Following House Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Testimony on 1 OCT 1996

by
Commander William (Chip) Beck, USNR
Outgoing Special Assistant to Director, JCSD
Defense POW/MIA Office

WASHINGTON, D.C. (1 OCT 1996)

When I accepted a recall to active military duty with the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) on 31 May 1995, I did not do so for purposes of a career, financial security, or promotions. I volunteered out of a sense of duty and honor, for one of America's most compelling missions: The search for U.S. persons Missing in Action and unaccounted for Prisoners of War.

Early in my tour of duty, it became apparent that one category of POWs has been consistently denied and abandoned for over 50 years. These are American POWs who survived the wars in which they fought, but who were never repatriated. They existed in World War II, the Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam.

In early March of 1996, DPMO Director James Wold approved a proposal created by Joint Commission Support Directorate Norm Kass and myself to take a fresh, creative approach toward finding information on the unrepatriated POWs.

From the time DPMO Director James Wold approved a limited our initiative, it was targeted for destruction by several DPMO managers who have long opposed any serious initiatives on behalf of unrepatriated POWs. They were assisted in this obstruction by elements outside DPMO, whose roles need to be better determined for substance and motive.¹

As stated in my 17 October 1996 open testimony, the Soviets have long had a clandestine program to exploit foreign prisoners of war, including Americans. The Russians and their former allies are still concealing the existence of these covert operations.

Regimes who killed, captured, and tortured American POWs have historically been protected, and still are, by a select cadre of American bureaucrats and policy makers. On the other hand, dedicated investigators, families, journalists, and even Congressmen, are treated as the enemy for trying to reveal what happened to the unrepatriated POWs.

It is time for these roles to be reversed.

¹ Following testimony provided in the 1 OCT 96 closed session chaired by Congressman Robert Dornan (R-Cal), this obstruction is being examined.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEGISLATIVE STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

Requested by Congressmen Pickett and Dornan, 17 September 1996

Testimony by: Commander William (Chip) Beck, USNR¹
 Special Research and Investigations Assistant to
 Director, Joint Commission Support Directorate,
 Defense POW/MIA Office

COVERT OPERATIONS AGAINST AMERICAN POWs
in WWII, the COLD WAR, KOREA, and VIETNAM

The testimony of LTC Philip Corso, Czech General Jan Sejna, and strategic intelligence expert, Mr. Joe Douglass on 17 September was compelling, and long overdue in a public forum. If it results in a sea change in the way the POW/MIA issues are viewed, and addressed, it will constitute a valuable service. In support of their long struggle over the years, and their courageous testimony today, I wish to add the following.

Although I am an official of the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO),² I offer this statement as my own analysis and viewpoint.

As a retired member of the Clandestine Service, and a Special Operations officer with more than 33 years experience, I have participated in many of the Cold War's "shadow conflict" around the world, in Indochina, Asia, Africa, Central and South America, the Middle East, and on the frontiers of the old Soviet Union. I have witnessed many things that supposedly "never happened."

My experience and training in covert operations, over a lifetime, provided skills and insights upon which to investigate the POW/MIA issues. Upon that experience and available information, I base the following conclusions.

For half a century, the Soviet Union masterminded an elaborate exploitation of foreign prisoners of war. Into the Gulag Archipelago that contained 30 million Soviet nationals, were sent hundreds of thousands of non-Soviets, including nearly a half million Germans, Austrians, Italians, Eastern Europeans, and Japanese.

The pool of foreign prisoners of war included hundreds, if not thousands, of Americans over these 50 years. What happened to these American GIs is a chapter in our nation's history that has, for too long, gone unwritten.

¹CDR Beck has an MA in political science from George Washington University. He speaks three foreign languages and began his active Navy career in 1968 as a frogman, and served as a Forward Observer with 3rd MARDIV units in Vietnam in 1969. He later switched to Naval Intelligence, and is a credentialed NCIS Reserve Agent. He was recalled to active duty in Desert Storm as the Navy's Combat Artist. From 1970-1993, he served in the clandestine service of the CIA, as a special operations expert, retiring in an overt status in 1993. He was again recalled to active duty for most of the 1993-1996 period, serving with DPMO since May 1995. He is a combat veteran who has served in military, intelligence, and diplomatic assignments in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Western Sahara, Sudan, El Salvador, Panama (Just Cause), Honduras, Beirut, Colombia, and the Gulf War.

²From May 31, 1995 to 30 September 1996

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The transfer of Americans into the Gulag was intentional. If it were a "mistake," the Soviets would have corrected it through diplomatic channels decades ago. The very nature of clandestine operations means they are not accidents. Nor are they acknowledged or willingly revealed. The greater the magnitude of the covert operation, the greater is the secrecy that surrounds it. The transfer of American POWs to the USSR is one big secret.

What the Soviet Union started in 1945, Russia, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, China, the Khmer Rouge, and even Cuban and certain Eastern European countries, still guard today. Secrecy is still vital to these governments, regardless of shifts in world politics since 1990.

Why? First, the sensitivity of the Soviet-orchestrated operations to exploit foreign POWs ranks as high as its nuclear secrets, perhaps higher.

Second, communism is not "dead." As its doctrine decrees, it is only underground. Of vital importance to the POW/MIA questions, there were no purges in the communist intelligence services in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Documents and records, as General Sejna points out, were transferred from Eastern Europe to Moscow. Those who ran the KGB, still run the SVR, and a dozen other services in Russia and the FSU.

Third, it is difficult, but not impossible, for communist veterans who participated in these covert programs, and who may know the fate of our POWs, to come forward. Their lives, families, and well-being, are still at risk. As one former KGB officer told me, "journalists and businessmen are being killed in Moscow and St. Petersburg for trying to break secrets far less sensitive than the POWs. [sic]"

DPMO, and America, needs to take a new approach toward solving the key POW mystery. Traditionally, we have concentrated efforts on "individual loss cases," essentially neglecting the "strategic" aspects of the communist operations and policies toward foreign POWs as assets. Such an understanding is fundamental to finding out what happened to unrepatriated POWs who were transferred to the USSR.

If we continue the habit of acting as "bone-hunters and archeologists," it makes it far easier for the Vietnamese and Lao communists, Khmer Rouge, North Koreans, Chinese and "Soviets" to hide the existence of the broad-based and long-term clandestine programs they coordinated and executed against the POWs.

Since Vietnam, U.S. POW investigators have focused sizable efforts on investigating crash sites, perhaps to the detriment of larger, more difficult issues. The balance of investigative resources needs to be adjusted, not for show, but for effect. I wish to go on record as saying the U.S. has a chance of solving this issue, but only if it employs, and applies, the proper resources and most dedicated people it can muster.

Investigators must understand that, in terms of the POWs, World War II, Korea, the Cold War, and Vietnam, were linked. Soviet policy perspectives, intelligence requirements, and covert operational needs were coordinated with their allies. Just as Soviet political doctrine was taught to emerging communist states, so were more practical issues, which included the handling and exploitation of foreign POWs. Americans must understand the connection between those conflicts before it can solve the mystery of unrepatriated prisoners.

Likewise, the methods and goals of Soviet/bloc operations were not random, unplanned, or untested actions that occurred spontaneously in those conflicts. They were

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carefully and methodically connected. To expose the consequences of those operations, we need to probe the strategic importance that the Soviets placed on U.S. and other foreign POWs.

To accomplish this, we need fewer, or at least no more, "traditional analysts." What is required are more "investigators," men and women who can exhaust promising new leads that are available, and solve mysteries. In this vein, we need to shift the fields of inquires from the old battlefields of Asia, and seek the answers in the more important capitals of Europe, from where the operations were directed. The answers are out there, and can be obtained, if we send our best people. It is the effort, the commitment, and the way we apply resources that will count.

What is needed is a renewed commitment, more creative efforts, and fresh people, to aggressively pursue the twin issues of unrepatriated POWs (since WWII), and the transfer of American POWs to the USSR. The recovery of remains, alone, is only part of the mission, and could truthfully be accomplished with fewer, or smaller, bureaucratic institutions, if that is all we intend to really accomplish. The heart of the mission should be to find out what happened to those who were purposely hidden from us.

Even if every one of the POWs and MIAs who were left behind, are now deceased, American still owes them a debt of honor, (which we also owe to LTC Corso, and General Sejna.) The full measure of their sacrifices can only be known by exposing what really happened to these exploited and abandoned POWs. The facts may turn out to be ugly, but they must be revealed.

What to do with the facts when they become known is also a major consideration. Mr. Douglass brought up the specter of war crimes. Since American's record on prosecuting war crimes, after Nuremberg, is virtually zero, the question of amnesty may have to be considered as an option for the truth to be revealed. Resettlement for those who come forth with the facts may also be in order. I know from my own investigations that other western nations, who had POWs transferred to the USSR in WWII and Korea, faced these same issues, and enacted their own solutions. The British response in Korea was mentioned by LTC Corso in his testimony. What was missed in the hustle of the hearings was that the British got their POWs back from the Soviets, not the Koreans.

Why was it in the national interest of the Soviet Union to acquire, transfer, and exploit Americans, and other foreign POWs? Some of my colleagues and I in the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD), under Mr. Norm Kass, have identified many reasons that motivated the Soviets. Without listing all of them, the following are offered as partial examples:

In WWII, perhaps 6000-7000 American POWs, "liberated" from Nazi POW camps, went to the Gulag. This was partially because the Western Allies would not forcibly return Russian POWs who had fought for Germany against Stalin. Stalin could not exact vengeance on those he considered traitors, so he took a measure of revenge against the soldiers of countries (U.S., Britain, Canada, etc.) who denied him his will. American POWs of the Nazis, became "hostages" of the Communists.

In Korea, American POWs were sent to Siberia, as LTC Corse points out so emphatically, while others were sent to Moscow for atomic radiation experiments, drug experiments, and medical testing. General Sejna, who saw the men firsthand, and read the subsequent laboratory reports, called them "guinea pigs." Additionally, they were

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exploited for intelligence, the use of their identities, espionage support, technical information, avionics, skilled labor, propaganda insights, and forced labor.

In the Cold War, the U.S. did not admit to violations of Soviet air space, so the Soviets conveniently did not have to acknowledge the presence of live airmen it may have captured in this clandestine war.

The Vietnam War was not isolated from the rest of the communist world, or its collective experiences and support. Too many credible people have stepped forward, in private situations, to say otherwise. General Sejna's testimony that transfers took place, not only in Korea, but Vietnam, has been supported in conversations I have had with other reliable defectors.

Having served nearly five years on the ground in Vietnam, I know that we lost the war, in large part, because of our national arrogance as to the capacities of the Vietnamese to deceive and defeat us. We cannot afford to continue to be arrogant, as frankly some still are, and think we have answered all the questions concerning the POWs, in Indochina or elsewhere.

Let's be realistic. The communist strategists who brought the West such surprises as Dien Bien Phu, Khe Sanh, Tet, Hue, the Ho Chi Minh trail, vast tunnel systems, and who infiltrated nearly every U.S. and South Vietnamese military, intelligence, and political network, are very capable of planning, executing, and covering up an elaborate, secret, second-tier, POW system.

These programs were guided and supported by the Soviets, who are masters of "*maskirovka*," or deception. They've been experts at it for a thousand years. The Soviets never expected to lose the Cold War, or to answer for human rights abuses of its own people, or foreigners. So they acted with impunity. They still are.

I agree with Congressman Dornan's concluding statement. If DPMO believes, institutionally, that all the major questions have been answered, then we need only to assign some caretakers to the files, and let CILHI and JTF-FA hunt for remains in the field.

If we determine, as some of us in JCSD have, that the really hard questions have not been effectively addressed, much less answered, then new methods, new approaches, and fresh minds, need to be applied toward the lingering POW/MIA mystery.

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